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Abstract 
This dissertation develops a socialist feminist aesthetic theory that brings an 
intersectional and anti-capitalist analysis of aesthetics to art criticism, museum studies 
and cultural policy. It begins by positing the social value of the arts in terms of their 
relationship to social change, which is catalyzed by cultural memory. This argument 
proceeds by developing the concept of cultural memory through keystone texts in 
aesthetic theory, which it redeploys to explain how cultural memory operates through 
the arts. The dissertation then outlines a socialist feminist politics that distinguishes 
cultural memory from discourse and explains the mutual impact of discursive and 
material conditions through the mechanism of cultural memory. 
This theoretical construct is applied to a case study of Charlotte Salomon's 
massive and multidisciplinary Life? or Theatre?. The case study attends to the socialist 
feminist dimension of the work, which has otherwise been underrepresented. The 
dissertation further applies a socialist feminist theory of art as cultural memory to its 
analysis of problems in the work's exhibition at the Art Galley of Toronto in 2000. 
This analysis reveals the ways in which the work's political content was circumscribed 
by the exhibition. It also explores the political and economic climate of patriarchal 
capitalism impinging on the gallery to describe how this circumscription was 
preconditioned. By developing the concept of cultural memory in this way, the 
dissertation makes a contribution to the study of Salomon's work, as well as debates on 
art's social value and political effects, feminist art history, and the sociology of art. 
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Introduction 
This dissertation challenges the premise that art exists for the purpose of 
decoration, distraction, and distinction, to nurture a mood within a particular place or 
person, or to gratify an urge toward self-expression by individuals .of a peculiar 
disposition. Prime Minister Stephen Harper expressed these ideas when he made the 
following remarks after cutting $45 million from arts and culture funding: "I think 
when ordinary working people come home, turn on the TV and see a gala of a bunch of 
people at, you know, a rich gala all subsidized by taxpayers claiming their subsidies 
aren't high enough, when they know those subsidies have actually gone up - I'm not 
sure that's something that resonates with ordinary people" (Toronto Star). The 
country's foremost representative was articulating a popular perspective among 
Canadians-one that views the arts as a realm of privilege and little collective 
relevance. Indeed, the Harper campaign saw its highest polling numbers the day after 
he made what has been dubbed his "Ordinary People Don't Care About the Arts 
statement" (Wheeler), suggesting that many Canadians regard artistic practice as 
frivolous and private, rendering marginal value to society at-large except when, as a 
commodity of decoration, distraction, and distinction, it can produce consumer value. 
It does so either by generating cultural capital through the sheer aura of originality or by 
connecting consumers to capital generating corporations, thereby fueling a local, 
regional, national or global economic system. This is why lucrative cultural industries 
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exist within Canada, as does an affluent but extremely narrow art market. Even so the 
average artist lives below the poverty line. There remains within :the population of 
Canada at least a residual understanding that some human activity is not market durable 
yet might merit communal support for the sake of enrichment and innovation, otherwise 
known broadly speaking as the public good. For this reason, the arts have long been 
supported by private and public donors in this country, despite a pervasive attitude of 
indifference and occasionally disdain. 
This is the popular profile of the arts in Canada at the time of writing. This is 
the profile by which artists and artworks of every ilk and character are to be recognized 
in every branch of mass media, as well as perhaps in most classrooms and living rooms. 
It is a profile reflected in the ghettoization of arts education into underfunded, academic 
sub-disciplines. It is evident in the well-publicized need of cultural institutions to 
continuously pursue another blockbuster event or architectural makeover. The names 
and faces of our artists never appear on our currency or on our public infrastructure, as 
they do in other countries (Leger). Rather, the arts are the first budget line to be cut at 
every level of government-despite being one of Canada's largest employers and most 
efficient investments, suggesting that even a market-based justification for arts funding 
often goes unrecognized. While the cultural sector receives 1 % of total government 
funding, it employs 600,000 nationwide and contributes $45 billion to our GDP 
(Statistics Canada), yet the topic of cultural policy remains virtually unmentionable 
throughout elections. 
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A widespread failure to comprehend the multivalent capacity of art, beyond 
hobby or commodity, is evident across cultural sectors, and is core to the manifold 
problems surrounding artistic production, presentation and reception. It is well 
understood that the making, study, valuation, display, and interpretation of art are 
utterly and indelibly flawed undertakings, alternately wrestled and discarded within the 
realm of public policy as humanist interest expands and contracts around an extra-
market phenomenon that can not be reduced to means ends rationality; policy wrestles 
with attempts to quantify the unquantifiable. Hence, the assumption of a starving artist, 
despite its implicit violence, has long been as acceptable and iconic as that of the more 
novel media mogul. Surely, there is the belief underlying this condition that artists are 
inherently flawed, misguided and possibly degenerate enigmas, at best passively 
inspiring risk-takers, and therefore reside rather fairly at the mercy of life's vagaries 1• 
Yet we know that none of this is true. We know, through the simple practice of reason 
and observation, that no fewer degenerates or geniuses dominate other professional 
domains, yet this special "artistic" nature stands to explain (or denigrate) the status of 
the artist. The nature of the artist as resented enigma, is a reflection of the role that 
artists play both inside and outside of the capitalist market system, and is a problem in 
social relations that informs this dissertation. 
1 Richard Florida's work on the creative class does not help to improve this perception of 
the artist since, in his terms, the "creative class" represents competitive, information 
technology elites, and "creativity" refers to any source of symbolic capital that this class 
can consume. 
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Despite these problems in the social status of art, human beings are consistently 
drawn to the sensorial endeavors that make themselves at home ip the world of the 
"artistic". We know ourselves to be moved by a novel, or an album; we know our 
comrades and our countries to be galvanized by the language of artists; time and again 
we associate the dawning of a new age with the developments, whether prefiguring or 
articulating, of artistic movements; we define our historical epochs by these very phases 
of the moon. In the contemporary era, whenever we seek to change or affix hearts and 
minds we still rely essentially on the artists' tools of rhetoric, symbol, sound, 
movement, and imagery. We know there is something at play, but we act as though it 
were not so. Or perhaps we have trouble remembering. Many of us seek out the arts as 
a means of healing social rifts-from memorial marches to monuments, from 
documentaries to documenta, from murals to musical anthems. Art therapy writ-large 
persists as a potential tool of subversion, an alternative to what is, while little is 
articulated or understood about its efficacy as such. Even as the politicization of art 
waxes and wanes, there remain few attempts to conceive of the juncture between art 
and politics. 
My research into the social value of art stems from these contradictory 
conditions. I propose that a more workable understanding of art's value must be 
recollected from the philosophy and sociology of art, consolidated and developed, to 
guide our evolving cultural consciousness, our personal receptivity to the arts, and our 
structural deployment of them. I assert that our capacity for critical engagement and 
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constructive public policy depends on an evolution in the way we think, practice, and 
communicate about the arts, and the politics we bring to them. For this reason, I intend 
to establish here a socialist feminist theory of art as cultural memory, to shift our 
understanding of artistic activity and the cultural sector. 
Defining "Art" 
To what do I refer when I use the word "art"? I am thinking about the fine and 
performing arts across disciplines, but art itself is a contested term. The aesthetic 
dimension is key to any definition of art, in so far as the arts tend to engage or access 
sensory modes of perception to convey meaning. However, that can equally be said of 
many things-from affection to abuse-rendering it a necessary but insufficient 
component of any definition. Art remains essentially a social category, the contents of 
which shift and evolve according to specific historical circumstances. 
Historian Larry Shiner makes the case that the Eurocentric delineation between 
the fine and popular arts solidified during the 18th century in relation to an emerging 
market economy and middle class art public (Shiner 7). Within the past 60 years, the 
institutional assimilation of genres, media and materials previously belonging to other 
social categories-such as popular culture, craft, and technology-has broadened the 
category of art, demonstrating the permeability of its borders and the power of 
institutional gate keepers, without actually overcoming the established divide: the 
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setting off of art as a luxury commodity segregated from the rest of society (Shiner 
269). Nonetheless, this urge toward the unification of art and life has rendered it 
commonplace for people to declare that anything can be art. Note for instance this 
October 2001 headline from the UK's Telegraph newspaper: "Anyone's an Artist, 
Anything Can be Art"2, which explores the legacy of Dadaism's efforts to democratize 
the arts. Similarly, Arthur Danto' s book After the End of Art reflects on how 
contemporary art has escaped definitional grand narratives. Shiner establishes that this 
not just a contemporary phenomenon since for two thousand years preceding the 18th 
century the term "art" applied to "any human activity performed with skill and grace" 
(Shiner 5). But he also points to a persistent polarity underlying our current art system3, 
a duality of genius versus skill, mind versus body, which distinguishes contemporary 
attitudes about art from those of the previous era. He is referring to the separation of 
fine art from craft and the popular arts, a separation between refined (aesthetic) and 
ordinary (functional) pleasure (Shiner 6) that resulted from "the replacement of 
patronage by an art market and a middle-class art public" (Shiner 7). Shiner explains 
that "frustration" with these economic conditions led eighteenth-century German 
writers to create the elevated category of the "aesthetic" (Shiner 7) to sustain market 
2 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/4 726169/Everyones-an-artist-anything-can-be-
art.html Accessed February 20, 2012. 
3 Shiner uses the term "art system" to reference "various art worlds and subworlds of 
literature, music, dance, theatre, film and visual arts. Art worlds are networks of artists, 
critics, audiences, and others who share a common field of interest along with a 
commitment to certain values, practices, and institutions. An art system embraces the 
underlying concepts and ideals shared by various art worlds and by the culture at large, 
including those who only participate marginally in one of the art worlds." (Shiner 11) 
() 
autonomy. This elevation produced a hierarchy between artists and 
labourers/craftsmen. Furthermore, those genres chosen for elevation reflected existing 
social hierarchies, reinforcing dualisms of gender, race and class (Shiner 7). The 
maintenance of this hierarchy, even as the commodification of art has extended its 
reach into "high" art, has further served to alienate people from the arts. 
I concur with Shiner that a new art system must emerge to straddle such 
polarities. This is why I aim to develop here an understanding of the arts as the terrain 
of cultural memory through which such polarities might be overcome. Cultural 
memory is a quality of art that renders it valuable in processes of social change. It 
moves our valuation of art away from the dichotomy of aesthetic and functional 
pleasure, away from commodity and class value. A cultural memory approach to art, 
which I explore below, grounds the very broad category of art in the social world 
without compromising art's autonomy by dictating the definitional parameters of art. 
Likewise, debates concerning the definition of art ultimately do not affect the content or 
usefulness of the concept of cultural memory. The concept of cultU!ral memory can help 
us understand whatever we define as art, and perhaps can be the conceptual bridge on 
which a new art system depends. 
Defining "Cultural Memory" 
One might ask why I am using the term "cultural memory" instead of "culture" 
to identify the social value of art. Cultural memory reflects the dependence of culture 
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on memory processes. Culture is not something that just is; it is created through 
processes extended in time and space because it is based on experience, which is both 
historical and experiential; in other words, it is based on a synergy of accumulated 
knowledge and embodied or lived exposure to the sensuous world. Culture is passed on 
or inherited through memory and it is filtered through amnesiac processes, which shape 
and focus it. So in a sense, culture (i.e. pervasive values and practices) is really a 
reflection or instantiation of cultural memory. However, in this project I am interested 
specifically in the arts as cultural media and I am asking us to look at them as memory 
making mechanisms. So when I discuss the arts as cultural memory I am using the 
word "culture" in reference to artifacts or symbolic resources (i.e. the arts), that are 
media of collective memory with cultural (in the original sense) significance. 4 
The concept of cultural memory is a useful means of perceiving the social and 
political dimension of art primarily because it reveals art's dialectical nature. If cultural 
memory is the propagation of collective memory through cultural signs, it is dialectical 
because collective memory and cultural signs are never static, espec.ially as the subject 
of political activity; rather, they are the terrain over which ideologies battle to establish 
their legitimacy and history within the memory of a community. 
4 I am essentially adopting Raymond Williams' popular and dialectical definition of 
culture, which points to its manifestation in concrete artefacts and abstract processes. 
Williams provided three, closely related definitions: "(i) ... a general process of 
intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development.. .. (ii) ... a particular way of life, whether 
of a people, a period, a group, or humanity in general .... (iii) ... the works and practices of 
intellectual and especially artistic activity." I am employing sense (ii) and (iii} here to 
explain how culture as described in sense (i) is dialectically achieved and to introduce the 
role of memory in this process. 
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While it is important to recognize that the cultural signification underlying 
cultural memory extends beyond the fine and performing arts (for instance, political and 
familial discourses are not self-consciously artistic but are agents of cultural memory), 
such an ideological struggle is explicitly engaged by artistic practices, which may in 
turn be determinant of other cultural memory sites (Edelman). In so far as cultural 
memory is also a value in other things or categories, such as food and education, it 
serves to enlighten us on the function and value of those, rather than to lessen the 
usefulness of the concept as a means of valuing art. So while cultural memory is not 
exclusive to the arts, the concept is no less a revealing means of understanding them. In 
chapter 2, I will examine the ways in which others have defined "cultural memory" and 
I will develop its definition through a reading of aesthetic theory, which suggests both 
what cultural memory is and how it relates to the potential for art to catalyze social 
change. 
Theoretical Stance 
This dissertation takes a self-consciously socialist feminist standpoint to 
elucidate cultural memory's application to the field of art as a specific site of 
ideological struggle. The political dimension of cultural memory is manufactured, 
framed, and perpetuated by ideological actors. As an ideological actor, I wish to make 
the case that a socialist feminist purview should be brought to bear on the production 
and evaluation of cultural memory. A socialist feminist aesthetic theory analyzes 
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artistic production as a product and producer of cultural memory, in relation to its 
political and economic context. It brings an anti-oppression analysis and critique of 
capitalism to the interpretation of a work and its reception. It questions the ideological 
content of the cultural memory process under examination, given .the power dynamics 
surrounding and constructing the arts as a social activity, as labour, experience and 
discourse. 
This theoretical approach is oriented toward social change in favour of anti-
capitalist, intersectional, feminist values. Ultimately the change I seek through this 
theoretical lens is ideological and material, (depending on social movements as much as 
philosophy) within the base and superstructure of Canadian society, and must be 
achieved dialectically through the methodology of praxis. 
Praxis has long been associated with the unique behavior of humanity, which 
Kant conveyed as the union of pure and practical reason. Successive philosophers (e.g. 
Marx, the Frankfurt School, feminism) added a uniquely ethical dimension to praxis, 
seeking it out as the source of truth (in Hegel's terms, "absolute spirit"), the remedy for 
false consciousness, and the source of emancipation. 
The question of praxis from a Marxist perspective has historically focused on 
the nature of social consciousness and its relation to social action (especially labour), 
realized with the aid of theory, and manifest in political organization. The failure of 
political organization, and the limited success of social change in general, led Lukacs, 
Gramsci, and later the Frankfurt School to highlight the force of ideological structures 
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and the potential of anti-hegemonic forces. Further, the Frankfurt School examined the 
structures of communication (e.g. the culture industry) as sites for praxis, and feminists 
extended praxis to language itself as an ideological actor (e.g. patriarchal speech). 
Thus, socialist feminism as a theoretical perspective embracing praxis, has come to 
view all cultural artefacts as political, and cultural production as the (re )creation of 
social life, born from a convergence of the theoretical and the practical. 
To explain the historical trajectory of socialist feminism would require a 
dissertation in itself. Of fundamental importance to this tradition is a combined critique 
of capitalism and an intersectional analysis of power and oppression, which I outline in 
chapter 3. In that chapter I will also develop the tenets of socialist feminist aesthetic 
theory by bringing together Marxist and feminist analyses of aesthetics. 
My project builds on this dialectical tradition; it would ideally manifest in the 
forefronting of a socialist feminist framework within curatorial practice and cultural 
policy, to encourage counter-hegemonic memory making. 
Method 
To triangulate the too often segregated studies of cultural memory, art, and 
politics, I will engage in two methodological movements: first, I will attempt a detailed 
and dialectical literature review concerning art's social value, cultural memory, and 
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socialist feminist theory. 5 Out of this dialectical exchange between and across 
literatures I will articulate a politically engaged and developed understanding of cultural 
memory as a means of understanding art's social value, thus generating a socialist 
feminist aesthetic theory otherwise unavailable. 
When we talk about the political and art, we tend to think about political art, 
rather than the political in art. I am not explicitly or exclusively addressing avant-garde 
art, or art in the service of social movements. I intend to apply very broadly the 
arguments I am making about the cultural memory capacity of art and the relationship 
of art to social change, because I cannot conceive of a work of art that does not carry an 
ideological, and therefore political, dimension, be it progressive, conservative, 
complacent, or regressive. Consequently, I am interested in analyzing the arts, as well 
as the conditions of their production and reception, from a specifically ideological 
standpoint-socialist feminism-as chapter 3 will explain in great detail. 
My second methodological movement will engage in a detaiiled case study, 
using the theoretical construct described above to analyze Charlotte Salomon's multi-
disciplinary work Life? or Theatre? By examining its form, content, curation, critical 
reception, and theoretical implications, I will elucidate the counter cultural capacity of 
5 I rely on western theoretical traditions because of what is available in English 
translation, and because it forms the basis of Canadian curriculum and public discourse. 
This does not preclude understanding aesthetics as cultural memory frbm another 
vantage point, and comparison would be revealing. My interest in anti-oppression 
politics specifically is drawn primarily from Marxist and feminist theory rather than other 
forms of anti-oppression literature because these easily facilitate commentary on 
intersectional frameworks of oppression and aesthetics. · 
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the work, (which I will frame as a memory-based project) and the extent to which its 
feminist content is under-realized by the touring edition. 
Building on this case study as a heuristic tool, I will also consult museum and 
cultural policy studies to demonstrate how the structural conditions of cultural 
production can render such work ideologically hegemonic or transformative. 
The breakdown of chapters follows this methodological outline quite closely. 
Chapter 1 reviews aesthetic and social theory to consolidate our current understanding 
of art's social value, especially its role in social change. This consolidation also lays 
the groundwork for the construction of a socialist feminist aesthetic theory. The 
chapter begins by reviewing existing arguments on behalf of art's ideological and 
political influence. It mobilizes these arguments to conclude that the social value of the 
arts can be found in their capacity to influence social change. The chapter then 
explores the role of subjectivity in social change and how aesthetics engage 
subjectivity. This leads to me toward the concept of cultural memory, a mode of 
engagement between the arts and the subject that facilitates the subject's action. 
Chapter 2 surveys the use and meaning of the term "cultural iv.emory". This 
allows me to establish that memory is a reoccurring if understudied theme in social and 
aesthetic theory, which suggests that it resonates with many theorists as an important 
means of understanding social and cultural life. I then examine central arguments from 
aesthetic theory concerning art's value and I reconceptualize these arguments as 
explanations of art's mnemonic dimension. I am therefore able to develop a 
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multifaceted definition of cultural memory that explains how it is present in the arts. 
The arguments from aesthetic theory also enable us to understand the dialectics of art. 
Consequently, I argue that all dialectical struggles within art are essentially the struggle 
of cultural memory, which clarifies the role of art in dialectical social development. 
In chapter 3 I argue that a socialist feminist politics is a necessary framework for 
our analysis of cultural memory. It offers direction to social development. I begin by 
defining socialist feminism and explaining its political content. I then describe the 
relationship between cultural memory and the project of socialist-feminism, which 
makes them relevant to one another. This association leads me to argue that cultural 
memory should be conceived of as distinct from discourse, if culturfll memory is 
perceived through a socialist-feminist lens. In fact, cultural memory creates a 
connection between discourse and material reality. This explains how the arts intervene 
in the world. 
Chapter 4 demonstrates the impact of a socialist-feminist aesthetic theory of art as 
cultural memory on a reading of Salomon's unique, multidisciplinary and extensive 
body of art. It does so by identifying the intersectional politics evident in the form and 
content of Life? or Theatre?. It then proceeds to consider how its politics were 
compromised in a particular exhibition, and the kind of cultural memory that was 
thereby encouraged from and through the work. This analysis aims to highlight an 
under-valued dimension of Life? or Theatre? While the intersectional critique I 
mobilize here is not unique, its application to this exhibition is so. Critics to date have 
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focused on Life? or Theatre? as life-writing, and have noted some of its feminist 
content, but none have observed the ways in which that content is managed by the 
exhibition and the political consequences. 
Finally, chapter 5 demonstrates the impact of a socialist feminist aesthetic theory 
on the analysis of Salomon's exhibition context, suggesting how this theoretical model 
might critique and inform cultural economics. Here I argue that the conditions of 
production impinging on arts institutions affect the cultural memory impact of the arts. 
At this level, I am calling for a more ethical approach to curatorial practice and cultural 
policy, which is informed by my case study and by a politically engaged concept of art 
as cultural memory in the service of social change. 
This project aims to alter our perspective on the arts so that we might better 
access its potential to aid us in establishing a more just and sustainable society. It 
seeks to remember that neglected aesthetic value, so material to our collective resources 
as agents of memory and social action. It proceeds now, with an attempt to describe 
that very resource, in all its manifestations. 
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Chapter 1: Art's Social Value 
Together, art, the mind, and the situations in which they are applied 
construct and transform beliefs about the social world, defining problems 
and solutions, hopes and fears, the past, the present, and the future. 
(Edelman 5) 
This dissertation sets out to renegotiate our relationship with the arts, to forge the 
basis of new social contract, which is time and again called for by artists, 
administrators, patrons, politicians and academics. It aims to inform a general public 
that is never sure how to take a position in relation to the arts without dismissing them. 
I take for granted that the assumption of an abstract social good associated with art will 
not suffice. There is a dirth of clarity and discussion on this matter, which undermines 
arts advocacy. While the seeker can find much material in aesthetic theory regarding 
the relevance of art to social development, such ideas have rarely taken center stage in 
any depth or detail within the public sphere, and few texts address the subject with 
explicit, explanatory intention. This chapter will attempt to compensate for that 
absence by refocusing attention on an under-utilized language, literature, and quality of 
thought concerning art's social value, to demonstrate and detail its political potential. 
My argument will proceed by positioning the arts as ideologically viral. They offer 
models for political organization and upheaval, and thereby reveal the malleability of 
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political conditions. I will then argue that the manipulation of politics, and of artistic 
materials, is necessary to the cultivation of humanity, which is necessary to its survival. 
I will offer evidence of art's role in galvanizing social activism to further this claim. 
Then I will look at the subject of social change, to explore how consciousness relates to 
action and how art relates to consciousness, to substantiate my argument that the arts 
can catalyze social action. Finally, I will begin to indicate how feminist art and cultural 
memory relate to one another, and how cultural memory relates to consciousness, in 
preparation for the following chapters where I develop a socialist feminist aesthetic 
theory of art as cultural memory that capitalizes on art's social value. My overview of 
this research leads me to argue here that the social value of the arts is primarily 
grounded in its capacity to generate social change. 
We begin to see this interpretation of art in recent sociological discourse. In his 
introduction to a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Communication, Dick Stanley 
summarizes the social effects of the arts documented therein by using the term "cultural 
citizenship".6 It is his finding7 that the arts facilitate "appropriation of cultural content 
into the public life" of individuals, thereby improving their capacity to participate in 
civic society (Stanley 8). The arts can do this by legitimizing our values and social 
networks (whatever they are), infusing us with the confidence to act on them; they can 
also question and disrupt our beliefs and identities by habitually exposing us to new 
ideas while connecting us with others who are "similarly exposed" and thus able to 
6 Stanley p. 8, borrowing the term from Andrew & Gattinger 
7 Stanley is relating the results of a collaborative research program, the Initiative to Study 
the Social Effects of Culture. 
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collaboratively analyse and synthesize ideas with us (Stanley 10). Essentially, Stanley's 
analysis renders the social value of art synonymous with its capacity to facilitate 
cognitive development and cooperation among citizens-basic skills that enable social 
action. 
Similarly, Murray Edelman's From Art to Politics explicitly addresses art's 
social value in terms of its transformative ideological force. He illuminates art's 
political capacity by arguing that it substantiates and disseminates ideas, which spread 
virally, gaining momentum "through discourse, paraphrases, imitations, and emulation, 
and through attacks on them as well. Their key political consequence is to focus 
attention, fundamental assumptions, and ideology" (Edelman 11). This viral theory of 
art is consistent with critical discourse analysis and meme theory, as well as more 
traditional understandings of the arts as found in aesthetic philosophy. All of these 
theoretical approaches have long provided comparable means of unµerstanding the 
power of art to influence minds. 
Reception theorists such as Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay have raised the matter 
of subjective agency to question arts' influence, and they have demonstrated the power 
of audiences to create unintended meanings and interpretations. Given the complexity 
of subjectivity, it would be easy to doubt the influence of the arts on the formation of 
ideas, since individuals navigate multiple positions of experience and identity from 
which they interpret and act on the world and are therefore not easily or consistently 
determined by ideological prescriptions as contending social locations influence their 
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mode of reception. However, Richard Sandell' s study of audience engagement with 
exhibitions concludes that "despite the variability and unpredictability that has often 
been found in audience responses to various media, there is nevertheless both 
theoretical support and empirical evidence to suggest a degree of influence on the part 
of cultural producers" (Sandell 15). In other words, it seems that there is some actual 
communication between objects and people, and that intended messages are 
consistently, if not always or completely, conveyed (Sandell 15). Moreover, Sandell 
finds that artistic influence "extends beyond the confines of individual exhibition 
spaces, leaking out through a variety of ways including media reporting, promotional 
communications and the ongoing social interactions of visitors" (Sandell 176 citing 
Kratz). 8 Sandell's study provides further empirical evidence to support Edelman and 
Stanley's conclusion that the arts are an effective medium for the dissemination of ideas 
shaping civic engagement. 
Edelman and others argue that art is particularly effective in this regard because 
it accesses and examines private, emotional responses (Edelman 53, Adams, Bennett). 
Even artwork concerned primarily with private experience "can carry strong political 
associations: the message, for example, that politics is a relatively trivial concern most 
of the time, or that it can be an unfortunate intrusion on what people want to do with 
their lives" (Edelman 50). Such work is political in the sense that it encourages 
disengagement. As Adorno has argued, it is this simultaneous autonomy and non-
8 Further unpacking of the connection between art, consciousness and social action will 
proceed later in this chapter. 
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autonomy from social life, that renders art "the social antithesis of society" (Adorno, 
Aesthetic Theory 8). Indeed, ideas are intrinsically political, even when attempting to be 
explicitly anti-political, because they influence social thought and behaviour. 
Ultimately, privately held conceptions established by art influence not only the social 
terrain generally (on which the efficacy of any social change project depends) but the 
very processes of political organization in so far as those revolve around socially 
inherited notions of authority and subordination, the perception of issues, and emotional 
investments in them. 
I am compelled to make this argument (drawing on Edelman, Stanley and 
Sandell) that the arts, other than that which is typically recognized as political, are 
inherently political although they are commonly disassociated from politics by 
dominant modes of pedagogy and display that reflect a capitalist economy which 
sequesters and depoliticizes all activity. This disassociation renders our understanding 
of art's political dimension very vague. When arts politics are acknowledged, it is 
typically with distaste for the category of propaganda. But without developing a careful 
and thorough understanding of art's political dimension we cannot begin to adequately 
conceptualize, let alone promote, its social value. 
We also fail to fully understand fundamental aspects of political events when we 
lack a political analysis of the arts. For instance, we overlook how the manifestation of 
social upheaval responds to the dictates of art. As Edelman explains, "rioting is neither 
spontaneous nor automatic, but a response to a dramatic script that has often provided 
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one scenario out of many that might be followed in such a situation: personal despair; 
revenge on the jurors and police; political action to change the criminal justice system 
radically ... " (Edelman 8). The practice of popular theatre relies on this tendency of the 
arts, as media of communication, to articulate forgotten or suppressed political impulses 
and strategies. As we learn from Augusto Boal, "performances are ... rehearsals for 
revolution (Boal 141) that 'having rehearsed a resistance to oppression will prepare 
[participants] to resist effectively in a future reality, when the occasion presents itself 
once more' (Boal 150)" (Kistenberg 178). Such an understanding of politics-that it is 
fundamentally scripted by art-reveals the inherent malleability of politics. In so far as 
art coalesces and conveys disparate perceptions, it also reminds us of the dialectical, of 
the mutually determinant relation of subjective and objective (Edelman 66) that renders 
any political moment transitory and subject to upheaval. This is not to argue that 
politics are merely performances, but that both are human constructs, susceptible to 
creative action. 
Art is not only a means of altering the conditions of one's existence through the 
imagination of difference or the representation of action; it is also a means of survival 
and the fulfillment of phylogeny. This existential aspect should not be overlooked. As 
philosopher Karl Lowith explains, "every artificial elaboration is as natural to man [sic] 
as the automatic processes of organic life. For he is not able to live as a human being 
without cultivating his environment and in doing so cultivating himself' (Lowith 60). 
Every living being must by necessity impact and alter its environment to some degree. 
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To thrive, every organism must create the conditions for its own evolution. In other 
words, self-actualization ultimately depends upon creative work, innovations that are 
life enabling. Art is uniquely equipped in this regard because its creative dimension 
works toward, not merely subsistence, but the cultivation of an elevated existence: 
"Morality and art are to this extent parallel: they stir the human spirit to a realization of 
its own creative possibilities, of what it can do and be. They do not derive from 
inanimate nature .... rather they shape, direct and transform it" (Berlin 175). It is in this 
fundamental sense then, that art motivates social change. It is not only through the 
development and exchange of ideas, and through vitally important modeling of political 
praxis, but by way of being change in itself, instantiating the transformative moment, 
that art inspires and enacts political movement in any direction. 
Evidence of art's success in impelling progressive, morality based social action 
is, while understudied, ample. For instance, Rickie Solinger et al. (2008) present 23 
case studies that document the capacity for narrative storytelling to galvanize social 
activism. But perhaps the most comprehensive documentation of the role of art in social 
movements can be found in Jacqueline Adams' work, which illustrates that even under 
the most clandestine circumstances, art executes "framing" and "resource mobilization" 
(Adams 21 ), determining how social conditions are represented, and garnering various 
kinds of public support to address them. These terms are noteworthy because of the 
particularly active and concrete way in which they describe the social impact of 
aesthetics. 
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I have just outlined contemporary perspectives on art's role in social and 
political construction because I wish to propose that we can gain an even deeper insight 
into art and social change by conceiving of art as the cultivation of cultural memory. In 
some sense, when we are talking about the dissemination of ideas, framing and 
collectivizing around them, we are talking about how cultural memory is transmitted 
and taken up. I will elaborate on this concept in chapter 2. Again, I undertake to do 
this with the knowledge that art's social value is commonly either rejected or assumed 
within Canadian society without adequate argument, which calls for a more developed 
theory of art's political dimension. According to Peter Burger "a developed aesthetic 
theory of engaged art does not exist" (Burger 97). To the extent that arguments on 
behalf of art, such as those cited above, do exist, I intend this dissertation to be a 
contribution to that discourse, employing the concept of cultural memory alongside a 
socialist feminist critique to focus attention on the impact of material conditions on the 
production of cultural memory. 
Before entering into a more specific discussion of the parameters of cultural 
memory and its relationship to art in the next chapter, it is necessary to first consider 
here the significance of the subject in actualizing social change since all of the 
arguments above on the social and political impacts of art assume the individual who is 
impacted. It is necessary to stop and query the real potential of individuals to act, 
separately or collectively, or to be changed by the arts in any way. In fact, I believe it is 
the concept of cultural memory that best enables us to argue on behalf of art's efficacy 
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in this regard by explaining how the arts access the subject. By examining the work of 
Donald Hall, Sherry Ortner, and Paul Smith below, I will argue here that cultural 
memory is productive of social change through its relation to subjectivity. 
Art's Imbrication in Subjectivity and Social Change 
There is near consensus in the literature that texts/cultural signs/representations, 
construct the subject (at least to some extent) and thereby play a role in social change. 
In fact, this dynamic is "central" to the literature on subjectivity. According to Donald 
Hall, "a central concern is how we should-and to what extent we even have an ability 
to- change society through concerted individual action, and the ways that cultural 
representation can, does, or does not abet those changes" (Hall 5). Such a project 
requires an understanding of the effects of art-one means of cultural representation-
on the subject as an agent of change. Likewise, Sherry Ortner is concerned with a 
subject who is shaped by art, if art can be understood as symbolic forms, influencing 
(un)consciousness and action. She states, "By subjectivity I mean the ensemble of 
modes of perception, affect, thought, desire, and fear that animate the acting subject. 
But I always mean as well the cultural and social formations that shape, organize, and 
provoke those modes of affect, thought, and so on" (Ortner 11). For Ortner, 
subjectivity and representation are symbiotic. The subject connects art and social 
change and anchors the theories that make such connections. The dynamics of subject 
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construction by art and perception must therefore be outlined. 
I will consider the particular dynamic between the subject and the symbolic 
order--or how cultural formations construct consciousness-in a moment. But first, I 
want to question how consciousness (by this I mean Ortner' s "modes of perception, 
affect, thought, desire, and fear") "animate[s] the acting subject". The literature 
explores this topic by asking whether it is sufficient to make subjects aware of power 
and subjectivity, to change their "mode of perception", and thereby change their subject 
positions. Is drawing people into recognition of control/subjectivity/the potential for 
self-determination adequate to animate them, to make them agents of social change, and 
therein to affect an immediate kind of change? Theorists and social movements argue, 
"one can gain control over that which has controlled one's consciousness by becoming 
conscious of that dynamic of control" (Hall 55). But Hall, followi11;g Karl Marx, argues 
that one cannot simply change one's subject position by recognizing it (Hall 55). As 
Paul Smith explains, even if you consciously recognize alternate subject positions, you 
cannot simply choose between them, for "who or what would be the agent of such a 
choice? On what grounds would such a choice be made? How, in any case, does a 
subject-position in reserve translate into lived activity?" (Paul Smith 38). Given these 
complexities, Smith is able to insist that recognition does permit resistance, and that 
you can both recognize and resist through the variability of subject positions you 
possess, because they make total interpellation into any one subject position impossible, 
and they reveal the contradictions that exist between the subject positions you occupy. 
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This kind of resistance enables a fragmented identity to undo the mono-logic of 
dominant ideology (Paul Smith 59) as an imperative to critique arises. Such 
deconstruction can then lead to a practical ethics and program for political change (i.e. 
the conscious development of rules and principles for action) because the subject has 
been moved to a place of agency wherein she is capable of asserting something 
progressive (i.e. formulating action), thereby rendering ideological resistance effective. 
Feminism is an example of this movement from consciousness-raising to 
resistance to political action and social change. Feminism is not only a philosophy but 
also a political project to both negate patriarchy and posit new structures for women's 
equality. It has generated real change precisely through the concomitant singularity 
(i.e. its historical specificity) and diversity of its composition; it is able to ideologically 
access the fissures between the multiple subject positions of its participants, straddling 
race and class interests, for example, and straddling various roles both internal and 
external to patriarchal relationships, such as wife and scholar. By manifesting itself in 
multiple forms and arenas, it can enable subjects to balance and reconcile their multiple 
subject positions because it creates diverse sites of contestation and non-essentializing 
responses to the ubiquity of patriarchy. Consequently, it has had success in 
empowering agency rather than merely inducing or highlighting anxiety. 
Anxiety is a complication of consciousness-raising. While psychoanalysis and 
existentialism posit that there is a route to ideological resistance through the individual 
psyche, some argue that this route is inadequate because the substantial freedom of self-
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determination is accompanied by a paralyzing anxiety and responsibility; consequently, 
"our ability to think ourselves out of our own neuroses is highly limited, even doomed 
to failure" (Hall 64). However, both Psychoanalysts and Marxists Existentialists argue 
that such an undertaking would not be wholly solitary, given the role of individuation, 
the collective unconscious, and utilitarian ethics (Hall 76). In other words, the 
responsibility to others persists as an imperative to action in the face of anxiety. So we 
can conclude that self-determination is manageable, despite anxiety, given the relational 
situation of the subject, and the responsibility to others that produces solidarity. This is 
one reason why people enter into social movements, to collaborate in making change, 
together overcoming the anxiety and rising to the responsibility, which are 
consequences of consciousness-raising. 
But let us return to the question of art's role in the service of consciousness 
raising, resistance, action, and solidarity. Paul Smith is useful here in establishing that 
art plays a role in reconciling the fragmented aspects of our psyches, not so that the 
fragmentation is ultimately dissolved, but so that we are able to act. He looks to 
psychoanalysis for a way to theorize a subject that has agency, one that is 
heterogeneous in that it is constituted by various subject positions, which make it both 
harder to control and more available to redefinition. Smith looks to feminist 
psychoanalysts in particular to discover "how and in what manners resistance to the 
ideological is conditioned" (Paul Smith 22). His inquiry raises the question, how does 
art intervene in the multiplicity of the subject, or access ideological fissures? This 
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question is answered by Kristeva' s dialectic of the semiotic (desire, feeling) and 
symbolic (law, thought), which she charts within avant-garde literature.9 These 
connotative and denotative levels of meaning are interdependent, and I note their 
similarity to what Friedrich Nietzsche identifies as the Apollonian and Dionysion 
principles of Greek mythology (Nietzsche, Birth). Smith reveals that the arts can 
participate in resistance through this dialectical dimension, this heterogeneity, evident 
in Kristeva' s analysis of literature. Essentially, the dialectical nature of the arts enables 
the arts to relate the self and the social (artist to audience, audience to audience, etc.) 
"the subjective and the objective [i.e. as it engages the interdependent dualities of 
meaning and interpretation, form and content], ... the symbolic and the real" (Paul 
Smith 124); I would add that, in its presentation of ideas, art also engages the actual and 
potential. In other words, the arts participate in resistance through a dialectical process 
of reconciling (because it is always ultimately about itself10) and rearticulating its own 
heterogeneity, as this parallels the dialectics of social conflict, the subject's own 
9 I think it is reasonable to move from "literature" to "art" here for two reasons; first, 
literature is one of many art forms, which no more immediately transmits ideas than 
other mediums. In some cases, one may be more immediately impacted by an image or a 
score, for instance, than a text. Furthermore, text is also image, language is also sound. 
The categories of art and literature not only overlap; they are embedded in each other. 
Secondly, manifestations of art other than literature constitute other forms of language, 
since they too consist of a dialectical tension between the semiotic and symbolic. 
1
° Further unpacking of the connection between art, consciousness and social action will 
proceed later in this chapter. By sublimating the empirical world, art becomes self-
referential-artworks are after all things representing things; art thereby achieves a 
"heightened order of existence" for empirical reality, which it animates as the subject of 
art/representation (Adorno, "Art" 4). In this regard, art is intimately tied up with the 
material world at the same time that it exceeds empiricism. It is this duality that both 
enables and restricts artistic autonomy and political implication (Adorno, "Art" 6). 
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dialectical process, her own heterogeneity, her own otherness between structure and 
agency. This is how I interpret and would like to extend Smith. Like feminism, the arts 
can appeal to, and facilitate, the multiple subject positions of the subject and connect or 
partially reconcile contradictions within her existence, enabling her orientation and 
action. Furthermore, this reconciliation promotes responsibility between and among 
social actors. This is especially so since it is the subject's heterogeneity that makes her 
a subject-able to relate with other subjects-and not an object. 
To understand the effect of Kristeva' s dialectic further, it is worth reconsidering 
the heterogeneity-induced anxiety of the subject as the locus of social change. 
Essentially, art's reconciliatory action does not dissolve anxiety, but aids in rendering it 
constructive. Max Weber has explained how the anxiety of the modern subject was 
intensified by Protestantism's "doctrine of predestination and its assumption of the 
remoteness and inaccessibility of God" (Ortner 115), which left one with an 
"unprecedented inner loneliness" ( qtd. in Ortner 115) and fed "the spirit of capitalism" 
by promoting a compensation found in rationalized productivity. Ortner claims that 
such anxiety is not just an effect of modernity (although its particular object of anxiety 
might be) but is rather central to "the condition of being a cultural creature" (Ortner 
118). Clifford Geertz explains that the subject always fears "conceptual chaos" (e.g. in 
the notion of human/animal hybridity), and that we "literally depend on external 
symbolic culture ... to survive" (i.e. to provide conceptual order) (qtd. in Ortner 118-
119) given our internal complexity and experience of contradiction. For Jameson too, 
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the anxiety ridden subject contains "various kinds of complex subjectivities" ( qtd. in 
Ortner 121 ), the productive potential of which has already been outlined above, 
borrowing from Paul Smith. Hence, anxiety itself seems to be a real and potential 
source of resistance in so far as it is tied to the heterogeneity of the subject and the 
dialectic of social change. But that anxiety must be rendered meaningful through 
negative dialectics, the negation of the negation, which means that negative ontological 
conditions are responded to with a refusal that opens up a space for the ontological 
alternatives to emerge (Adorno, Negative Dialectics). Art can perform this refusal or 
negation and transform anxiety into critique through its own dialectic as the 
symbolizing stage of semiotic angst (Marcuse, Aesthetic Dimension). 
We must not forget that heterogeneity-induced anxiety can also be inhibiting. For 
Jameson, postmodern architecture in particular stands accused of this problematic, of 
failing to facilitate the reconciliation potential to art, leaving us mired in anxiety rather 
than moving us toward action and responsibility (Ortner 122). Postmodern forms 
(Jameson's primary example is the architecture of Las Vegas) cannot provide a 
meaningful order, it is argued, because they can only represent what is not merely 
complex and multiple, but shattered beyond recognition. This is the result of what is 
unique about postmodern aesthetics, which is according to Jameson its close integration 
"into commodity production" (Jameson 4) and multinational capitalism; it uses 
fragmentation to mask the sameness of production. This has already been identified by 
the Frankfurt school in relation to capitalism: myopic and superficial ontologies, 
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determined by false needs and libidinal repressions. Hence, the subject is not 
productively alienated but hopelessly disoriented and, consequently, emotionally 
reduced (Ortner 122). She is in a state of inescapable conceptual chaos, and without 
agency. 
Postmodernism also challenges our faith in reconciliation through cultural forms 
by claiming that the concept of culture as 
the world view or ethos of a particular group of people ... .is too undifferentiated, 
too homogeneous: given various forms of social difference and social 
inequality, how could everyone in a given society share the same view of the 
world and the same orientation towards it? ... the homogeneity and lack of 
differentiation in the culture concept ties it closely to "essentialism" (Ortner 
112). 
This would suggest that art can be an agent of homogeneity. However, Ortner 
overcomes this critique by explaining that "while recognizing the very real dangers of 
'culture' in its potential for essentializing and demonizing whole groups of people, one 
must recognize its critical political value as well, both for understanding the working of 
power [i.e. that it tries to homogenize] and for understanding the resources of the 
powerless [i.e. their opportunities to disrupt the homogenous]" (Ortner 113). Art can be 
a resource on either side. It is a material manifestation of culture, through which 
cultural power and resistance can be examined (because they have been made material) 
as an epistemological ground of subjectivity. Art also breaks open the homogenous 
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facade of culture because it is heterogeneous. It "can no more be reduced to the general 
formula of consolation than to its opposite" because "by virtue of its rejection of the 
empirical world ... art sanctions the primacy of reality" (Adorno, Aesthetic Theory 2). It 
is non-reducible solely to the commodity, despite the contingency of its autonomy. 
Even when it is employed in the service of cultural homogeneity, art creates the 
conditions for its own overturning by creating something to resist or work against. It is 
also heterogeneous in the diversity of its material manifestations and in that it 
encompasses multiple dialectics, not least of which is the fact that "it exists only in 
relation to its other" (Adorno, Aesthetic Theory 3) as it is always in the process of 
becoming. As Adorno explains, "the concept of art is located in a historically changing 
constellation of elements; it refuses definition" (Adorno, Aesthetic Theory 2). 
Therefore, the arts are seemingly, perhaps even singularly, well suited to the project of 
radical social change. As individual psyches are not homogenous, heterogeneous 
aesthetics are consistent media for their transformation. 
The question remains: How would the arts provide conceptual order if they 
embrace heterogeneity? They establish the order of heterogeneity, through 
representation. It is like the Balinese cockfight described by Geertz; it "orders [a 
myriad of anxiety inducing cultural themes] into an encompassing structure .... It puts a 
construction on them, makes them ... meaningful-visible, tangible, graspable" ( qtd. in 
Ortner 117). This can also be understood as the construction of cultural memory; it too 
is never homogenous. For example, feminist artists who consciously engage in cultural 
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memory making projects harness the symbolic field to orient subjects in a particular, 
historical consciousness, based on a memory of violence against women that is 
heterogeneous yet stable, re-centering subjects in such a way that they are both made 
cognizant of their potential to construct a past that differs from dominant history, and 
they are (thereby) empowered to construct a future of difference. This dynamic has 
been documented to some extent in a book I co-wrote entitled Remembering Women 
Murdered by Men: Memorials Across Canada (Cultural Memory Group). Following 
chapters will elaborate on this dynamic and expand it in a different direction by 
analyzing one artist's body of work in the museum context, to establish the 
heterogeneous means of establishing a coherent cultural memory. 
It could be argued that cultural memory can provide depth, orientation, narration 
and thus resistance to the culture of late capitalism, which is otherwise determined by 
the "principle of 'no long term"' (Ortner 124). Acts of feminist cultural memory 
making exist alongside hegemonic forms (like capitalism and postmodemism-points I 
will argue in chapter 3), but they introduce a heterogeneity that is key to a "fully 
cultural consciousness" which is "always multilayered and reflexive" (Ortner 127), and 
can therefore facilitate negative dialectics, the basis of revolutionary activity. But 
negative dialectics requires more than conscious negation. As Jameson explains, 
"resistance involves not just conscious self-constituting acts, but also the agent's 
individual history, conceived here as a memory" ( qtd. in Paul Smith 68). Both 
conceptually and semantically, this sentence suggests the place of cultural memory in 
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dynamics of social change. The unconscious is the place in which memory is stored; it 
is itself a heterogeneous space, "between 'subject' and Other" (Paul Smith 76), neither 
wholly knowable nor unknowable. As such, it is not directly determined by discourses 
impinging on consciousness. Consequently, to be an instrument of social change art 
must affect subjectivity through both consciousness and the unconscious. As an agent 
of cultural memory, art achieves this duality because recalling a memory is conscious, 
but it is inculcated at the unconscious level. This inculcation of memory, which is 
performed by aesthetics, must also be progressive however. To be a medium of 
memory art cannot merely be relegated to impressions upon the unconscious, or to 
articulating a disabling negation. It must also be creative; it must actually draw from 
and build memory to enable agency. As Herbert Marcuse has explained in the Aesthetic 
Dimension, the arts can stimulate instincts that are repressed by Thantic society, and it 
can counter this repression by bringing the Erotic into consciousness. He writes, "the 
life instincts rebel against the global sado-masochistic phase of contemporary 
civilization. The return of the repressed, achieved and preserved in the work of art, may 
intensify this rebellion" (Marcuse, Aesthetic 64). In chapter 2, I will further explore 
how the arts can build memory. 
So the heterogeneity of the subject, oflife, of art, of cultural memory, is essential 
to politicizing the subject. Hall makes a similar claim for the dependency of agency on 
heterogeneous conditions. He describes his understanding of the liberatory potential of 
heterogeneity when he writes "only by pluralizing our intellectual engagement and 
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activities, by recognizing community and foregrounding the necessary, ongoing 
revision of those engagements is human being rendered significantly different from the 
being of those entities that are instinct-driven or simply mechanical" (Hall 130). He is 
describing a kind of self-reflexivity that empowers us to abandon naturalized 
subjectivities 11 , but his depiction also brings us full circle in these readings; he is 
indicating that we have created a social context characterized by heterogeneity, which 
reflects our anxiety about heterogeneity, and thus, orders it. 
In this chapter I have developed in part the ground upon which a claim for art's 
significance to social change might rest. I argue that it is important to reference 
empirical studies that demonstrate the viral, modeling, and transformative effects of the 
arts, and to perceive art's mediation between consciousness and action in its 
engagement with subjectivity. It is important to back-up philosophical deductions with 
empirical evidence and vice versa, recognizing that neither approach on its own would 
be adequately persuasive. Each could be erroneous in its own right, relying on some 
degree of bias, but this two-pronged approach reduces the likelihood of overlooking 
alternatives, and it enforces the conclusions I have drawn about how we should proceed 
in our perception of the arts as a facilitator of social change. Together the social 
science and humanities approaches allow us to directly inquire into the practical 
conditions of political action and also the psychological processes at play, what people 
actually seem to do and why they might be doing it. I have written this chapter because 
11 This critique is relevant to my deconstruction of the Charlotte Salomon exhibition, in 
chapter 4 where I argue that the exhibition presents a problematically linear 
representation of the artist's subjectivity. 
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it is necessary to substantiate claims on behalf of art's social value and political effects. 
Having established the impact of aesthetics on subjectivity, I will now develop in 
chapter 2 and 3 a theory of cultural memory that advances our understanding of this 
impact and our knowledge of art's political dimension. 
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Chapter 2: Establishing Art's Cultural Memory as an Agent of Social Change: 
Definitions & Applications 
More studies of the way memory practices are central features of modem and 
postmodern life and more theories of these epochal forms with memory at their 
heart should follow .... social memory studies is not a narrow subfield. It 
provides powerful lessons for sociology as a whole, is consonant with the 
reformation of historical sociology now occurring, and provides important 
insights for theory at the broadest level. Sociology, we argue, cannot afford to 
forget memory. (Olick & Robbins pdf20) 
Cultural memory is a concept that seems to have significant currency, especially 
in the wake of 20th century manifestations of violence--domestic and international in 
scope-shifting borders, and reorganized empires. However, our understanding of 
what cultural memory is and how it functions can be better developed and employed to 
illuminate the social value of the arts. This is what I aim to do in the current chapter by 
examining the meaning and value of "memory" within social and aesthetic thought. I 
will argue that cultural memory constitutes a dialectical unfolding facilitated by 
aesthetics that resonates in bodies and minds. Consequently, the concept of cultural 
memory will help us to understand the political capacity of the arts, how they define, 
transform and mobilize agents. 
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Memory as Power and Resistance 
Memory is called on in the service of power from above and from below, in the 
construction of subjectivity and in its subversion. The literature on memory explores 
how notions of the past inform identity and are transmitted through various cultural 
veins, especially the family, generational peers, public lieux de memoires (Nora), ritual, 
and other symbolic forms such as media and political rhetoric. For example, in their 
work on traumatic memory as pedagogy, Roger Simon et al. explain how media 
contains memories used to establish and inform collective action: 
Social memories are produced as bounded sets of symbolizations (texts, images, 
songs, monuments, and rituals) and associated emotions. Collectivities share 
these as ways of stabilizing and transmitting particular versions of past events 
and, in so doing, attempt to offer perspectives on present dilemmas and future 
aspirations. Formations of memory, in this view, are efforts to mobilize 
attachments and knowledge that serve specific social and political interests 
within particular spatiotemporal frameworks. (Simon et al. 3) In other words, 
the semiotic and symbolic dynamics of artistic media mobilize solidarity 
because they capture and convey memories that underlie group association. For 
this reason, "control of a society's memory largely conditions the hierarchy of 
power" (Connerton 1). As a consequence of memory's capacity to associate 
individuals with collectivities across points in time, memory has an ethical 
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dimension that is underwritten by political power. 
In a more recent elaboration on Paul Connerton' s assertion that "the struggle of 
citizens against state power is the struggle of their memory against forced forgetting" 
(Connerton 15), Naomi Klein argues that memory deprivation is a fundamental tactic of 
violence. It is both the consequence and the precedence of "shock therapy", which she 
documents as a morally bankrupt method of psychiatric research, and as a means of 
socio-economic domination within the paradigm of "disaster capitalism". In even the 
most extreme cases, Klein finds that memory is continuously rebuilt12, leading her to 
conclude that "memory, both individual and collective, turns out to be the greatest 
shock absorber of all" (Klein 557). Likewise, Walter Benjamin highlights the resilience 
and redemption of memory when he asserts that memory intervenes in "moments of 
danger" by escaping the totalizing embrace of hegemonic discourse (Benjamin 255-6). 
Memory persists both in the psyche and in counter hegemonic practices. 13 
In Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, Foucault conceives of such counter-
memory as counter-discourse, and this seems to be the definition of memory (discourse 
from or about the past) prevalently assumed by others 14• Streams of Marxism (e.g. 
12 One example of memory being rebuilt can be found in the preservation of Kurdish 
culture, which is facilitated by the work of kilim (i.e. carpet) weavers in southeastern 
Turkey, where a criminalized population labours under a state that refuses to permit its 
people even to speak the Kurdish language. Another example, morn pertinent to Klein's 
context, are the worker recovered factories of Argentina, which incorporate cultural 
workshops and educational centres within them, to express, process, celebrate, record 
and transmit the experience of the workers and their communities. 
13 These may be consciously or unconsciously political, as in the case of dialect speakers 
who maintain a language against the hegemony of the state, in Italy for instance. 
14 In chapter 3 I will begin to distinguish memory from discourse. 
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Marx, Benjamin, Marcuse) recognize memory as the recollection of what is forgotten or 
repressed by dominant discourse--countering the amnesiac effect of capitalist 
processes that erase the economic relations and labour history behind the commodity. 
For scholars such as Andreas Huyssen, memory is also a way "to claim some anchoring 
space in a world of puzzling and often threatening heterogeneity, non-synchronicity, 
and information overload" (Huyssen 7) which characterizes capitalist society. Memory 
can be understood to facilitate social re-orientation because of its relational quality; it is 
"the mechanism through which we feel pride, pain, or shame with regard to events that 
happened to our groups before we joined them" (Olick & Robbins pdf 13). This 
finding leads Jefferey K. Olick and Joyce Robbins to claim that "memory is a central, if 
not the central, medium through which identities are constituted" (Olick & Robbins pdf 
20). Consequently, what is at stake in memory is the capacity of agents to locate 
themselves within, and also to direct, personal and social levels of existence. 
Narrowing the Field of Study 
Olick and Robbins provide an exhaustive overview of the various terms used by 
theorists to discuss memory, noting that "both the public and academia have become 
saturated with references to social or collective memory" (Olick & Robbins pdf 2). 
These scholars approach social memory studies as "a general rubric for inquiry into the 
varieties of forms through which we are shaped by the past, conscious and unconscious, 
public and private, material and communicative, consensual and challenged" (Olick & 
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Robbins pdf 5-6). In their attempt to define such a wide-ranging area of study, they 
examine "sets of mnemonic practices in various social sites" and thereby distinguish 
social memory from every other kind of social reproduction (such as custom or 
tradition), and avoid "reifying a mystical group mind", or asserting the hegemony of 
homogeneous memory (Olick & Robbins pdf 5-6, emphasis mine). 
The transmission of socially constructive memory through mnemonic practices 
can in part be understood using Marita Sturken's broad concept of cultural memory, 
which she describes as "memory that is shared outside the avenues of formal historical 
discourse yet is entangled with cultural products and imbued with cultural meaning" 
(Sturken 3). 15 Sturken is building on Jan Assman's association between cultural 
memory and aesthetic experience. Assman writes, "the concept of cultural memory 
comprises that body of reusable texts, images, and rituals specific to each society in 
each epoch, whose 'cultivation' serves to stabilize and convey that society's self-image" 
(Assman 9). Such cultural products include the arts, and artistic practice can therefore 
be read as mnemonic practice. While it is important to recognize that the cultural 
signification underlying cultural memory extends beyond the fine and performing arts 
(for instance, political, commercial and familial discourses are not self-consciously 
artistic but are agents of cultural memory), it is explicitly engaged by such artistic 
practices, which in tum influence other cultural memory-making sites through the 
process of memory's transmission and reiteration. 
15 Even more broadly, Sturken eloquently describes "the memory landscape that we 
inhabit. ... a complex mix of narrative, displacement, shared testimony, popular culture, 
rumour, fantasy, and collective desire" (Sturken 234). 
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Memory and Representation 
It should not be assumed that cultural memory, whether dominant or subversive, 
is simply reflected in art. In fact, some argue that artistic form is necessary to the 
production of memory because the difficulty of remembrance requires that a memory 
must always be inscribed to be realized; a memory "can only be fully present, even to 
the memory worker, when it acquires a more elaborated form: written, spoken or 
visualized. In this sense remembering is dependent on the means of representation 
available in the present" (Claire & Johnson 213). Furthermore, the material 
characteristics of the medium impact the transmission of cultural memory by shaping 
what is conveyed, stored, or represented16• Memory's dependence on representation 
facilitates its personal and socio-political value since it enables the writing and 
rewriting of history; "without the effort to remember and without cultural forms to 
remember with, there is no continuity; without the effort of reworking versions of the 
past, there can be no change" (Claire & Johnson 221). Huyssen asserts that 
representation is also dependent on memory, when he argues that all representation is 
based on the recollection of experience (Huyssen 2). 
Given this interdependence of memory and representation, it is not surprising that 
artists are often centrally concerned with the subject of memory in their work. This 
tendency has led Joan Gibbons to survey the role of memory in contemporary art and 
the historical conception of memory in art and philosophy. She documents artworks 
16 Chapter 3, 4, and 5 engage further with the materialism of representation by analyzing 
the impact of a specific artwork and its aesthetic strategies. 
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that address private and indexical memory, recovered social and political memory, 
Holocaust memory, "relational" re-enactments, and the ordering of knowledge and 
memory data (Gibbons 8). She concludes that "given the amount and variety of 
attention paid to memory in contemporary art, it is rather surprising that it has been 
written about only sporadically in relation to particular artists or particular exhibitions" 
(Gibbons 7). The theory of cultural memory that I aim to develop here responds to this 
observation that we have not adequately grappled with the memory value of art. 
Despite the currency of "memory" in social theory, cultural studies, and artistic 
practice, and despite popular faith in its fundamental significance to human life 
generally and to political transformation specifically, there has been relatively little 
development of the cultural memory concept, or explanation of the means by which art 
can be understood to convey memory. Indeed, in their wide-ranging survey of the field, 
Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nlinning assert, "despite two decades of intensive research, the 
design of a conceptual toolbox for cultural memory studies is still at a fledgling stage" 
(Erll 2). Perhaps this lacuna is understandable since "memory" intuitively resonates 
with personal and private processes of recollection and narration, and is therefore a 
taken-for-granted concept when extrapolated to artistic practices. Individual processes 
of memory are more thoroughly studied and, through immediate experience, memory is 
widely understood to be "the act of bringing experience to reflection and/or to issue, the 
act of embodying an act or object or place or concept in some portion of the brain or 
another" (Mortimer-Sandilands 274). Beyond our basic understanding of how 
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representation articulates and instantiates memory, how exactly, and with what 
significance, might art intervene in this process of remembering, and expand our 
understanding of memory? 
To answer this question, I propose that we develop the content of the concept of 
cultural memory by employing existing aesthetic theory, reinterpreting central, 
historical arguments on behalf of art's social value, as explanations of art's memory-
making means and mechanisms. I wish to foreground within the tradition of western 
aesthetic theory an understanding of aesthetic value that is essentially an understanding 
of art's mnemonic dimension. By understanding art's mnemonic dimension we can 
develop the concept of cultural memory, elucidate art's impact on memory and identify 
its consequent impact on social life as a source of cultural memory that can enable 
political action. 
Reading "Cultural Memory" from Aesthetic Theory 
When we examine the social relevance assigned to art across history, we 
discover that a consistent set of rationales has been maintained in the literature of 
aesthetic theory, while a radical transformation has simultaneously occurred therein. 
This transformation is not unlike that in the realm of moral and political philosophy, 
which Isaiah Berlin characterized in his comparison of classical and romantic thought 
by writing, "there begins to emerge the notion that perhaps value judgments are not 
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descriptive propositions at all [ ... ] that values are not discovered but invented" (Berlin 
10, emphasis mine). It is this constructed, creative and humanisti~ quality of "values" 
that has overtime moved the dominant perception of art from the realm of revealed 
metaphysical ideals to the region of material realities, while maintaining a common 
understanding of art's unique virtue. Passing from antiquity, through the Enlightenment 
and into the Romantic era, art becomes increasing integrative for western thought, 
tending to consolidate aesthetic principles with the very possibility of human existence. 
I will argue that this movement in history gives us insight into the concept of cultural 
memory as the ongoing reconciliation between dialectical forces that are central to 
social preservation and transformation. I will selectively examine pivotal thinkers in 
the western aesthetic tradition to illustrate the mnemonic dimension of aesthetics. 
These authors represent a historical trajectory, but they also offer specific arguments 
about aesthetic value that I wish to redeploy as definitions of cultural memory. 
I will begin with Aristotle's contribution to early, western classical aesthetics as it 
is both representative of major arguments about art's social value stretching into the 
present day, and can be used to develop our understanding of the cultural memory 
concept. His theory of catharsis reveals that the arts can intervene in memory by 
provoking reflection on vicarious experiences. Aristotle is a particularly important 
starting point for this dissertation because his argument overcomes Plato's earlier and 
now infamous concern (in Book V of The Republic) that the sentiments evoked by 
poetry are a danger to rational society. This concern has persisted, most notably as a 
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factor motivating iconoclasm and in contemporary Canadian ambivalence about the arts 
as described in my introduction. In contrast, Aristotle contends that artistic sentiments 
can exorcise and transform our emotional impulses, disabling them as sources of social 
and psychological disruption. Aristotle offers us an explanation of art's cathartic 
capacity, its ability to aid in socio-psycho well being by provoking the purging of 
emotions through the unity and coherence of plot, character, and style (Aristotle 27). 
Art's representation of universal laws (through its embodiment of beauty and unity, as 
well as in its representation of probability or cause and effect) strengthens the 
audience's rational and moral faculties by providing them with objects of contemplation 
(Aristotle 25, 30). They also take pleasure in experiencing art because it satisfies an 
instinct toward learning (Aristotle 25). Consequently, art is believed to serve individual 
and collective. well-being by developing one's cognitive skills in accordance with 
metaphysical ideals. 
I want to argue that art's cathartic, contemplative and educational capacities, 
evoke or constitute the process of memory as a cognitive process of reflection and 
integration of experiential knowledge, that compels collective and vicarious feeling, 
and leads to a learning by example. This is the definitional content that Aristotle's 
theory of catharsis might add to the evolving concept of cultural memory and our 
understanding of art's memory making capacity. 
Aristotelian concepts of art's moral and rational effects re-emerge in the writing 
of Longinus, whose theory of the Sublime I wish to employ in revealing another mode 
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of art's intervention in memory, as revelation, or a return of the repressed (to use 
Marcuse's language). Longinus describes the artistic Sublime as art's capacity to 
provoke sheer amazement concerning the nature of objective existence, rather than 
mere persuasion, or pleasure, even beyond the action of catharsis; art has the power to 
move its audience into moments of ecstatic understanding (Longinus 56). Longinus 
concerns himself to identify the five sources of this effect in the artwork's rhetorical 
structure and in the artist's innate genius, specifically, "the faculty of grasping great 
conceptions"; "passion, strong and impetuous"; "the proper handling of figures"; "noble 
phraseology" and "dignified and spirited composition" (Longinus 60). Emphasis has 
begun to shift, in this theoretical body, from the function and form of art, onto the 
artist's inspiration and the skilled artist's peculiar capacity to inspire (through stylistic 
devices) rather than merely generate well-being. For Longinus, art accesses the 
immortal-"the greatness of man's soul" in the case of both artist and audience 
(Longinus 72). In other words, the Sublime facilitates the recollection of a deep, 
existential ontology. I argue that Longin us therefore offers us an understanding of the 
Sublime as a mnemonic device, which enhances our perception of art's mnemonic 
capacity and expands our definition of cultural memory to encompass the existential. 
Consequently, cultural memory can additionally be understood as recollection of what 
lay beyond the reality principle, beyond the limitations of a present state of material 
existence. 
I have argued thus far that keystone texts in the western aesthetic tradition 
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position art as a means of persuasion, pleasure, and transcendence of the material realm, 
and that this is all affected through what I wish to conceive of as mnemonic processes, 
thereby adding content to the concept of "cultural memory". While Romantic 
philosophers such as Edmund Burke and David Hume sustain classical understandings 
of art's pedagogical and spiritual value, they explicitly perceive art as the embodiment 
of the dialectical. Some basis for this development can be found in Aristotle and 
Longinus, since both have faith in art as an instrument of mediation. However, the 
Romantics invert the idealism of classical dialectics with a materialist perspective, 
stimulated by the passage through Enlightenment empiricism. This intervention 
represents a move away from Idealism toward a grounding of art in human action, away 
from the discovery of aesthetic and moral values toward their construction and 
cultivation. From the Enlightenment and Romantic periods, the concept of cultural 
memory can gain definitional dimension as constructed knowledge in the service of 
political will and material advancement. In the work of Burke and :Hume art is a means 
of human cultivation and construction because, through our compar1ison of a 
representation and its object, through the association and contemplation of different and 
similar images, "we produce new images; we unite, we create, we enlarge our stock" 
(Burke, On Taste 18, emphasis mine). Hence, the reception of art becomes a creative, 
and dialectical act, one leading from, and potentially to, a synthesis of "the primary 
pleasures of sense", "the secondary pleasures of the imagination", "the conclusions of 
the reasoning faculty, concerning the various relations of these, and concerning the 
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human passions, manners, and actions", which culminates in an intellectual and 
embodied advancement of knowledge (Burke, On Taste 23). Again we find here an 
allusion to the cognitive process of memory-in the synthesis of the embodied and the 
intellectual. 
Burke also enlarges the concept of the Sublime from Longinus in a way that is 
useful to our understanding of dialectical cultural memory. He endows it with a 
relationalism that underlies Romantic politics 17• For Burke, the Sublime is the 
psychological effect of holding terror-"the strongest emotion whi1ch the mind is 
capable of feeling"-at a safe distance in the representation of pain. and suffering, such 
that the greatness of the thing is internalized through one's very ability to apprehend it 
(Burke, On the Sublime 46). To me this aesthetic dynamic is another way in which the 
arts embody the dynamic of memory, since it is a function of memory to hold trauma at 
a distance as an object of contemplation and often, in the case of collective memory, 
holds the trauma of others in an empathetic position. Burke further argues that this 
dynamic generates self-preservation and sympathy for others in pain, "to relieve 
ourselves in relieving those who suffer" (Burke, On the Sublime 36, 42). So our ability 
to sympathize with another's pain-and thereby motivate self-preservation because we 
"delight" in our removal from pain- is really a necessary condition for our survival. 
17 I am referring to the humanist ideals dictating compassion and equality that 
underwrote the Romantic era's attacks on industrialism, urbanism, religion, and the state. 
In addition to Burke, Shelley and Schiller ~~ovide quintessential examples of this ethos. 
In so far as art cultivates our empathetic memory 18, we can conclude from Burke's 
essay, it is no less than a matter of life or death. The Sublime's primary role in 
rendering art socially relevant is additionally elaborated in the Romantic period when 
theorists become concerned with how such excitation of the imagination triggers will, 
imperative to the actualization of individuals, on which a democratic politics depends. 
So if we employ Burke following on Longinus to situate the Sublime as a feature of the 
mnemonic, we can better understand cultural memory as self-preservation and political 
agitation in so far as it stimulates empathy. 
To review, there is a negotiation in art theory between a conception of art as 
engagement with the material world of human thought and action, and alternatively, 
with a realm of ideals that extends beyond the real. This dialectic is negotiated, I am 
arguing, by what is essentially memory work, if we conceive of that in the ways I have 
just outlined: as learning by example, extended to recollection of the repressed, 
cultivated empathy, and praxis. By examining the selected texts we can see how this 
definition of cultural memory can be constructed from established arguments on the 
aesthetic. 
Memory itself shares with art a dialectical nature, a grounding in both the real and 
the ideal if, as I propose, we understand memory as a negotiation between matter and 
spirit, body and mind, permanence and transformation, self and other, or past, present 
18 Ernst Van Alphen concurs. In his reading of multiple sites in which personal and 
collective memory converge, he concludes, "the sublime can offer a solution to this 
rivalry between their memory (which is both plural and other) and my own memory .... 
We can use sublime experience to break out of individualism" (Van Alphen 204 
emphasis original). 
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and future. So I am making two points here. First, foundational texts concerning art's 
social relevance can also be understood as explanation of art's memory work, and thus 
develop the concept of cultural memory with the following three definitions: 
1) cognitive processes of reflection and integration of experiential knowledge, that 
compel 19 collective and vicarious feeling, and lead to a learning by example 
2) recollection of what lay beyond the reality principle, beyond the limitations of a 
present state of material existence 
3) constructed knowledge in the service of political will and material advancement 
based on empathy, which is stimulated through a synthesis of the embodied and the 
intellectual modes of perception. 
Note that each of these definitions demonstrates the dialectical nature of cultural 
memory, by which I mean that cultural memory is the product of contrasting but 
interdependent forces and therefore constitutes a kind of active transformation of social 
significance. Cultural memory emerges through the dialectical method so we must 
examine the dialectics at work in the arts to understand how art becomes the terrain of 
cultural memory. Consequently, my consideration of foundational arguments for art's 
social relevance (cited above) point toward an understanding of art as dialectics (a way 
of thinking about the arts that should be reprioritized) and, likewise reveal the 
dialectical nature of the project of cultural memory-making. 
19 The compulsion is through form and reason, the psychological need for catharsis, and 
the pleasure of contemplation, as described by Aristotle. 
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A History of the Concept of Art as Dialectical 
I will briefly examine five major contributions to our understanding of art as 
dialectics-Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx, Jameson, and Marcuse-to illuminate the 
dialectical quality of my definition of cultural memory and to suggest how the dialectic 
of memory is active in the work of art. I am arguing that the work of art is always a 
way of working out memory and the dialectics it engages. The work remembers or 
forgets experiences and ideas (moments in the unfolding of other dialectics) and 
prompts the same within subjects. In this way memory can be heuristically employed 
as a surrounding dialectic of remembering and forgetting, within which all other 
dialectics (such as male/female, rules/freedom, form/content) are negotiated; they are 
the struggles of memory, and the objects of memory, just as they are constitutive of 
memory. 
A dialectical understanding of art was explicitly articulated by G. W .F. Hegel, 
who wrote of art's capacity to reconcile rules with freedom, which I argue is facilitated 
by memory. For Hegel, art makes sensuous the (Platonic) Idea, and is therefore a 
means of realizing truth about ourselves, what we are and can be, our immanent form. 
Art allows a man to reflect on his desires at a remove, since it presents his desires to 
him through representation. He can then perceive a desire as "an object which he 
contrasts with himself' (Hegel 54). In this way, he learns to experience the sensuous 
(which is rule bound in the work of art) intellectually, and he thereby learns to think 
freely and critically, which is prerequisite to his ability to make morally sound choices. 
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Hegel writes, "art has the vocation of revealing the truth in the form of sensuous artistic 
shape, of representing the reconciled antithesis [between the material and immaterial] ... 
and, therefore, has its purpose in itself, in this representation and revelation" (Hegel 
61 ). In effect, for Hegel art is this reconciliation; as such its value is that it renders 
meaning to the mundane by translating the universal into the immediacy of the material 
world, and vice versa. Hegel introduces us to the idea that art is dialectical in a way 
that reveals the memory work of art as a negotiation between the real and the idea. 20 
We build memory, a storehouse of critical thought and experience which is the basis of 
moral action, through this process of synthesizing the sensuous and abstract in our 
reflections on art, 
In Nietzsche's rendering of aesthetic dialectics, one can begin to perceive 
memory as the dialectical reckoning of Eros (the life instinct) and Thanatos (the death 
drive). Here one finds the idea that art can exemplify the reconciliation of dialectical 
forces defining human nature and struggle. Nietzsche sees this potential emanating 
from the reconciliation of the Apollonian and Dionysian spirits/aesthetic qualities, 
exemplified in Greek tragedy. One does not overcome the other, as in Aristotle reason 
overcomes emotion through the process of catharsis, but they productively co-exist. By 
reconciling these two forces, man reconciles a duality within himself; he thereby 
reconciles himself to others, and to nature, because he comes to see humanity as 
20 He is also significant because the interpretations of art as dialectics which follow are 
themselves structured by memory, both in the sense that future aesthetic theory is 
influenced by a "memory" of Hegel's contribution (Marx and Nietzsche for example) 
and that his work itself is coloured by the cultural memory of his time (in his 
understanding of Asia for example). 
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nature's artistic creation (Nietzsche, Birth 37). Through this dialectical purview, 
Nietzsche not only returns us to the classical era; he effectively summarizes a 
transformation in aesthetic thought affected by the intervening centuries in so far as the 
Apollonian represents constricted order and the rule of law, while the Dionysion 
represents unbridled will and sensuous play, reconciled here in the application of free 
will and rational thought to the determination of an ethical world. From my vantage 
point this dialectic is both producer and product of cultural memory because it is 
inherited from human society and, as a model of reconciliation, it is inherited by social 
agents. It is an example of art problem solving through memory and vice versa. 
Nietzsche claims even more power on behalf of art in his treatment of the 
Sublime as dialectical. By representing that which is Sublime, Nietzsche posits the 
artist is able to confront what is most overwhelming; consequently, the Sublime 
becomes a reflection of our capacity for courage in the face of suffering (Nietzsche, 
Twilight 530). Such courage is enabled by the illusions generated by art itself. The 
deceptions Plato sought to censor are here "necessary in order to live", to conquer 
reality through the imagination that something else is possible. Art exceeds the real-
"it is worth more than truth"-because it gives us the courage [retained in memory] to 
change, and thereby affirm, life (Nietzsche, Will 453). This is why Nietzsche attributes 
art with making life itself possible (Nietzsche, Will 452) and argues that the Sublime, 
more than revelation or empathy, incites resistance to the denial of life (Nietzsche, 
Twilight 530). Such thought thus inaugurates a revolutionary spirit that will inform the 
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avant-garde movements of the twentieth century in their pursuit of a more just and 
meaningful world, driven by the remembrance of will. The Sublime activates cultural 
memory just as it is activated by it. 
Karl Marx perceives the dialectical quality of art through the paradigm of 
materialism, which correlates art, social relations, and consciousness, lending itself to 
understanding the production of cultural memory through this chain of relations. As a 
reflection of society, art embodies society's contradictions, but may also exceed them. 
It has historical specificity but it also mirrors the dialectical nature of history 
.(Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy 149). It is this dialectical quality of 
art-which is both affirmation of socially determined consciousness and consciousness-
altering instrument of critique-that renders art a prominent role in revolutionary 
politics and social change, given the centrality of consciousness to any political project. 
Here, I am arguing that the dialectic of affirmation and negation is again determined by 
cultural memory. What is affirmed or negated, this double movement within art (every 
critique is also an endorsement of something other), is determined by a cultural chain of 
relations in memory and the result of that dialectical unfolding produces a new state of 
affairs to be captured by cultural memory. 
A dialectical understanding of art is taken up in many ways by other theorists 
within the Marxist and Anarchist traditions who wrestle with art's dual capacity to alter 
or affirm consciousness, and the way this capacity is tied up in its relative autonomy 
from or imbrication in social life. Notably, Fredric Jameson identifies the 
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contradictions revealed by the work of art as a kind of projected resolution to social 
issues, which become inscribed in memory.21 Jameson strives to develop a new 
hermeneutic to elicit this political dimension adherent to all artworks, however 
unconscious the traces of class antagonism (broadly conceived) are to be found within 
them. These traces are a "persistent dimension of literary and cultural texts precisely 
because they reflect a fundamental dimension of our collective thinking and our 
collective fantasies about history and reality" (Political 35). In this sense Jameson 
shows us that the work of art is explicitly rooted in social reality and in memory, 
especially since history and reality are only accessible to us within an aestheticized, 
narrative form (Political 35). 
To what extent might such narratives also be autonomous or remote from the 
material world of social change? Jameson answers this ambiguity with the concept of 
mediation-the dialectical relationship between "the formal analysis of a work of art 
and its social ground, or between the internal dynamics of the political state and its 
economic base" (Political 39). I would suggest that the subjectivity of the 
artist/audience, which is constructed by memory, is that mediation embodied, embodied 
in such a way as to be potentially active and transformative, and Jameson's work on 
interpretation anticipates this dynamic. For Jameson, mediation reveals that the 
seeming separation of art from everyday life is "merely the reality of the appearance; it 
21 Art is not only informed by ideology but also productive of it "with the function of 
inventing imaginary or formal 'solutions' to unresolvable social contradictions" 
(Political 79). With art we "project decorative or mythic resolution of issues that [we] 
are unable to articulate conceptually" (Political 79). 
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exists ... as the basic logic and fundamental law of our daily life and existential 
experience in late capitalism" (Political 40). However, "social life is in its fundamental 
reality one and indivisible" and "on that level they were never separate from one 
another" though this be forgotten (Political 40). But Jameson does not wish to argue on 
behalf of a homology between art and everyday life; these maintain relative autonomy. 
A text's productivity (or social action) turns on this very (dialectical) ambiguity-
because the subject must interpret it. This hermeneutic approach is dialectical. 
Interpretation is still informed by material reality. Jameson gives us a reading of the 
subject's role in textual interpretation and social change. He helps us to understand 
relative autonomy from material conditions, how a subject can read a relatively 
autonomous work with relative autonomy. This is useful because it challenges the idea 
that there are either grand narratives tied to a false investment in materiality (no 
autonomy), or there is open interpretation (total autonomy). Such ideas are expressed 
by Jean-Francois Lyotard who writes of metanarrative, "we have paid a high enough 
price of the nostalgia of the whole and the one .... The answer is: let us wage a war on 
totality" (Lyotard 82). Derrida's response is to claim that "the absence of a 
transcendental signified [in relation to a text] extends the domain and the interplay of 
signification ad infinitum" (Derrida 519). This false dichotomy between subjugation 
under meaning and meaningless does not explain how the subject can possibly affect 
social change, or how art can act on subjects, which a dialectical lens on aesthetic 
interpretation allows. 
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Jameson adopts a psychoanalytic terminology to describe the process of 
interpretation, which we can use to further clarify the mnemonic dimension of art. He 
recommends that as interpreters we grasp the relationship of art to society not just as 
reflection but, "in more active terms of production, projection, compensation, 
repression, displacement, and the like" (Political 44). With this mnemonic conception 
of art we alight on one more, if inadvertent, contribution to the concept of cultural 
memory, that memory is a series of unconscious processes related to the fragmented 
psyche that characterizes human experience within late capitalism, and its 
preoccupation with the management of desire. Indeed, desire remains within the work 
of art (as for Marcuse) a "Utopian vision of the liberation of desire and oflibidinal 
transfiguration" essential to revolutionary social movements (Political 67). The 
revolutionary imperative is evident in our very creativity. 
Marcuse picks up on this psychoanalytic strand in the Aesthetic Dimension, 
where we find the Marxist critique of the loss of memory under capitalism: 
Forgetting past suffering and past joy alleviates life under a repressive reality 
principle. In contrast, remembrance spurs the drive for the conquest of suffering 
and the permanence of joy .... If the remembrance of things wast would become a 
motive power in the struggle for changing the world, the struggle would be waged 
for a revolution hitherto suppressed in the previous historical revolutions. 
(Marcuse 73) 
Art is essential to such a revolution because, by calling on the Erotic impulse, art breaks 
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us from the amnesia of reification and forces critical awareness. 
I have just reviewed several major arguments detailing the dialectical quality of 
art as its negotiation between a) the material and the spiritual (as in Hegel), b) the 
sensuous and the rational (as in Nietzsche), c) text and context, author and reader (as 
exemplified in Jameson), and d) the affirmation and negation of the reality principle 
(explicit in Marx and Marcuse especially). The dialectical tradition22 in aesthetic theory 
has a great deal to offer the current project because it is important to understand that the 
dialectical tensions within art are the terrain on which memories struggle, to unite the 
embodied and the imagined, to affirm or negate reality, and to realize any potentiality. 
Furthermore, evolutions in art theory are themselves evidence of a dialectical 
unfolding as a consequence of thought being shaped by memory. In other words, 
Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx, Jameson, and Marcuse bring related but different memory to 
bear on their subjects by virtue of their cultural inheritances, resulting in related but 
different outlooks on art's relationship to social life. Importantly, this development has 
a political character as it unfolds into a cultural materialist analysis in the tradition that I 
am reconstructing here. 
By establishing that memory responds to cultural production and vice versa, that 
they share a dialectical method of development, I am further substantiating the claim 
that memory and art should be thought together as a dialectical pair resulting in the 
concept of "cultural memory". This approach contrasts to the dominant biological view 
22 I have not tried to capture the entire tradition here. Others, such as Lukacs and 
Eagleton, have been omitted because I am trying to establish a connection between 
memory and dialectics more than a historical overview of the dialectical tradition. 
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of memory and the prevalent poststructuralist view of art. Neither viewpoint would 
perceive its object to be in the process of becoming. From such perspectives, memory 
is, it is stored and perhaps it can be lost23; likewise, a work of art may be open to a 
variety of interpretations in play, but there is no meaning to that variation (see Derrida 
above). Alternatively, from the perspective of feminist cultural materialism (which I 
will develop in the next chapter), there is always significance to the unfolding, and a 
desired (though not teleologically necessary) outcome concerning the enhancement of 
human capacities within an anti-oppression framework of analysis. 
Summary 
Memory is thus a subject of much contemporary concern but is under-theorized, 
which this dissertation seeks to remedy. As I have established, memory is the central 
means of solidarity building and is therefore fraught with power struggles; 
representation not only contains and transmits memory, but also ac:tualizes and 
incarnates it. I have here attempted to detail a definition of cultural memory through 
nodal points in aesthetic theory, thereby demonstrating the centrality of cultural 
memory to our understanding of art's social value and how exactly the arts process 
history. This has brought me to conclude that cultural memory facilitated through the 
arts can be understood as 
23 I am referring to cognitive neuroscience, for instance the Atkinson-Shiffrin model of 
memory which spatializes memory storage. 
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i) cognitive processes of reflection and integration of experiential knowledge, that 
compel collective and vicarious feeling, and lead to a learning by example 
ii) recollection of what lay beyond the reality principle, beyond the limitations of a 
present state of material existence 
iii) constructed knowledge in the service of political will and material advancement 
based on empathy, which is stimulated through a synthesis of the embodied and the 
intellectual modes of perception 
iv) unconscious processes related to the fragmented psyche that characterizes human 
experience within late capitalism, and its preoccupation with the management of desire 
These are claims that can be put to art when we consider the cultural memory dynamic 
of a work. More generally, they are claims on behalf of art's political function, and 
explanations of how the arts activate cultural memory. 
Finally, I have demonstrated that the dialectic of memory surrounds all other 
dialectics that are the terrain of art. I have used Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx, Jameson and 
Marcuse to identify many of those dialectics: the real and the ideal, Eros and Thanatos, 
life and death, affirmation and negation, art and society, desire and repression. The 
unfolding of these is determined by, and constitutes, cultural memory-what is 
remembered and what is forgotten. Consequently, this dialectical unfolding points 
toward a political principle. While Hegel initiates the dialectical understanding of art, 
Nietzsche informs us of its psychological impact on the subject and Marx informs us of 
the social implications; Jameson then subverts a postmodern dichotomy of 
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interpretation (i.e. grand narratives vs. open interpretation), and thereby demonstrates 
how subjects are activated by relative autonomy; and Marcuse gives us an expressly 
revolutionary interpretation of the dialectic of memory-forgetting and remembering-
that is always performed by art. Through this circuit we begin to perceive the potential 
for art to remember life, to awaken political will, and thereby be a force of power from 
below. 
The next chapter will explore this political principle by unpacking a concept of 
socialist feminism. Specifically, I will highlight the value of socialist feminism to 
politics, aesthetic analysis, and the concept of cultural memory, enabling me to 
establish and advance a socialist feminist approach to understanding art as cultural 
memory, before moving onto a case study that demonstrates its application in chapter 4. 
62 
Chapter 3: The Feminist Frame: A Consideration of Art's Social Value Often Excluded 
from Dominant Discourse 
This is the last of three chapters that are intended to establish a socialist feminist 
aesthetic theory of cultural memory as a means of understanding art's social value. In 
the first chapter I explored the social value of art and argued that art's principal social 
value might be found in its contribution to social change. In the second chapter, I 
explained cultural memory's contribution to social change as a mode of dialectical 
struggle, and I further developed the definition of "cultural memory" by examining the 
mnemonic dimension of the arts. In this chapter I will develop a political analysis of 
that dimension, which is a way of measuring the impact of the cultural memory 
dialectic (inherent to art) on progressive social change. Specifically, I will spell out the 
value of socialist feminism to social praxis, art, and the concept of cultural memory. I 
undertake this argument to establish the necessity of including socialist feminism in an 
aesthetic theory of cultural memory, since otherwise cultural memory is politically 
neutral, by which I mean that it can be cultivated to affirm any kind of political project. 
By proposing a socialist feminist theory of cultural memory I aim to reprioritize and 
develop a dialectical reading of art that would be sensitive to how the arts impact social 
dynamics of power and oppression. This theoretical model can help us remain attune to 
the positive potential of aesthetics because it brings to aesthetic analysis a life-enabling 
politics. 
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Thinking Socialism & Feminism Together 
I begin with the contention that feminism and socialism are a politically and 
intellectually essential pairing because of the material insight they offer each other. 
Before exploring their relationship I must first define these terms. Broadly conceived, 
socialism concerns itself with the mutually embedded quality of social and economic 
relations. It encompasses an array of philosophical branches and political projects, but 
on the whole it represents an analysis that perceives the impact of society on the 
individual and the agency of individuals in creating social systems, while critiquing the 
exploitative nature of capitalist economic systems. I consciously avoid employing the 
term "materialism" in place of "socialism", despite my affinity with cultural 
materialism (Williams), because of the recent tendency for theorists to employ 
"materialism" devoid of economic or structural analysis (e.g. thing theory, or what 
Teresa Ebert has termed "matterism"). Likewise, while I acknowledge my debt to the 
Frankfurt School, I have avoided the term "critical theory" because it has come to refer 
to all forms of cultural critique, as compared to the specifically Marxist analysis 
practiced by the Frankfurt theorists. I have chosen to use the term "socialism" to 
denote a specific kind of political economy analysis that identifies and rejects the logic 
of capitalism. I am using the term "socialism" over "Marxism" not because I believe it 
to be better in all cases and on all occasions, but because it offers a broader approach to 
aesthetics. Marxism is a form of socialism that adheres to the principle that life is 
determined foremost by economic systems. Socialism can prioritize equally the state, 
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culture, and economics. 
While socialism concurs with Marxism that the mode of production is 
fundamental to life, and must therefore be a sustained aspect of aesthetic theory and 
cultural criticism, it also considers other conditions of life (e.g. patriarchy, Eros) to be 
significant to full human potentiality. Furthermore, art cannot be fully co-opted by 
capitalism for this reason; it holds life-values within it. This is essentially Marcuse's 
argument in The Aesthetic Dimension. The arts remember these life values, even when 
they are otherwise neglected within society at-large. Indeed, this is the revolutionary 
potential of art as cultural memory, as a return of the repressed under, but not confined 
to, capitalism. So I embrace the term "socialism" with reference to this life-affirming 
conception of culture and economics. 
The socialist critique of capitalism is of central importance to my theory of 
cultural memory. Capitalist economic activity is unique because it depends upon the 
"private and exclusionary ownership of the means of production [i.e. land, labour and 
capital] for profit" (McMurtry & Reed 9). A socialist analysis assesses capitalism's 
failure on at least two accounts: efficiency and externalities. It is questionable whether 
pursuing a social good (i.e. the raison d'etre of the marketplace) by private and 
exclusionary means is efficient, but capitalism is certainly inefficient if we account for 
the cost of externalities (such as human health and environmental degradation), which 
are normally excluded from the capitalist frame. A third and similar criticism is that the 
profit imperative creates inefficiencies and undermines social good by demanding 
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limitless and unsustainable growth. Finally, the dependence of profit on surplus labour 
value (i.e. value above and beyond owners' capital costs) institutionalizes inequality 
because it systematizes dependence upon the benevolence of owners to reinvest profits 
in the corporation and its workers, much as feudal states depend upon the benevolence 
of noble lords. Concurrently, (and in contradiction) the capitalist marketplace is 
founded upon a profoundly erroneous assumption that self-interest is the primary 
motive force of human behaviour.24 
While socialism offers this critique of the oppressive nature of capitalism, it has 
also been criticized for failing to grasp the gendered nature of capitalism or the 
patriarchal basis of oppression beyond the economic system. Feminism should be 
linked with socialism because it is the first social theory to centrally address gendered 
oppression; for that reason, it can be claimed that social theory before feminism was 
"distorted and ideological in the sense of presenting a view of reality which masks 
oppression. Thus a feminist materialism is a necessary precondition for the 
development not only of feminist theory but of general social theory" (Hirsch, drawing 
on Christine Delphy, 221 ). A socialism without feminism is unable to perceive the 
scope of social relations embedded in the economic sphere. Likewise, feminism 
without socialism is insufficiently equipped to challenge the economic basis of power. 
In so far as economic and gendered social relations underwrite artistic production, they 
play a significant role in art's construction of cultural memory. 
24 See Wade Rowland's analysis of capitalist theory for evidence and critique of this 
underlying rationale, which is founded in utilitarianism, scientific rationalism and 
Protestantism. 66 
I also want to assert that a socialist feminist theory can tackle the field of art with 
a dialectical critique of the personal and political. A dialectical critique is available 
through socialist feminist theory because this theoretical approach maintains that "the 
personal [i.e. the individuated experience of power] is always an effect of social and 
economic contradictions and conflicts" (Ebert 13). In chapter 1 I 'argued that 
subjectivity (which I define as the intersection of the individual and collective) is the 
locus of social change. A socialist feminist analysis is well positioned to access that 
potential for social change, given subjectivity's dependence on the personal/political 
dynamic, the dialectic between agency and structure. 
Within art history there has been a systematic marginalization of the feminist 
problematic that I examine here; this marginalization is related among other factors to 
the development of capitalism. Patriarchy has historically disenfranchised female 
cultural producers by excluding them from guilds, academies, and academic curriculum 
(Nochlin, "Why"), but Shiner shows us how economic conditions have also served to 
sideline female artists. He tells us that the expanding role of the market in the 
eighteenth century, moving away from patronage, created competitive demand for 
creative genius and reinforced a division between work and home. This process 
relegated women to domestic labour while assigning genius and inspiration to the 
domain of men. Such alienation persists in the economic conditions of cultural 
production today since 
women are still far from equal when it comes to the art market. .. where the 
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monetary value of their work is far lower than men's; and the male to female 
ratios at galleries and museums are greatly imbalanced, with few exceptions. 
Women are also often excluded from exhibitions within which one would think 
they would play major roles, and women curators are rarely invited to organize 
the more prestigious international exhibitions. (Nochlin & Reilly 19) 
Given this inequality, no credible effort to change conditions within the art world-or 
outside of it--can afford to overlook the persistence of such a gender imbalance, nor 
the significance of gender-biased economic systems, with all of their wide-ranging and 
mutually embedded implications for the field of cultural production in general and 
women's lives in particular. 
I do not mean to claim that feminist critique has made no impression on the arts. 
It has in fact played "a central role in the development of critical models of reading 
visual imagery in visual culture and its related disciplines of art history, film theory, 
television studies, and the visually oriented arms of media, new media, and cultural 
studies" (Jones 3). However, this influence has been primarily the effect of a 1960s-
1980s surge in gender critique by theorists such as Laura Mulvey and Teresa de 
Lauretis, and by artists such as Judy Chicago and Louise Bourgeois. The influence of 
feminism on the arts has also been reduced by critiques of its monocultural 
essentialism. 
Such critiques have led to a diversification of feminisms, many of which have 
become associated with identity politics, playing with the discursive construction of 
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identity and seeking to subvert totalizing discourses. In addition to the challenge of 
patriarchy and capitalism, feminism must now overcome the shortcomings of such 
discursively centred-strategies, which have tended to neglect a materialist critique. For 
example, Judith Butler and Julia Kristeva, in terms of nodal points in art theory, leave 
one without a way of reading art beyond the terrain of desire and its performativity, the 
body as text and the representation of difference. The prevalence of their approach is 
evidenced in celebrated, sexually explicit performances from artists such as Annie 
Sprinkle and Carolee Schneeman, whose work is documented along with thirteen artists 
of similar ilk in Angry Women. In this volume, bell hooks explains her own career in 
acutely discursive terms: "My work is almost a psychoanalytical project that also takes 
place in the realm of what one might call 'performance'-a lot of my life has been a 
performance, in a way" (79). This quote reflects the influence of psychoanalytic and 
performance theory on her cohort (and in-tum on their proteges ), and the tendency 
therein to problematically conflate everyday, material existence (life) with discursive 
action, persona, and psychosomatic desire at the expense of materialist critique. 
Similarly, Chadwick notes that feminist deconstructive practices have often been 
conflated with a postmodern critique of discourse (3 82), and preoccupied with the 
representation of difference ( 400). While such discursively centred methods are 
imperative to the deconstruction of gender and power relations, diversifying responses 
to power and highlighting agency, (they generally ignore) the economic conditions of 
society and the possibility of social movements25; they are therefore limited in scope to 
25 Consider for instance Annie Sprinkle' s gqm work. While some of Sprinkle' s work 
addressing the perceptions and actions of individuals, rather than a more collective, 
political project. Without being able to reckon with materialism, this strategy focuses 
on the discursive agent as the only source of change. 
The problem with a centrally discursive approach to social change, which is not 
unique to feminism, can be seen in critiques of Jurgen Habermas, a second generation 
critical theorist whose work has reinforced this linguistic tum. He has argued that 
discourse is the primary field of battle since communication precedes labour in the 
production of norms. While this is not entirely untrue, the consequent imperative for 
ideal speech acts limits the value of his analysis. What is required for communicative 
action is that all biases be first abandoned, but we know that economic bias represents a 
relationship to power that is not easily put down. We also know that discursively 
created needs cannot always be resolved discursively (e.g. I need an iPad); when it is a 
question of self-discipline, I may not be able to overcome my urges. Furthermore, 
material needs (e.g. healthcare) cannot only be resolved discursively. While dialogue, 
individual action, identity, performance, and the subversion of power therein are 
has contributed positively to sexual awareness, much of it has also been uncritical and 
inward looking. Her embrace of the porn industry has legitimated it as a site of capitalist 
exploitation and undermined the feminist movement's foundational investment in the 
idea that the personal is political because she promotes porn as a mode of individual 
agency and self-empowerment, as though it had no broader consequences. As a result, 
"she has spoken of her time in the industry as 'a learning experience.: learning what I do 
and don't want to do, how to say No, learning what I like and what I don't like .... !think 
that if I was a victim, in a sense I was just as responsible as the victimizer - that sounds 
harsh, but whenever that happened I'm sure I created a lot of it. So I take responsibility 
for any exploitation that occurred"' (Garretson, italics original). In attempting to centre 
the self in this evaluation of porn, Sprinkle abandons a feminist analysis of power and its 
basis in the material conditions of labour. 
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politically important maneuvers, a structural critique addresses and enables reform of 
the economic base. Both approaches are necessary, but both are not equally represented 
within the literature and practice of feminist aesthetics. 
Third wave feminism has shifted the focus, in art and elsewhere, to play, sexual 
power, and individual freedom, in response to the sometimes homogenizing and 
essentializing tendencies of second wave feminism, but it has done this at the expense 
of the second wave' s analysis of institutional, political and economic structures, often 
leaving the material and collective realm of human practice unexamined. 26 The effect 
is not unlike that of environmental activists who concentrate on the promotion of 
recycling and green consumerism (i.e. what the individual can do for the environment), 
while accepting the structural conditions of environmental exploitation, such as 
economies dependent on unsustainable resources and the perpetuation of 
environmentally devastating war. While retrofitting my home with Energy Star 
products may be a wise choice, doing so does not absolve me from the necessity to 
oppose the tar sands through legal reform, backed by a critique of capitalist 
consumption. Likewise, while oppressive sexual taboos may be chaHenged by feminist 
porn and pornographic personas (see for instance Shu Lea Cheang's film lK. U., 
Valerie Export's Aktionshose Genitalpanick, and Lynda Benglis' dildo ad in Artforumn 
26 I am not claiming that no alternative exists; encouraging examples can be found in in 
Nagar and Swarr's work for instance, which examines how praxis is being undertaken 
through north-south collaborations between academics and non-academics. But such 
projects and approaches are not dominant. 
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1974), these do not adequately challenge, and may even reinforce, sexual violence, 
which is the logical result of a capitalist ethos that commodities female bodies. 
When one goes in search of a more concrete and politicized aesthetic theory, a 
socialist feminist aesthetic theory that would enable social transformation and empower 
a non-identitarian politics, one finds little beyond the Guerilla Girls' activism as a guide 
in the absence of other economically and historically situated modes of feminist 
analysis, with perhaps the lone exception of Janet Wolff. This is what motivates my 
effort here to establish the principles of a socialist feminist aesthetic theory and to 
demonstrate, through a case study in curatorial practice, how valuable such principles 
might be to the practice of art, criticism, and cultural policy. 
While I prefer the term "socialism" for the reasons I have outlined above, I am 
necessarily drawing from Marxist aesthetic theory27, which identifies the trace of 
economic relations in representation and perceives art as a reckoning with alienation 
under capitalism. Marxist aesthetic analysis offers us a way of understanding the 
relation between art and society as dialectical, but it has historically been blind to the 
intersectionality28 of identity and oppression. Feminism corrects this with an 
intersectional politics, imperative to social change29• 
27 Specifically Marx, Burger, Marcuse, Jameson and Adorno 
28 Intersectionality is "the relationships among multiple dimensions and modalities of 
social relationships and subject formations" (McCall 1771). An intersectional analysis of 
oppression recognizes how differing and distinct forms of oppression are interrelated and 
complicated by the multiplicity of the subject. 
29 I am attributing intersectional politics to feminism because I trace it back to the efforts 
and ideas of feminists (e.g. bell hooks, Audre Lord, Kimberlie Crensh~w) who have 
engaged class and race politics with gender analysis, and have also urged feminism to be 
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Feminism is always useful to a critique of capitalism in particular because, even 
if it was not patriarchal, capitalism would continue to be an oppressive formation and 
feminism offers a historically grounded analysis of oppression and its intersectionality. 
Therefore, it is a necessary modifier to a socialist30 political economy since socialism 
has not consistently encompassed anti-oppression, just as socialism is a necessary 
adjunct to a feminism that has not always engaged with collective struggle or the 
economic base. 
Finally, the political necessity to take seriously the feminist paradigm is 
evidenced by the fact that "more girls and women are now missing from the planet, 
precisely because they are female, than men were killed on the battlefield in all the wars 
of the 20th century. The number of victims of this routine 'gendercide' far exceeds the 
number of people who were slaughtered in all the genocides of the 20th century" 
(Kristoff & WuDunn 3). This reality leaves us with little recourse but to confront the 
gendered dimension of political struggle. It also brings to bear, on any discourse 
analysis, the necessity to conceive of the material impact of discourse, through a 
socialist framework that renders such analysis germane. In other words, while a study 
of art may seem to be an indirect approach to addressing violence against women or the 
material conditions of life, I undertake it in the belief that the status of women and of 
art are intrinsically related by the logic of late capitalism, and that, at base, recognition 
cognizant of difference beyond gender. (See Anderson & Hill Collins for other 
examples). 
30 I am moving from Marxism to socialism here, taking Marxism to be a philosophy 
underlying socialist politics, which are also informed by other philosophies, such as 
anarchism 
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of this fact is necessary to their mutual advancement. Both are reduced by the 
expansion of the commodity-form and the ideology of identitariah exchange into social 
and cultural life, which suppresses difference. 
In the first section of this chapter, I have argued for the value of socialist 
feminism in addressing the status of women and cultural production. In the following 
pages I will present a way of understanding the dialectical dimensions of feminism and 
its value for social change by providing an overview of its contributions to art and, 
through art, to social praxis. I will then explore the relationship between feminism and 
cultural memory to substantiate a feminist aesthetic theory of cultural memory. I will 
ultimately be able to distinguish cultural memory from discourse, as a mediator 
between material reality and ideology, which goes some distance to explain how 
conceiving of art as cultural memory empowers our understanding of its potential role 
in social change. 
Major Contributions of Feminist Art & Criticism to Social Praxis: The 
Personal/ Political Dialectic 
To build a socialist feminist aesthetic theory, it is necessary to begin with a 
historical consciousness of feminism's contribution to art criticism and vice versa. In 
as much as feminism has informed cultural production, it could be argued that feminist 
art has served as a model for feminist thought, and as a basis for an intersectional 
analysis of oppression in particular. As Teresa de Lauretis has argued, an analysis of 
74 
intersectional frameworks of oppression became "inscribed" in women's cinema before 
it was "sufficiently focused on in feminist film theory or feminist critical practice in 
general" (de Lauretis 138-139). Artistic practice can be a source of innovation for 
social theory. 
Feminist art, by which I mean art that articulates a challenge to patriarchal culture 
and an alliance with feminist issues, can be useful to feminist theory because art's 
dialectical nature facilitates the continuing and creative evolution of feminism as a 
theory of change. It is the dialectical character of art (outlined in chapters 1 and 2) that 
renders it a ground of innovation for feminist thought. Feminist art informs theory "as 
a mode of praxis that brings together material and thought, embodiment and 
knowledge" (Meskimmon 395). Consequently, feminist art theory "can speak 
eloquently to the wider project of feminist scholarship ... .in as much as feminist art 
theory enacts the transdisciplinary movement between ideas, objects and images, 
creating resonances and making new connections ... " (Meskimmon 395). A central 
connection revealed within feminist aesthetics is that between the personal and the 
political, a dialectic that is key to feminist thought. I refer here to the notion, as it was 
originally conceived, that the domestic sphere to which women have been historically 
confined is not merely private and individuated but characterized intrinsically by 
conditions common among women because they are structured by economic relations. 
These economic relations in tum correspond to patriarchal ideology and in their 
commonality provide the basis for women's solidarity against the limited and limiting 
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effects of their containment. The dialectic extends further, linking the individual man's 
struggle with his own sense of masculinity, to social organization at-large, and so on. 
Feminist artists have framed this dialectic through various means. De Lauretis 
suggests that the dominant themes of feminist cinema can be captured by the phrase 
"the personal is political": 
The gender-specific division of women in language, the distance from official 
culture, the urge to imagine new forms of community as well as to create new 
images ('creating something else to be'), and the consciousness of a 'subjective 
factor' at the core of all kinds of work-domestic, industrial, artistic, critical, or 
political work-are some of the themes articulating the particular relation of 
subjectivity, meaning, and experience which en-genders the social subject as 
female. (de Lauretis 145) 
The fact that feminist art has grappled thematically with these many articulations of the 
personal/political dialectic indicates the wide-ranging, critical potential of the aesthetic 
realm. 
In addition to thematic concerns, feminist art has engaged with the 
personal/political by attempting to develop what Hilde Hein calls an "aesthetic of 
experience" which seeks to avoid "adopting male language and truth claiming" (Quoted 
in Jensen 142). Such an aesthetic questions traditional subjects, forms and methods, 
which historically have objectified the female other and reproduced patriarchal myths. 
We see evidence of that aesthetic in feminist memorials, such as Vancouver's Marker 
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of Change or Ottawa's Enclave31 , which document individual women's experience of 
violence. These are different from traditional memorials that valorize men, either for 
attaining some measure of material success or for dying as combatants of war. In 
contrast, feminist memorials put into question the criteria for public recognition and the 
dynamics of war, countering soldiers and "heroes" to the objects and victims of 
violence. Likewise, feminist memorial makers concern themselves withformal 
innovations in the memorial/public monument genre. For instance, these works tend to 
employ a horizontal plane, creating meditative, gathering spaces to promote collective 
healing and activism, as opposed to the vertical and even phallic icons common in 
traditional memorials that have tended to absolve us of the responsibility to act or to 
actively remember by reifying social consciousness. In both form and content, feminist 
art has aimed to capture the specificity of personal experience and to reveal the politics 
of representation that normally exclude it, thereby subverting the power relations under 
scrutiny. This activity has served to write women into the historical record, making 
them visible as they had not been before within the field of representation, on their own 
terms. 
The necessity to subvert the master's tools through aesthetic innovation stems 
from the extent to which "male gaze" has become implicated in representation and 
internalized by the female subject. This dynamic is another manifestation of the 
personal/political dialectic found in art criticism. It results from the gendered nature of 
31 See the Cultural Memory Group for a discussion of these and other feminist 
memorials. 
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artistic production and the reproduction of patriarchal perspectives by which the female 
subject is interpellated, or called into identification with a social position. Nochlin 
concisely articulates Laura Mulvey's theory of the gaze when she writes "there are two 
choices open to the woman spectator: either to take the place of the male or to accept 
the position of male-created seductive passivity and the questionable pleasure of 
masochism-lack of power to the nth degree" (Nochlin, Women 30). Nochlin adds, 
"this positioning of course offers an analogue to the actual status of women in the 
power structure of the art world-with the exception of the privileged few" (Nochlin, 
Women 30). The claim here is that since women are interpellated by patriarchal 
representations of women, they are prepared to reproduce a patriarchal power dynamic 
through false consciousness. 32 
Despite this reproductive dynamic, feminist art has also revealed that gender is 
susceptible to counter-construction by discourse. As de Lauretis explains, 
the construction of gender goes on today through the various technologies of 
gender [e.g. cinema] and institutional discourses [e.g. theory] with power to 
control the field of social meaning and thus produce, promote, and 'implant' 
representations of gender. But the terms of a different construction of gender 
also exist, in the margins of hegemonic discourses (de Lauretis 18). 
The constructed quality of gender makes room for the deconstruction of discursive 
patriarchy through artistic practices that pursue "the deaestheticization of the female 
32 The structure and management of arts institutions, the very mechanisms of collective 
representation, also become cites of patriarchal reproduction as a result of people 
occupying institutional roles. I will consider this problem further in chapter 5. 
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body, the desexualization of violence, the deoedipalization of narrative, and so forth" 
(de Lauretis 146). For de Lauretis, feminist art constitutes not a feminist aesthetic but a 
feminist deaesthetic33, a deconstructive practice such as is performed by Orlan in her 
confrontation with cosmetic surgery. By exploring socially relative forms of female 
beauty, this artist enters into the abject and grotesque-her own surgical deformation-
which not only problematizes cultural "universals", but forces us to witness their 
inherent violence. 
Perhaps what Orlan's practice best illustrates is that a feminist, deconstructive 
analysis, which concerns itself with cultural representation, can also transcend 
discursive critique by revealing the susceptibility of art to bias and the material 
implications of that bias through material intervention. Consequently, it establishes or 
re-privileges the relationship between art and social change by challenging assumptions 
of art's disinterestedness (Wark 28). We cannot assume that the arts occupy a separate 
realm since they are in fact affected by social power dynamics. A conception of art that 
33 This term is similar to Hal Foster's postmodern "anti-aesthetic" which questions the 
categories of taste and universality. It is also "sensitive" to alternative, marginal 
aesthetic practice "engaged in a politic" (Foster xv). But the term differs somewhat from 
de Lauretis' concept since she is writing specifically about undoing the objectification of 
women's bodies. This can be done in a way that challenges traditional aesthetic 
vernacular and categories. However, de Lauretis addresses the inhelient risk of 
reproducing oppressive frameworks through opposition, emphasizing instead aesthetic 
attempts to actively deconstruct patriarchy from within. She seeks t© revise narratives of 
coherence but-unlike Faster, who embraces differance and claims that "we are never 
outside representation or its politics" (Foster xv)--de Lauretis wants to do so by 
foregrounding the contradiction defining the feminist subject as "both inside and outside 
the ideology of gender" (de Lauretis 114 ), as extra-discursive. 
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masks gender politics obstructs art's capacity to gain social status through social 
engagement. A politically engaged conception of art is a necessary if insufficient 
condition to restore art's social status. Perhaps the chief contribution of feminism to 
art, and of feminist art to social life, is located in this capacity of the personal/political 
dialectic to empower art's relationship to everyday life by revealing (through thematic 
exploration and formal innovation, as well as theories of the gaze and counter 
discourse), that the arts are susceptible to gender bias, having political impact on private 
lives and politically amplifying private lives. 
I do not mean that the intersection of the self and the social order had not been 
theorized prior to feminism. There is a long history of related, identitarian politics 
(Ghandi and Marx are examples). But the feminist movement can be credited with 
crystallizing and popularizing the idea that the personal is political, and it is a 
movement as old or older than others that convey a similar analysis (such as 
postcolonialism or modem sociology). I do not aim to privilege one movement over 
another but rather to highlight, especially in the aesthetic field, how feminism has 
played a leading critical role. As Jayne Wark explains, "from the conventional Leftist 
focus on classes and masses, feminism shifted the focus to a concept of the political as 
emerging from and merging with the personal. In this way, feminist artists enabled the 
kind of direct engagement between art and the politics of everyday life that had seemed 
so daunting to their male peers at the time" (Wark 5). To this extent, it behooves us to 
remember the unique quality of a feminist perspective, which is why I have identified 
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some of the central achievements of feminist aesthetic theory, highlighting the 
contribution of feminist thought to aesthetics and of feminist aesthetics to social 
thought. 
Ultimately, I want to argue that while the rift between art and everyday life has 
been navigated by the personal/political dialectic, realizing that dialectic depends on the 
function of cultural memory, not simply discourse, as a bridge. Consequently, a 
feminist cultural memory analysis enables us to understand art's potential to influence 
social change beyond discourse. 
Feminism, Art and Memory 
First, let us consider feminisms' association with cultural memory. The chief 
contribution of feminism to the development of cultural memory has been its analysis 
of the personal/political dialectic under patriarchy. In fact, 
one of the more intensive and extensive memory projects is that prompted by the 
feminist critique of patriarchy. Starting with the idea that women had been 
largely excluded from the historical record and extending this idea to the still-to-
be record of contemporary life, feminist writers and scholars set out first to 
document women's experiences, women's perspectives, and women's roles. 
Whether the field be art, literature, music, science, or politics, the task is to 
retrieve what had been lost, to reevaluate what had been present. ... What has 
been provided by the numerous investigations is the informational base on which 
81 
collective memory can be restructured. (Zarecka 133-134) 
By representing individual lives with regard to their social conditions and contributions, 
feminism has sought to rehabilitate cultural memory, or make it more inclusive, through 
a revamped historical record and folk familiarity with women's voices. This activity 
extended new historicism's enfranchisement of social history by giving particular 
attention to the gendered nature of historigraphy. This movement has contributed to the 
concept of cultural memory as a collective understanding of private lives, embedded in 
cultural life, or as the meeting of personal and political identifications facilitated by 
cultural media. 
Given the investment of feminism in cultural memory, it is not surprising that 
feminist art commonly concerns the propagation of personal memory as political agent, 
and the personal internalization of socially held and politically infused memories. A 
feminist art preoccupation with memory is evident in a special edition of Matriart 
(1996), the United Kingdom's "Textures of Memory" exhibition34 (Hamlyn), and 
academic articles such as Renee Baerts' "Materializing Memory: The Clothing Works 
of Faye HeavyShield". Writing of HeavyShield's work, Baert effectively summarizes 
what can be said generally concerning the cultural memory work of feminist art: these 
works 
serve to anchor collective remembering, and in doing so to counter a dominant 
representational regime that places marginalized identities under erasure .... 
34 This exhibition was a curatorial partnership between Pennera Barnett and Pamela 
Johnson, and featured seven artists from the UK, Canada and the USA. It was shown at 
Angel Row in Nottingham, London's Pitshanger, and Birmingham's Mac (Hamlyn 40). 
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Yet. .. these works, founded upon memory, are neither held in the orbit of the past 
nor seek to 'transcend' its travails. Rather, they materialize memory and its 
capture within the body with great power even as they create, through material 
and form, metaphoric 'spaces' of renewal and possibility. (Baerts 49, italics 
original) 
The materialism of art both is, and represents the potential of a real transformation in 
the material realm as an effect of representation rooted in memory and its production. 
This is the case in the materialism of the work of art, which externalizes memory, and 
in the potential of that externalization to work upon the bodies of its audience who, as 
actors in the world, might bring its effects forward in conscious conduct. 
Further demonstrating the prevalence of cultural memory as a common, 
dialectical discourse within feminism, Pollock and Sauron suggest that "the past, 
whether in the form of visual or literary culture, myth or personal history or trauma, 
interacts with the present in the formation of a space both deeply personal to the 
creative artist, writer or academic but also able to negotiate much wider questions" of 
social and political significance (Pollock & Sauron 5). This duality leads me to 
conclude that, in effect, the dialectic of memory (past/present) corresponds with the 
feminist dialectic (personal/political). Personal memory (the past) can be incorporated 
into collective consciousness (the political present) and vice versa. In this sense the 
project of feminism is a cultural memory project. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I wish to argue that the mutual investment of 
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feminism and cultural memory is also a basis for grounding each in the material 
because each grounds the other in the experience of women's lives and in their 
transformation. Here I will be distinguishing cultural memory from discourse by 
developing a chain of relations between material reality, memory, and discourse. 
Memory as Material 
Cultural memory can be understood to have a material dimension, or be relevant 
to materialism, in at least two closely related ways: first, through its aesthetic and 
sensory dimensions and second, through its mediation between discourse and material 
reality enabled by its aesthetic and sensory dimensions. I will examine the first claim 
with reference to the work of Catriona Sandilands, Susannah Radstone, and Jill Bennett 
to establish a basis for the second claim. 
We can understand memory as material in so far as it derives from and is 
stimulated by our physical interaction with the world around us. As Sandilands 
explains, 
both the written page and the storied landscape are warehouses of memory that 
are external to the individual body ... the fact remains that the act of vemembering 
involves a recognition of a relationship between the body/mind and the external 
world that is not only determined by internal forces. The experience of memory 
is thus always already social, technological, and physical in that the conditions of 
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the relationship between brain and object cannot help but be located in a complex 
range of conditions that offer the subject to the experience, and experience to the 
subject. (Mortimer-Sandliands 274) 
Memory is not merely internal; it is also experiential because it is stimulated by the 
physical world. Through Sandilands' analysis, we can perceive that memory exceeds 
the individual intellect because it is externally mediated. This is a useful way of 
relating memory to the material world, but it is limited because it suggests that memory 
does not exceed the signs which store memory, and is therefore stiH seemingly akin to 
discourse, although these signs have a material manifestation. The distinction between 
the material and the discursive is not clear. So while memory may be impacted by the 
physical world, this alone cannot explain how memory might have material impact or 
how it might be distinct from discourse. 
Radstone moves memory away from discourse when she posits that it draws on 
the "felt knowledge of one's own history and cultural formation" (13), which might be 
liberatory because it enables the transformation of identity. This theory begins to more 
clearly distinguish memory from discourse because emotion (i.e. Radstone's "felt 
knowledge) is pre or post-discursive. Discourse can participate in creating emotions, 
but one can experience emotions regardless of whether or not one has a discourse 
through which to make emotions meaningful. This is at least a non-discursive, if not a 
material, understanding. So, through Radstone, we can begin to conceive of memory as 
more than discursive. 
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Bennett's work takes our conception of memory closer to materialism in her 
analysis of art associated with trauma. She investigates contemporary visual art such as 
film, theatre, and sculpture that is relational because it is not concerned so much with a 
particular subject's interior condition as it is with the extension of trauma in space and 
time, the translation of post-traumatic memory from interior to exterior (Bennett 12). 
These works rely on the transaction of sensation rather than the communication of 
personal experience, to leads us "toward a conceptual engagement with the work" 
through sensory experience, rather than a more reductive "emotional identification or 
sympathy" (Bennett 7). The intellectual shock of such work generates within the 
audience an empathetic memory that compels critical inquiry rather than the 
appropriation or objectification of others' experience or an over-concentration on the 
artist's subjective experience. It does not rely on the shock of violent imagery but on 
the more enduring impression of trauma's after effects. Both the individual and 
collective memory can thereby be sustained. Neither need annihilate the other. In fact, 
they inform one another. This dialectic is fertile and irresolvable. It moves us past 
capitalist preoccupation with individual experience (i.e. consumer choice, libertarian 
ethics, identitarian politics) as opposed to the relational, and it resonates with historical 
arguments concerning art as a dialectical engagement of the embodied and the 
intellectual, which I have argued in chapter 1 is key to our understanding of art's social 
value. As both an intellectual and embodied entity, arising from the meeting of 
sensorial perception and intellectual reflection, memory relates the discursive to the 
86 
non-discursive at the level of the individual. But Bennett demonstrates how this 
engagement between the body and mind expands outside of subjective experience to 
become relational and shared through sensory experience. Art is a relationa/35 means 
of engendering memory that renders it "a political rather than a subjective 
phenomenon" because the memory materially extends, spatially and temporally, in the 
work of art and in the bodies of its audience (Bennett 12). This is what for Bennett 
constitutes art's "empathic vision" which "understands or enacts the political as a 
sphere of interconnection, in which subjectivities are forged and sustained, but within 
which new links might be traced between subjects and places with only limited 
experience in common" (Bennett 21 ). Therefore, the extent to which art embodies and 
incites sensory, experiential memory (which is material in the first sense) through 
reception implicates it in not only personal memory, but in collective memory of 
political importance because it is the basis for material action. 
I want to expand on this notion of the material impact of memory to argue that, 
through its sensory capacity to evoke empathic vision, cultural memory essentially 
35 While Bennett calls this kind of work an "aesthetics of relations" (21) she does not 
reference Bourriaud' s "relational aesthetics". What Bennett describes is closely related 
to Bourriaud' s characterization of artwork that represents or prompts social relations 
(Bourriaud 112) but Bourriaud's concept is broader than Bennett's. Bennett is interested 
specifically in the transaction of the sensation of trauma. Another differenc.e between 
these two approaches to the relational is in their perception of art's political potential. 
For Bennett, empathic vision is actively political by virtue of engendering critical 
insight" into the experience of others (Bennett 152). For Bourriaud, aesthetic 
relationalism is political in so far as it challenges the reduction of social relations within 
a privatized and automated social context (Bourriaud 17). I have chosen to write about 
Bennett rather than Bourriaud because her work is centrally concerned with affect, or 
how a work can "transcribe sense memory into common memory" (Bennett 29) to 
develop audiences' understanding of issues. 
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mediates between discourse and the material world in a way that explains the impact of 
discourse on the construction of actual truths and material practices. In other words, 
memory mediates between past, present and future experience, and between reality 
(past and present) and the discursive (in which the future exists). It therefore writes the 
future and translates through discourse into the material reality that unfolds. This is 
different from praxis, which is the product of the synthesis of discourse and action, 
rather than a mediator between the two. Variations in material reality, which exists 
outside of discourse, lead to changes in discourse over time via memory. 
For example, imperialist practices combine with religious fundamentalism to 
produce a discourse concerning the prevalent threat of terrorism; or an earthquake hits 
Haiti, and this begins to re-enter Haiti into cultural memory, manifesting in a discourse 
concerning poverty. This is not to claim that the memory is permanent, or singular. 
However, the circuit of connection-material-memory-discourse-material-memory-
discourse-is ongoing and bi-directional, so that when a discourse (e.g. capitalism as 
freedom) becomes congealed in memory it shapes material reality (e.g. the free 
expansion of capitalism), and memory also transforms material reality (e.g. racial 
discrimination) into discourse (e.g. "racism"). The chain of relations I propose here 
develops the concept of cultural memory with an explicit understanding of its material 
impact and distinction from discourse that is lacking in the literature. Cultural memory 
is not only stored in the material realm; it produces material conditions and generates 
discourse from the material. This chain of relations grounds our understanding of art's 
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social value in a materialist framework, thereby addressing a lacuna of materialism in 
the critical scholarship around discourse and the politics of aesthetics. 
Donald F. Bouchard seems to capture this chain of relations in microcosm when 
he writes about Foucauldian theory in his introduction to Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice. His title signifies the chain of relations between the human sciences 
(language), modern literature (counter-memory) and social life (practice), a chain that 
Bouchard employs to characterize Foucault's work. However, for Bouchard the 
meaning of counter-memory is found only in what is absent-as for Foucault the 
meaning of texts is found in the social milieu external to them, or for Nietzsche in the 
oppressed will. Consequently, Foucault concerns himself with identifying and 
categorizing absented discourses as an array of differences, without evaluating them 
from a material standpoint. Specifically, he does not consider, as I will, the economic 
conditions of cultural production, and the myriad historical voices and political projects 
contingent upon them. This limitation also compromises his historical trajectory. 
Whereas I wish to argue that the cultural memory making capacity of art extends 
throughout the dialectic of history, and is not just an advent of modernism, for Foucault 
a counter-memory of alternative sexuality, for instance, only becomes possible in the 
modern period, following the disruption of power dynamics by revolutionary events. 
In summary, I have argued that cultural memory is used and produced by 
discourse and is not interchangeable with it. Cultural memory is congealed discourse-
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what discourse must become before it can translate into material reality36, and it is 
material reality becoming discourse. This is what distinguishes Bennett's concept of 
sense memory from the general, discursive idea of memory narratives, and renders it 
another dimension of art's social value. For instance, writing of Doris Salcedo' s work, 
Bennett claims that the work of art enables an "enactment of the sense memory--or 
trauma. Thus, it is not simply the nature of the object that is important (as is the case 
with the knife that evokes pain) but the fact of its transformation, its subjection to the 
process of remaking, its 'becoming strange.' ... [This] transformation testifies not to a 
singular experience but ... to the cyclical nature of the violence" (Bennett 67). Here it 
seems to me that cultural memory transforms the material (knife) into discourse 
(violence). Bennett views this transformation as political not in terms of the passive 
representation of political propositions, but in so far as it actively engenders critical 
thought by producing "embodied perception" that can "shift perspective" (Bennett 152). 
As an analytic tool of materialism then, cultural memory, which finds a vehicle in art, is 
a useful means of explaining how discourse and the non-discursive engage with and 
respond to one another. 
36 For example, the criminal tendencies of immigrants is a discursive notion that becomes 
an increasingly prevalent reality when it is internalized as memory by people who a) 
create social structures (such as under-funded schools and exploitative,employment) that 
push immigrants toward crime through resource deprivation or b) begih to see 
themselves as criminal, as a consequence of narrativization, and therefore beceme prone 
toward actual criminal activity. This movement from discourse to material truth is 
essentially Foucault's knowledge/power concept, although he omits articulation of the 
intermediary--cultural memory. 
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A common critique of discourse theory (as noted above) is that it fails to 
adequately account for or address material existence. Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman 
comment on the need to bridge discourse and material reality when they note a self-
contradictory tendency within postmodern discourse theory as a result of its over-
investment in the linguistic: 
Although postmodems claim to reject all dichotomies, there is one dichotomy that 
they appear to embrace almost without question: language/reality .... they have 
rejected one side and embraced the other. Even though many social 
constructionist theories grant the existence of material reality, that reality is often 
posited as a realm entirely separate from that of language, discourse, and culture. 
This presumption of separation has meant, in practice, that feminist theory and 
cultural studies have focused almost entirely on the textual, linguistic, and 
discursive. (Alaimo & Hekman 2-3) 
I argue that cultural memory heals that separation. It provides within the human psyche 
the material basis necessary for social action because it navigates the dialectic of 
embodied and intellectual experiences. It provides a way of thinking about materialism 
without conflating it with discourse. It explains the transmission between them while 
leaving them distinct from each other. 
Sandilands demonstrates the bridging potential of memory when she reflects on 
Alzheimer's erasure of memory: "memory ties together bodies and landscapes in ways 
that reveal the inextricable connection between physicality and reflection and also the 
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ways in which different types of memory combine to enable (or not) socially sanctioned 
and culturally meaningful interactions with the more-than-human world" (Mortimer-
Sandilands 271). Alzheimer's illustrates that the absence of memory negates discourse, 
makes it incomprehensible, and still the subject suffers because suffering is not 
discourse-dependent. Suffering is a material reality, but it is mediated by memory in so 
far as memory determines the possibilities of dominant discourse, how we respond to 
suffering and what we know about it-our political will. The subject needs discourse to 
orient her to the world and to resolve her suffering, but that orientation is not possible 
without memory. 
The concept of cultural memory is also unique and valuable if distinguished from 
discourse because it accounts for changes in dominant discourse and the emergence of 
alternative discourses. For instance, consider Alaimo and Hekman's claim that 
the strength of postmodern feminism is to reveal that since its inception, western 
thought has been structured by a series of gendered dichotomies. Postmodern 
feminists have argued that the male/female dichotomy informs all the dichotomies 
that ground western thought: culture/nature, mind/body, subject/object, 
rational/emotional, and countless others. Postmodern feminists have further 
argued that it is imperative not to move from one side of the dichotomy to the 
other, to reverse the privileging of concepts, but to deconstruct the dichotomy 
itself, to move to an understanding that does not rest on oppositions. (Alaimo & 
Hekman 2) 
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This accreditation of dialectical thought to postmodernism is evidence of a memory 
being constructed by postmodern discourse. This new memory overrides any memory 
of a historical discourse of dialectics and the dialectical critique fmwarded by second 
wave feminism. The prevalence of postmodern theory proves the need for a theory of 
cultural memory that reveals how competing discourses are remembered or forgotten. 
It is also important to understand the mediation of memory as distinct from 
discourse because of the extent to which privileging discourse risks compromising 
feminist politics. A fundamental presupposition of discourse theory is that there is no 
meaning outside of discourse, given the absence of a transcendental signifier (Hall 45). 
What does this mean for a feminist politics? It creates a problem of identifying 
oppression as a moral wrong. One could disagree, on the basis that not all meanings are 
equally valid and therefore a moral system can be supported by discourse, but if there 
were no meaning outside of discourse, there would be no basis for the determination of 
a discourse's validity; there would be no grounds for a moral system. So, in reality, 
how do we determine that oppression is objectionable? The answer is in the repetition 
of experience, known via memory: the reality of deprivation does not change much 
over time-people suffer, poverty is bad for your health-these are rational and 
empirical norms, underlying moral judgment, that are neither culturally relative nor 
discursively dependent. The postmodernist engagement with discourse, like the 
modernist critique of ideology and hegemony, is indispensible, but feminism must 
remain grounded in historical materialism to be transformative (Ebert 38). 
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Consequently, I do not merely aim to create a discourse about cultural memory, since 
cultural memory itself is politically neutral. Rather, I am attempting to embed a 
socialist feminist critique in an aesthetic theory of cultural memory and to use the 
cultural memory concept as an analytic tool within a socialist feminist theory. 
A crucial component of a critique grounded in historical materialism has not yet 
been adequately addressed and that is a component that expands over the material-
memory-discourse chain of relations-the economic. The economic dimension of a 
socialist feminist aesthetic theory entails examining the economic conditions that 
determine which discourses and which material realities become memories. Like 
memory, economics are both material and discursive; economics is about the 
experience of wealth or poverty and the ideological narrative of economic systems. 
From both directions, economics powerfully influence which memories take hold. 
In the introduction to this chapter I indicated that the lack of economic analysis 
in contemporary feminist art criticism invites the development of a socialist feminist 
aesthetic theory. I will tum to Ebert now for a cogent argument on behalf of a 
materialist framework for feminism that properly encompasses a critique of capitalism. 
I will discuss her work as a means of further clarifying memory's difference from 
discourse, its relation to materialism, and its consequent capacity to serve as a central 
and necessary component of a socialist feminist aesthetic. 
Essentially, Ebert is concerned that postmodemism's influence on feminist 
politics has given too much attention to agency at the expense of structure because it 
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fails to critique the structural relations of production. This theory as play, in Ebert's 
terms, evades the material conditions of cultural production because it ''addresses itself 
exclusively to cultural politics as the theater of significations, resignification (Butler), 
remetaphorization (Cornell), and redescription (Rorty) ... ". Ebert argues that this 
dominant, theoretical paradigm has replaced dialectical critique with "desire/pleasure as 
the dynamics of the social" (ix Ebert). Consequently, 
in place of a historical materialist analysis for social change, feminists are 
provided with models for "the care of the self," for "power feminism," and for 
"sexual-agency feminism," all of which trivialize the situation of women: 
reducing it to matters of textuality, desire, or voluntarism . 
. . . as if women's experience (whether understood empirically or topologically) 
is ... severed from larger socioeconomic practices. (x; xii Ebert) 
I posit that the concept of cultural memory can be a useful tool in reparations. It 
mediates between the experience of structure and the possibility of agency in so far as 
memories are both personal and collective; memory is determinant, but we have agency 
to change collective memory through personal memory, and vice versa. Moreover, the 
critique of the structural relations of production is only possible through the mediation 
of cultural memory because it allows for a recognition and rearticulation of agents' 
experience under capitalism as morally valid (given memory's relation to material 
reality), and not merely another discourse. 
The dominance of postmodern discourse has established not no memory but one 
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that constructs a memory world conducive to patriarchal capitalism by ignoring the 
relations of production. 37 A transformative cultural politics depends on displacing the 
central role accorded discourse in favour of the material-memory-discourse triad I have 
proposed. This move attempts to undo the homogenizing effect of discursivity as a 
dominant critical tool. 
Ebert makes the point that in common parlance, "discourse" has already 
displaced "ideology" (of which it is properly a vehicle), 
a move undertaken in order to replace social contradictions (explained by 
ideology) with social 'difference': a concept that isolates differences in a 
locality and cuts its relations to other differences and, most importantly, to the 
cause of difference [economic power]. In so doing, it renders all differences the 
same. Ironically, difference, which is instituted to free us from universalizing 
concepts, itself ends up a neouniversalist regime. (Ebert 8) 
If we conflate memory with discourse, we affirm and reproduce this error because the 
conflation erases memory's capacity to facilitate the critique of capitalism as both 
discourse and material practice. 
Memory is also distinct from ideology since a system of ideas (i.e. ideology) is 
distinct from its material impetus and impact, and from their recollection. Ideology is 
expressed in discourse; memory is how discourse is experienced and embedded. So in 
37 This assertion complements Jameson's argument that postmodemism reflects and 
enables the cultural logic of late capitalism because, through the ahistaricism of pastiche, 
fragmentation and depthlessness, it obscures alienation under capitalism. 
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the case of Christian ideology, the discourse differs according to different factions (e.g. 
Protestant vs. Catholic), reflecting the always-potential variability of interpretation. 
However, the variations of discourse are also informed, and partially explained by, 
variations within cultural memory. 
Cultural memory gives discourse a bearing. Consequently, an analysis of the 
discursive, in this case the arts, as a source and expression of cultural memory enables 
us to understand art's capacity to alter the relations oflabour via consciousness because 
memory is itself dialectical and historically rooted; it forges a link between the personal 
and collective and that in itself is an act against the dominant, capitalist mode of 
production since capitalism relies upon a disjuncture between the personal and the 
collective, between agency and structure. It relies on collective labour to exist but is 
ideologically opposed to collective agency, advocating instead the individual pursuit of 
profit and individual freedom from the collective through the marketplace. For this 
reason capitalism idealizes the individual experience of consumption, which masks the 
social relations of production and the exploitative extraction of surplus labour value. 
Consequently, "Capitalism has always privileged experience because the logic of 
experience (local and individualistic) distracts critical inquiry and transformative action 
away from the system of capital" (Ebert 20). For example, in capitalism the experience 
of rape "becomes a matter between two persons and not the historically inevitable 
practices of power in a system that is founded upon the exploitation of the many for the 
benefit of the few" (Ebert 20). In contrast, feminist art can translate the individual 
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experience of rape back into the social and systemic framework by collectivizing it as 
cultural memory, which in turn generates feminist discourse. This is not merely a 
discursive gesture because such a work of art does not simply give a victim voice or 
transform rape into the terrain of sexual power play, but corrects a fundamental logic 
underlying capitalism. In this regard, it at least awakens a critical discourse with 
potentially material implications for the subversion of capitalism. 
However, art criticism can take that one step further by explicitly re-embedding 
the economic in our analysis. A political economy critique aimed at socio-economic 
transformation should be part of an aesthetic theory concerning feminist cultural 
memory. The economic component of socialist feminist aesthetic theory entails 
examining the economic conditions that influence which discourses and which material 
realities become memories. (My next chapter will demonstrate such an analysis.) 
Ultimately, economics, not desire, stands behind cultural memory. Indeed, "all 
needs, including sexuality and nutrition, are material, which is another way of saying 
that economic practices are the condition of possibility for all other human practices" 
(Ebert 47). Not all material practices are themselves economic (e.g. sexuality) but all 
are dependent on economic activity. Even one's sexuality is limited or enabled by 
one's access to resources otherwise in short supply, such as food, healthcare, and 
shelter; the ability to freely determine the nature of one's sexual activity and one's 
sexual partners is also impacted by economic need variously. 
It is important to note that by "economics" I am not referring only to capitalism 
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and thereby reifying the category of the material. This is the mistake made by 
capitalists and by some anti-capitalist activists. My definition of the economic is "the 
efficient production, distribution, and consumption of goods otherwise in short supply" 
(McMurtry, Living 8). This definition is broad because it categorizes almost all, human 
activity to produce anything, as economic activity. The only limit on it is that goods 
must be in short supply, which means that labour is required to produce them. 
Overconsumption and waste do not qualify as economic goods because they require 
almost no labour, which is also why there is no shortage of them. The mistake of 
postmodern critics like Julie Graham and Katherine Gibson in attempting to reframe the 
economic, is that they make all economic activity synonymous with capitalism, 
suggesting its libratory potential by "redefining" it. This is a misleading discursive 
deconstruction that in no way challenges what capitalism actually is. 
I am also not arguing that memory is resolutely determined by capitalism. In 
fact, the discourse and practice of capitalism is antithetical to memory since, as Adorno 
explains, 
All of bourgeois society stands under the law of exchange, of the 'like for like,' 
of calculations which leave no [recognized] remainder. By its very nature, 
exchange is something atemporal [i.e. not historically conditioned: price is 
always, for all time, economically true because it is dictated by the market] ..... 
But this means no less than that memory, time and recollection are liquidated as 
a kind of irrational remnant. ( qtd. in Burger 59) 
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Capitalism masks the historical activity of labour in its valuation of commodities. Given 
the antagonism of capitalism to memory, one could posit that cultural memory can be a 
challenge to capitalism in that it is able to question absolute truths, of which capitalism 
appears as one. 
In chapter 4 and 5, I will begin to undertake such a challenge by reconstructing 
the work of Charlotte Salomon and the economic environment surrounding its 
exhibition in Canada. The value of analyzing Charlotte Salomon's work lies in what it 
reveals about the concept of socialist feminist cultural memory and how that concept 
can be a useful means of accounting for the relations of production. I will argue that a 
feminist cultural memory is suppressed in this exhibition as a consequence of capitalist 
discourse impinging on its presentation. This will reveal more than has typically been 
discussed by scholars about the form and content of the work itself, while considering 
not merely the consciousness of subjects reading the work, but the material conditions 
of its production. By turning memory studies toward this kind of analysis, I hope to 
have enhanced its usefulness. It need not remain merely a mode of discursive critique. 
By positioning cultural memory as the lynch pin between discourse and reality, and by 
promoting its application to the relations of cultural production rather than merely the 
consumptive experience of artwork, I am aiming to reconnect critiques of cultural 
practices and significations to their economic conditions, thereby fulfilling Ebert's call 
for a materialist feminism. 
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Chapter 4: Life? or Theatre? as Feminist Cultural Memory 
The Berlin born Charlotte Salomon completed Life? or Theatre? in 1942, while 
living on the estate of the American Ottilie Moore in southern France. Moore's villa 
made a temporary home for many Jewish refugees. Salomon had migrated there from 
Berlin in 1939, following Kristallnacht. She remained there, first with her grandparents 
and later with her husband, until October 1943. She was then deported to Auschwitz 
where she was killed in the gas chambers soon after her arrival. Her father, a surgeon, 
and her stepmother, an opera singer, had been in hiding in Holland during the war, and 
they later recovered some of her work. Salomon had dedicated Life? or Theatre? to 
Moore, who returned it to her parents in 194 7. It appeared in a series of exhibitions 
beginning in 1959, and in 1971 Salomon's parents donated the work to the Jewish 
Historical Museum in Amsterdam, where her archive remains. It has inspired 
numerous international exhibitions, books, conferences, plays and films. Some of her 
work has been incorporated into the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial in Jerusalem, 
and portions remain on permanent display in Amsterdam. 
The first curator to mount an exhibition of Charlotte Salomon's Life? or 
Theatre? called it a "unique work, with nothing else of its conception and size in art 
history" (Lowenthal Felstiner, To Paint 224). This exceptional body of expressionist 
visual art consists of 1658 pieces, including 1263 gouaches, 289 of which have a 
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painting on the verso side, and 395 transparencies.38 The transparencies were originally 
attached to the gouaches by tape on one edge, suggesting that the whole formed a kind 
of bookwork of layered imagery and text (in German); Salomon even indicates chapter 
divisions in some locations. Typically the pieces are now framed individually or in 
small groups to convey their serial quality, and they are wall hung with accompanying 
textual translations. 
Salomon assigned the work's various components to three narrative categories: 
a prelude, a main section and an epilogue, as in a play. This play primarily conveys a 
semi-fictional representation of Salomon's life. Its characters represent the actual 
people she has known although their names are altered. Explanatory and often rhyming 
text, painted or penciled by hand, appears on the transparencies or on the gouaches 
themselves, alongside or overlapping images. As we watch Salomon's character 
mature throughout the early 20th century, we witness the privileged conditions of her 
upbringing, her experience of education and travel, her artistic travails, and her family's 
displacement during the Second World War. 
A central subject within the narrative is the suicides of several women in 
Salomon's family. This has a structural impact on the work as the subject both opens 
and closes the play. However, an equally absorbing and counterbalancing concern is 
Salomon's love affair, both thrilling and tortuous, with an older man who ostensibly 
38 December 9, 2011 email communication with Anton Kras of the Jewish Historical 
Museum of Amsterdam. The most recent publication of the work, which I will refer to 
throughout this chapter, includes "769 gouaches, thirteen painted pages of text and one 
transparency" (Salomon 4 ). 
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encourages her as an artist. He is the central figure of the work's main section, which 
documents his infatuation with Salomon's step-mother, Salomon's infatuation with 
him, his opinions of her work and character, his philosophies, his character flaws, and 
the tumultuous and erotic moments of their affair. Salomon writes that he has a 
"profound subconscious fascination for her" (Salomon 4 79). He is a voice teacher, 
veteran, and writer preoccupied with aesthetic theories of redemption. She engages 
with his theories throughout the main section and the epilogue, as she grapples with a 
legacy of familial crisis and multifarious sources of alienation-as a subordinate family 
member, as an artist struggling for achievement, as an unrequited lover, and as a Jewish 
exile. The narrative resolves in her decision to embrace the kind of aesthetic 
revitalization envisioned by her lover. She transcends alienation and trauma, both 
personal and political, by undertaking this very work of art rather than succumbing to 
emergent, suicidal despair. Consequently, Salomon shows us that she has wrestled 
between the tragedy of life and the creativity of drama, between the creative resilience 
of life, and the tragic drama of theatre, and that she finds a dialectical resolution therein. 
Just as the work's title and narrative content point to the ambiguity between life 
and performance, its composition captures the multisensory, theatrical nature of 
everyday life. Life? or Theatre? presents an extensive array of surreal images, akin to 
an illustrated manuscript, storyboard or film reel in some sense but much more 
expansive, layered and integrated. Salomon labeled it a Singspiel, referencing an 18th 
century genre of opera with spoken dialogue. This accounts for her inclusion of 
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dialogue in the text, and musical quotations, as well as the montage quality of the 
images, all of which aim to capture a potential, theatrical performance in two 
dimensions. The effect is sometimes comedic, sometimes anguished. The Singspiel is 
indeed a genre very little removed from life since it is a form of musical theatre that 
employs popular music, stories of the middle class, and vernacular language. Vitality 
springs from the work as a whole, even though many of the images portray isolation, 
distress, and obsession. Its vivid, diverse, and often muddy pigments bleed off the 
page. Its restless lines and rhyming language overlap imprecise, energetic images, 
creating layers that reveal and conceal. The spontaneity and intensity of these elements 
convey an unalienated labour process; the artist's labouring body and the immediate 
use-value of the work as a kind of psychoanalysis, as an exploration of memory, 
emanates from its sensate materiality. 
In this chapter, I want to consider Life? or Theatre? to be a kind of cultural 
memory work to gain fresh insight into the work itself and to analyze its reception by 
critics, while demonstrating the analytical potential of the concept of cultural memory 
that I have developed in preceding chapters. Life? or Theatre? can be understood as 
cultural memory work because it draws substantively on the memory landscape of the 
artist's life, and translates her recollections into a representation that is communicable. 
In this sense, it fulfills my first definition of cultural memory as a cognitive process of 
reflection and integration of experiential knowledge, that compels collective and 
vicarious feeling, and leads to a learning by example. Its heterogeneous composition 
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enables it to shape or produce memory, as opposed to being merely documentary or 
representative. As Steinberg explains, "the distinction between recovered history and 
recovered memory [in Life? or Theatre? ] is produced aesthetically, through its 
elaborate juxtapositions and differentiations of genre (image, music, text), 
temporalities, and voice (autobiography, history, fantasy)" (Steinberg 3). In this way it 
inculcates the sensual, visceral and associative qualities of lived memory. The work 
essentially organizes and constructs a private memory in the mind of its artist and it 
becomes, as it were, a talking cure because of its formulation as representation, as 
communication for another. This leads Ernst Van Alphen to speculate that "Salomon's 
work can be seen or read not so much as controlled narration, but as an effort to master 
trauma by embedding the re-enactment of death, of dead family members, into a 
controlled action of narration .... It is by means of the narrative technique of embedding 
that the trauma is healed, is transformed into a memory which can be told and shown to 
others" (Van Alphen, "Giving" 116). The formal breadth and hybridity of the work 
enables this process of reintegration by creating a heterogeneous space in which 
anxieties can be variously expressed, sublimated and transformed. Here we see that 
Life? or Theatre? takes on the fourth dimension of my cultural memory definition as a 
series of unconscious processes related to the fragmented psyche that characterizes 
human experience and its preoccupation with the management of desire. This process 
is both enacted and documented by the work itself, since Salomon employs Life? or 
Theatre? in exorcising various relational and artistic frustrations. Likewise, Salomon's 
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practice of dislocating popular and classical cultural references from German society, 
and relocating them in her work, can be understood as "an attempt to reappropriate the 
culture that had displaced and excluded her" (Schmetterling 123), thereby reasserting 
her agency in the matter of her own cultural location and identity. 
Salomon's conscious interpenetration of diverse and oppositional forms, made 
visible in-part by the collision of past, present and future within the work, reveals the 
disruptive and transformative potential of the interstitial space she occupies, the 
potential to transform the binary or seemingly fixed polarities structuring Salomon's 
work and world (e.g. male/female, German/exile, civilized/suicidal, artist/amateur, 
woman/child, secular/religious). The work is in this sense deeply dialectical and 
reflects/informs the theory of cultural memory I am developing here. Memory is a 
dialectical enterprise, the result of a negotiation between past and present, between 
immediate sensory experience and intellectual recall, between discourse and matter.39 
In its dialectical heterogeneity, Life? or Theatre? is consistent with an avant-
garde effort toward the sublation of art and life (as described by Bilrger), art as an 
instrument for living life (like Surrealist automatic writing); it illustrates that art is not 
only dialectical but self-consciously so because it searches for its own overcoming. 
This can be seen as an effect, or perhaps even as a motive, for Salomon's employment 
of the Singspiel genre. And of course, in the very title of the work, Salomon points us 
39 Exhibition of the work is likewise a reflection of what is remembered :and forgotten, 
which elements are affirmed and which are negated. It too is a memory project, 
somewhat distinct from the work itself. 
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toward the dialectical interplay between life and art, evoking the idea that through the 
interplay of these two forces memory can be made and remade. 
She affirms this position by relaying at the heart of her narrative, and in 
extensive detail, her lover's aesthetic theories, which are devoted to this very notion and 
are derived from his experience of post-traumatic memory as a veteran of World War I. 
Through his process of recovery he has discovered that art is a means of regenerating 
life by reconstructing memory; he concludes that, "art cannot exist for itself but must 
flow from life" (Salomon 293), by which he means from a confrontation between Eros 
and Thanatos. This through line in the work reflects my second definition of cultural 
memory as recollection of what lay beyond the reality principle, beyond the limitations 
of a present state of material existence. Life? or Theatre?'s life affirming dimension 
enacts and mobilizes this kind of memory. 
Life? or Theatre?' s cultural memory work has a particularly feminist character 
since it centrally addresses the gendered nature of social life and the intersectional 
nature of the artist's identity. Consequently, the work speaks to my third definition40 of 
cultural memory because it stimulates empathy in the service of political will. In the 
following pages I will consider the feminist dimensions of this work in detail by 
surveying critics' analyses of Life? or Theatre?'s feminist content and aesthetic 
strategies. I will then provide additional perspective on the work's feminist dimension, 
by drawing from feminist art theory. The feminist aspect of Life? or Theatre? deserves 
40 Third definition: constructed knowledge in the service of political will and material 
advancement based on empathy, which is stimulated through a synthesis of the embodied 
and intellectual modes of perception 
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this sustained attention because, as I will later show, that aspect has been undervalued 
by critics, by curators, and by public discourse surrounding its exhibition. Also, its 
feminist character opens up the possibility of social intervention by feminist cultural 
memory, which I have envisioned in earlier chapters. In other words, I hope to 
elucidate some of the work's innovative features and, in turn, the means and 
manifestations of feminist intervention in social and cultural life, thereby demonstrating 
the value of understanding art as cultural memory. I will then proceed to argue that a 
recent exhibition of the work constrained its feminist dimension and thereby 
conditioned (in a sense, depoliticized or politically reoriented) the kind of cultural 
memory it generated. Having established in this chapter the work's contribution to 
feminist cultural memory, and how the exhibition contained or prohibited this reading, I 
will undertake in chapter 5 to analyze the socioeconomic system of patriarchal 
capitalism that contextualizes the exhibition, and I will suggest its impact on shaping 
the representation of Life? or Theatre? 41 Consequently, these final chapters provide a 
case study in understanding art as cultural memory and in analyzing the political 
economy of the arts from a socialist feminist, cultural memory perspective. 
41 My approach here is comparable to Douglas Kellner's multiperspectival critical 
cultural studies frame and his three-pronged methodology, which I trace back to the 
methodology of the Frankfurt School. Those theorists developed the method of 
investigating cultural production through textual analysis, reception studies, and political 
economy critique. 
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The Feminist Dimension 
The first and most obvious element of Salomon's work that serves a feminist 
agenda is its heterogeneous form, which draws attention to the work's formal 
construction and thereby highlights the construction of meaning by semiotic discourse. 
Given the arbitrary relationship between sign and signified, we can understand that 
meaning is socially produced through linguistic structures. For instance, the meaning 
we associate with gender categories such as "feminine" significantly depends on 
symbolic practices that associate signs with one another, so that feminine comes to 
mean "beauty", "frailty", "maternity", etc. Feminist art has often confronted and 
deconstructed the structures of meaning that significantly determine our ideas, 
experiences, and interpretations. Likewise, by hybridizing art forms Salomon forces us 
to be aware of the aesthetic devices and social constructions impacting our reading of 
her work and our interpretations of the world. This formal characteristic lends a 
transformative potential to the work by opening up a space for revision and for 
psychological and somatic development by discursively deconstructing subjectivity and 
the social world. In this way the work reflects my fifth definition of cultural memory as 
a collective understanding of private lives, embedded in cultural life, or the meeting of 
personal and collective identifications that is articulated by cultural media. The work 
lends itself to this kind of memory construction because its feminist deconstruction of 
aesthetics foregrounds the ways in which individuals are culturally interpolated. 
While this aesthetic strategy is not unique to feminist art, it is frequently 
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employed within the avant-garde toward non-essentializing, femini:st goals (Barry and 
Flitterman-Lewis 58). Nochlin's study of feminist art allows us to align Salomon's 
formal interventions with those of other feminist artists who experiment with hybrid 
and interdisciplinary art forms to highlight and subvert the sometimes oppressive means 
of the production of meaning: 
Barbara Kruger, Cindy Sherman, Mary Kelly, and many others are again cutting 
into the fabric of representation by refusing any kind of simple 'mirroring' of 
female subjects; they tum to collage, photomontage, self-indexical photography, 
combinations of texts, images, and objects as ways of calling attention to the 
production of gender itself-its inscription in the unconscious-as a social 
construction rather than a natural phenomenon. (Nochlin 29) 
While Nochlin does not write about Salomon directly, her review of feminist art history 
suggests to me that Salomon's work could be considered a historical precedent in this 
vein since it too critiques the production of gendered subjectivity and objectification. 
Indeed, this is a central concern within Life? or Theatre? addressed by the work's 
visual perspective and intertextuality as much as by its narrative content. (Many 
examples will be explored below). Nochlin also draws our attention to similar 
techniques in the work of Salomon's contemporary, Hannah Hoch, whose photocollage 
practice "denies the beauty of the beautiful woman as object of the gaze" (Nochlin 29), 
demonstrating that such concerns were not absent from early 20th century, German art. 
Such a deconstruction of gendered, aesthetic discourse has been illuminated by 
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feminist filmmaking in particular. As de Lauretis explains, 
in order to counter the aesthetic of realism, which was hopelessly compromised 
with bourgeois ideology, as well as Hollywood cinema, avant-garde and 
feminist filmmakers must take an oppositional stance against narrative 
"illusionism" and in favor of formalism. The assumption was that 
"foregrounding the process itself, privileging the signifier, necessarily disrupts 
aesthetic unity and forces the spectator's attention on the means of production of 
meaning." (de Lauretis 128 quoting Silvia Bovenschen) 
Salomon achieves such oppositional transparency by explicitly referencing a 
multiplicity of semiotic systems (e.g. newspapers, fairytales, myth, art history, poetry, 
music, philosophy, film) within her work, which highlight the media of meaning.42 She 
also reveals the construction of her "theatre" and the "work" of its production through 
the repetition of images and the layering of seemingly incomplete or primitive sketches. 
The layering of text within many paintings and in transparent overlays further draws 
attention to the work as a discursive construction, as does the extent to which her 
images mimic frames of film and pre-production storyboards in the era of cinema's 
42 To some extent the work is consonant with cubist collage; both employ 
everyday objects, which facilitates the intrusion of the real. For this reason, both are 
provocative and multiperspectival without being anti-representational. But in Salomon 
the collage effect exceeds formalist innovation to perform social commentary, whereas 
cubists were interested primarily in the pictorial surface. As Guillaume Apollinaire 
explains, with cubism "versimilitude no longer has any importance, for the artist 
sacrifices everything to the composition of his picture. The subject no longer counts, or if 
it counts, it counts for very little .... the new painters provide their admirers with artistic 
sensations due exclusively to the harmony of lights and shades and independent of the 
subject depicted in the picture." (Apollinaire 180) 
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emergence. Furthermore, by fictionalizing her autobiography, translating key people 
from her life into characters, Salomon draws attention to the constructed nature of the 
theatre she has created while communicating the malleable character of reality. She 
thereby promotes a critical analysis in her audience concerning that reality. 
These avant-garde techniques lend the work a Brechtian ambition toward social 
change. 43 Bertolt Brecht pioneered a theatrical mode that draws attention to itself as a 
construction of reality, and forces critical, audience engagement by reminding the 
audience of the constructed nature of reality (Brecht). Brechtian theatre pursues 
estrangement effects (via e.g. songs that interrupt the action, explanatory placards) to 
shock the audience into an awareness and examination of the familiar conventions of art 
and the naturalized conditions of everyday life. Likewise, Salomon uses many of the 
same interventions to produce a theatrical performance that challenges aesthetic 
precepts and critically confronts her own biography. By employing such heterogeneous 
and deconstructive forms of expression, Salomon draws attention to the illusions 
created by art and media, which are always instrumental to the reification of identities 
in their representation of ethnicity, class and gender.44 
43 It is worth noting that Brecht wrote "Salomon Song" for his Threepenny Opera, an 
opera that centrally addresses sexual oppression, and a song that speaks to moral crisis, 
themes that are central to Salomon's work. Salomon would undoubtedly have been 
familiar with this production, which achieved wide recognition after its opening in Berlin 
in 1928. This suggests that her employment of Brechtian techniques in her Singspiel was 
neither accidental nor incidental. A detailed comparison of the two works might also be 
revealing. 
44 I will demonstrate a particularly good example of this dynamic in my discussion of the 
work's Sleeping Beauty motif, below. 
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Physical perspective within the images also communicates and thereby 
confronts the place of women in discourse (since the work itself is discursive), and in 
extra-discursive social relations. As Astrid Schmetterling explains, "most of the later 
scenes take place in interiors, presented at close range. Pictorial spaces that convey a 
sense of intimacy but also that of confinement. [sic] These are the spaces of those who 
are increasingly isolated and excluded from the public sphere ... " (Schmetterling 126). 
Here, the social and cultural dynamics of power coincide within gendered and multi-
generational relationships, bringing the material reality of patriarchy into conceptual 
view. In the spatial arrangement within the gouaches, "men break into women's 
domains, but women are not permitted to break into men's" (Lowenthal Felstiner 
"Taking" 326). For example, witness the images that emerge from Salomon's period of 
temporary internment with her grandfather and convey her attitude toward the power 
dynamics of space and gender (Salomon 803-811 ). As Lowenthal Felstiner has 
observed, 
What she preserved [of her summer 1940 internment at Ours] was disgust with 
her grandfather-as if the rats, the sweat, the noise, the violations of a very 
solitary person all embodied themselves in him. Three weeks in the ratty 
barracks of Gurs, and not a single commemorative sketch. Eight full paintings 
[only two of which are included in the exhibition discussed below] devoted to 
where Grosspapa and Charlotte would sleep a few nights after they got out. 
Maybe those nights, recalled two years later, trespassed the deepest part of 
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herself, where she had to fend off even her fellow exiles. In scenes on the way 
back to Nice, Grosspapa crowds Charlotte's spirit and body, saying, "What's 
wrong with sharing a bed with me if there's nothing else around?" [Salomon 
804] Charlotte, a mere refugee on the road, has to ask an innkeeper: "Would it 
be possible-I can't sleep beside by grandfather-for mete> sleep somewhere 
else?" [Salomon 806] Then she meets a stranger looking for his family and tilts 
back in empathy ... but he responds by putting an arm around her. She pulls 
away, he carps, she barricades her door. .. he forces his way in the window, she 
screams ... [Salomon 808-811] (Lowenthal Felstiner, "Taking" 125) 
The subject seemingly contends with sexual violence both internal and external to the 
family. The artist manipulates the question of space-as privacy or isolation, security 
or danger-by representing where segregation meets invasion, from a distinctively 
gendered vantage point, one that intersects with her generational and ethnic subjectivity 
as a young, Jewish migrant. Consequently, Salomon is relating/creating a memory of 
migration and of gendered relationships as they challenge and engage each other to 
reveal the intersectional power dynamics therein. She further compels critical 
reflection on the matter within the next image as she desperately claims responsibility 
for the rapist's actions and attempts to shield him from public shame (Salomon 811 ). 
She depicts both the attack and her denial of it. She thereby generates a memory of the 
event and of her submission to subordination. It is a memory of interpellation that 
undoes the interpellation. 
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Salomon's engagement with patriarchy develops further through the figure of 
Grosspapa; he comes to represent the link between patriarchy and creative annihilation. 
As Van Alphen has observed, Grosspapa "stands for the tradition in family life that 
subjects female children to the power of the father, and for the tradition in creative life 
that excludes women from artistic subjecthood". The artist "resists him by [visually] 
covering him with words" (Van Alphen, Caught 87) in aesthetic retaliation. But within 
the narrative, her removal from his "protection" leads her into the path of a potential, 
stranger rapist. He thereby comes to represent an internal threat that is seemingly the 
only alternative to external danger. Indeed, this is the bind of the patriarchal contract. 
Salomon's power to overcome this dynamic is limited in the extra-discursive realm, but 
her discursive resistance provides a basis for her enfranchisement as a subject through 
the medium of cultural memory. 
The subject of gender politics is not simply episodic. It is woven throughout the 
text as a dominant theme. Within the dramatic narrative, the work habitually conveys 
pivotal feminist concepts such as gendered violence, the patriarchal contract, male 
privilege, domestic isolation, objectification, and compulsory heterosexuality. It is 
evident within this story that "men are entitled to avoid the painful issues: Charlotte's 
father covers his ears against his wife's recitals of melancholy. But the women keep 
asking themselves terrifying questions: 'Am I to blame for her death?' and 'For what 
am I staying alive?' "(Lowenthal Felstiner, "Taking" 326). Salomon intimately details 
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her mother's submission to the conscription of being daughter, wife and mother45 and 
her grandmother's descent into self-loathing and immolation46, judging herself a failure 
in these roles. Moreover, the artist continuously emphasizes the narcissism and cruelty 
she perceives in the men around her and their mistreatment ofher.47 Yet relatively little 
critical attention has been paid to the consistent and pervasive quality of these themes. 
Most critics are interested in the work's status as Jewish history or as the representation 
of trauma with little direct reference to gender. 
However, the dialectical potential of feminist art reveals here that gender is not 
just a singular experience of patriarchy; Salomon also highlights female power with 
effervescent ingenuity, especially through her depiction of Paulinka, the adored 
stepmother. Here, Salomon challenges the archetype of jealous, female competition 
and mutual destruction, embedded in German fairytales, with a representation of female 
solidarity. This leads Lowenthal Felstiner to conclude that Life? or Theatre? is 
"testimony at last against those myths of female spite ... This fairy tale has a girl 
rushing 'to be tenderly hugged by the much-loved figure' of her second mother .... The 
artist knew she'd upended a myth" (Lowenthal Felstiner, To Paint 23). In place of the 
evil and vain stepmother, Salmon depicts a stepmother's careful negotiation of her 
career, her balancing of social and domestic duty with the self-realization of her 
45 Salomon 54, 58-9, 66-72, 166-81 
46 Salomon 143-191, 677-683, 732-790 
47 Salomon 185, 236-7, 265-8, 297, 300, 313-18, 339-61, 372-3, 383, 413, 428-42, 460-6, 
473,506-7,529,535-7,539,541,543-6,561,570,573,578,591-3,598-605,618,631-2, 
682-3, 723, 745-52, 766-9, 779, 790-3, 804-11, 814 
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creative work. 48 Her selection of a musical genre pays tribute to her stepmother's 
profession. Salomon also dedicates the work to a female friend and art collector of 
independent economic means, thereby again acknowledging women's potential self-
sufficiency, as well as their interdependence. Essentially, she objectifies the suffering 
of women to which she has borne witness and of which she has been a victim, as well 
as the creative and economic potential for their deliverance; she writes her work into 
the history of feminist struggle while writing the achievements of other women, as well 
as their despair. She is creating and recreating the memory of her own femininity 
through this interplay of the polarities of a feminine experience-asserting her own 
memories against each other in search of something else. By so doing, Salomon creates 
a heuristic piece for others to understand their own experiences and memories. 
Even in her attention to women's suicide she illustrates an emancipatory 
concept, not (as some have claimed) that suicide is an essentially creative act or 
affirmative choice (e.g. Van Alphen, "Giving" 125), but simply and more powerfully 
that the personal is political. The artist's mother committed suicide "in a nation with 
one of the highest suicide rates in the world, in a province and capital with the highest 
rate in the nation, in a city with the highest ratio of female suicides, in a class with the 
highest rate among classes, in a faith with the highest proportion among faiths. Her 
suicide was not anomalous [or private], it was exemplary" (Lowenthal Felstiner, To 
Paint 14, italics original). By investigating the source of the suicidal imperative for 
48 Salomon 93-141, 249-51, 260-2, 273-7, 326-37, 417-423, 454-458 
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these many women, of which her mother was an exemplar, the artist suggests the 
common and socialized nature of mental illness and embeds it in the category of 
gender. In this way, Salomon articulates Durkheim's famous argument concerning the 
social nature of suicide, against the understanding of it as merely an individuated act, 
but she surpasses him by examining the gendered nature of this phenomenon. The 
work expresses that to be a woman is "to be occupied and vacated at the same time, to 
be separate from others and undifferentiated at the same time: this, as Charlotte 
imagined it, is suicidal sentience" (Lowenthal Felstiner, "Taking" 326). 
The very fact that Life? or Theatre? is a study in women's mental health 
translates into feminist critique. As Wark explains, "one way that feminist artists 
formulated their resistance to how female bodies and sexualities had been determined 
and disciplined within patriarchal culture was to transgress taboos and defiantly flaunt 
the connotations of the corporeal body as 'abject' "(Wark 170). This practice can be 
used to reread Salomon's representation of the taboo "madness" afflicting the female 
members of her family, utilizing and usurping the historical representation or memory 
of the "madwoman". By publicizing her intimate family history, Salomon "reveal[ s] 
and resist[ s] the operations of cultural repression by which the female body and the 
feminine had been aligned with the abject" (Wark 170, writing of feminist performance 
art). Simultaneously, she amplifies the mechanism of this repression, by forcing 
confrontation with family secrets: "Her family literally faces her in these painting in a 
way that they did not and could not during her childhood and young adulthood" 
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(Buerkle 86). And it is in this paradigm of the domestic sphere that she reveals the 
underlying, common causes of female degradation. Put differently, "in maternal 
madness she found reason: the loneliness of women's lives, the misuse of their minds, 
the disregard by relatives they were meant to love" (Lowenthal Felstiner, To Paint 12). 
Thus we find a densely woven pattern of feminist thought in the work's management of 
the subject of suicide. 
It is also worth considering the feminist dimension of this work as a form of 
autobiography. Despite the fictionalized appearance of the work as a whole, all of the 
characters within it are drawn from the artist's own life and she appears as "Charlotte 
Kann". These factors render the work autobiographical, though her narrative 
perspective shifts to various women and one man. Women's autobiographical writings 
generally lack the male-traditional focus on the individual. Mason claims that "an 
unfolding self-discovery where characters and events are little more than aspects of the 
author's evolving consciousness, finds no echo in women's writing about their lives" 
(Mason 22). Instead, a woman's autobiographical writing tends to ground her sense of 
self in her relationships to others. This has led Doris Sommer to claim that the "most 
salient feature of women's autobiographical writings is an implied and often explicit 
'plural subject', rather than the singular subject we associate with traditional 
autobiography" (Sommer 107). In the case of Life? or Theatre?, Salomon's 
identification with a plurality of subjects through her characters is explicitly evident in 
her visual rendering of the protagonist Charlotte Kann, whose face occasionally alters 
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such that she resembles other characters in the play. The plurality of the narrator's 
perspective leads Salomon's biographer Lowenthal Felstiner to claim that "the unique 
form of Life? or Theatre? models itself on women-as emblems of empathy" 
(Lowenthal Felstiner, "Taking" 335). Salomon projects herself into the minds of 
several women in her play by relating their moments of private anguish in depth. This 
enables her to tell her own story and theirs through their intersections, without the 
egoism of male privilege. 
Her projection into the mind of her mother, who committed suicide when 
Salomon was eight years old, particularly conveys an empathy toward women's 
experience that spans and transcends specific historic contexts as she transports herself 
into a predecessor's existence. She performs this empathic representation to concoct a 
symbolic solidarity that helps Salomon to cope with her own despair. Celeste Schenck 
explains the significance in women's writing of identification with the mother in 
particular, as a mode of self-reclamation: 
... the mother's 'secret poetry' is the intertext, manifesting itself at the level of 
linguistic signs as well as actual words, typographical interruption of the page, 
visual as well as auditory rhythms. The effect of its dialogical presence in the 
daughter's autobiography is the diminishment of exile, ultimately of both textual 
and psychological consequence for the female subject. .. it is continuity with the 
present of the re-created maternal voice that makes writing at all possible for 
these daughters who would write. (Schenck 297, 300) 
120 
In Life? or Theatre?, Salomon consistently relates her mother's personal tragedy to her 
own disenfranchisement, giving the artist voice to express her own frustrations with 
womanhood through reunion with the lost mother, while she herself was having to 
withstand multiple forms of exile: alienation from her father and stepmother, from her 
lover, from her grandfather, from her school, city and homeland, and from a faith in her 
own mental stability as she felt herself being tempted by suicidal impulses. This 
strategy re-establishes relationality to socially and psychologically sustain the subject. 
Autobiography has long been a storytelling tool of feminist movements, 
employed to articulate the political dimension of personal experience and to participate 
in movement memory making (Wark 7). As a consequence, feminist art has engaged 
politics by demonstrating that phylogeny recapitulates ontogeny. This artistic 
intervention has been necessary to legitimize the feminist movement since "the use of 
autobiographical and narrative practices enabled feminist artists to organize this new 
life praxis by asserting themselves as active and self-determined agents and by 
challenging dismissive assumptions that any reference to the experience of women as 
women was self-indulgent and irrelevant to art making" (Wark 88). Autobiographical 
narratives have drawn the link between the personal and political here, just as slave 
narratives have served emancipation. Such narratives work in a dialectical fashion 
"both to explore their [author's] placement within the social structure and to foster an 
identification with the audience" (Wark 100). While the artist created Life? or 
Theatre? to reflect, confront and transcend both the destruction of women she 
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witnessed within her own family, and the exploitation she personally experienced, by 
fostering a relational identification with an audience her work also has the capacity to 
generate cultural memory around the social position of women. This is what a socialist 
feminist theory of art as cultural memory lends to our analysis of Life? or Theatre? 
Another way of understanding Salomon's work as cultural memory is by 
revisiting Bennett's analysis, which mirrors Brecht and Burke in its consideration of 
shock and empathy. Life? or Theatre? shocks the viewer into adopting a relational, 
empathetic memory through estrangement effects. The work engrosses us in her 
psychoanalysis but by fictionalizing the artist's experience and by highlighting the 
theatrical construction of Life? or Theatre? we are prevented from simply appropriating 
Salomon's memory. We are not lulled into the illusion of this theatre, yet its 
multisensory intimacy and its extreme self-consciousness convey the sensation of 
trauma's after effects. Its sheer scale impresses upon us the weight of the matter. 
Consequently, through its reception, Life? or Theatre? translates Salomon's experience 
of gender into empathic memory with the potential to manifest into discourse and 
activism. I now tum to examine how this capacity is enabled or constrained by the 
parameters of its exhibition and critical reception. 
Critical Framing of Life? or Theatre? 
I have provided extensive evidence of Life? or Theatre?'s feminist cultural 
memory work, and I have argued that its feminist dimension reveals the intersectional 
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nature of oppression and a dialectical approach to cultural memory. I am now 
interested in considering how these aspects of it have been overshadowed by the nearly 
exclusive attention paid to Salomon's Jewish identity and situation within the 
Holocaust. While a few critics have noted the work's feminist dimension, and some 
have questioned its association with Holocaust art, I have not found an adequately 
sustained analysis of either concern or anyone willing to assert that these two matters 
are related. I intend to relate the two here. The discursive emphasis on Salomon's 
ethnicity has the effect of generating a particular cultural memory from and around the 
work. As a young, cultivated woman, Salomon has become a symbol, both sympathetic 
and ideal, of the humanity jeopardized by anti-Semitism. But emphasis on her ethnicity 
alone is somewhat misleading given the content of the actual work, and it effaces a 
feminist politics that would better acknowledge the intersections of class, gender, and 
ethnicity to attain a more broadly informed and informative reading of the work and 
perspective on the artist, which would also enable the more comprehensive cultural 
memory offered by the work and further analysis of its aesthetic dimensions. In the 
remainder of this chapter I will examine how a more singular focus was established by 
a particular exhibition of Life? or Theatre? In the next chapter, I will attempt to explain 
this manifestation by drawing on museum and policy studies to identify the economic 
context (both discursive and material) of the work's exhibition. As a consequence, I 
hope to demonstrate the value that a socialist feminist purview has on an analysis of the 
work as an instrument of cultural memory. 
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The exhibition I am considering here was organized by the Royal Academy of 
Arts, London, and toured Toronto, Boston, and New York between 1998 and 2001. I 
experienced the exhibition during its residence in Toronto at the Art Gallery of Ontario. 
Outside of this exhibition, the work has been widely associated with Holocaust art not 
only because the artist was killed at Auschwitz; scenes of anti-Semitism, including her 
parents' forced resignations, her father's temporary internment, Kristallnacht, hate 
propaganda and Jewish exodus from Germany, appear within Life? or Theatre? and are 
valuable documents in and of themselves. But these scenes play a relatively minor role 
in the whole body of work. Critic David Maclagen concurs that, "the rise of Nazism, 
and its effects on the Salomon family and their friends, occupies a relatively small 
place, and is in no sense a central theme of the work" (Maclagen 77). Van Alphen adds 
that while Jewish history is a "reference", this "historical/documentary value seems to 
preclude awareness of its significance as a work of art; its autonomy is under pressure" 
(Van Alphen, Caught 66-67). Similarly, Norman Rosenthal, Secretary of the Royal 
Academy in London and originating exhibition curator, claims that he sees the value of 
the work in its artistic excellence: "I see it as part of the story of art, rather than outsider 
art. I see it as a work of high art, of great culture and great sophistication and 
complexity and skill. It's an act of great artistic will of the highest level" (AGO 
Member's Journal 4 ). 
Yet, the exhibition established an audience expectation that the value of the 
work is intimately tied to the Holocaust. Globe and Mail reviewer Blake Gopnik 
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admits his reluctance to visit the exhibition because of Life? or Theatre?'s World War 
II associations. After visiting it, he relays that the Nazi element of the work's historical 
context is actually less present in the work itself than he had been led to believe. He 
warns "suicides, seduction, murder by Nazis-the drama of Charlotte Salomon's life 
risks drowning out the impressive talent of her art" (Gopnik 10). If the audience's 
understanding of the Nazi context in which the work was created actually impinges so 
little on its appreciation, and indeed threatens to obscure its value, then how has the 
work come to bear these associations? 
The answer to this question lies in the language of the exhibition's marketing 
and tour guide material, and in its physical layout, rather than in Life? or Theatre? 
itself. The work's touring presentation layered it with Holocaust significance, fixing it 
in the context of a political, European past. Always in massive print, the refrain "take 
good care of it, it's my whole life", allegedly uttered by Salomon as she passed her 
artwork onto friends in France for safe keeping, confronted potential exhibition patrons 
in the newspaper, on the AGO website, in the gallery's members' journal, in on-site 
pamphlets, and scrawled across the exhibition's entrance. Buerkle observes that 
repeated employment of this phrase contradicted the exhibition's otherwise narrow 
focus on Salomon's death (Buerkle 75). This refrain was usually followed by "As Nazi 
aggression escalated, the Berlin-born Jewish artist Charlotte Salomon sensed the end 
was near ... Charlotte died in Auschwitz at 26." This detail of the artist's life served to 
enhance the value and attraction of the work on the grounds that the artist was 
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persecuted and killed within the most widely acknowledged and abhorred genocide of 
the last century. While this advertising communicated the certain tragedy of the lost 
artist, it failed to communicate anything about the form or content i0f Life? or Theatre? 
and thereby risked undermining the work's art historical value. Granted, the small print 
quotations from newspaper reviewers that often flanked the advertising somewhat 
compensated for the marketing rhetoric's focus by reflecting on the artist's technique. 
Nonetheless, given the overriding impression that this work is deeply concerned with 
the horrors of Nazism, the audience was encouraged to absorb the exhibition's 
sentiment of regret more than a nuanced attentiveness to other important elements of 
the work. 
The AGO website's educational content furthered the marketing emphasis on 
Salomon's Jewish identity by outlining basic details in her biography alongside 
episodes in the rise of the Third Reich, and not in tandem with any conceptualization of 
other cultural or historical developments. The Holocaust association was also enhanced 
by the fact that the educational information offered in community lectures hosted by the 
AGO contained a consideration of Life? or Theatre? in relation to other Holocaust art 
and situated the work in the context of Nazi censorship. 
Additional framing occurs in the exhibition catalogue, where Rosenthal 
contradicts his impulse, as expressed in the Member's Journal, not to promote Life? or 
Theatre? as Holocaust art. Here he claims that the work "stands as one of the few 
adequate memorials to the tragedy that culminated in the European, and particularly the 
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Jewish, Holocaust. .. [and] it anticipates the artist's terrible end" (Rosenthal 9). How, 
one might ask, does the work "anticipate" this end? According to Rosenthal, there is a 
"premonition" of some kind in Life? or Theatre? He writes, "without knowing the 
precise nature of the fate that was to befall her, but of which she clearly had 
premonitions, Salomon narrates events and produces veritable psychoanalyses of the 
persons who surround her as she heads toward her destiny. She, and those around her, 
become symbolic of so many nameless others" (Rosenthal 9). Unfortunately, Rosenthal 
does not indicate where he sees this premonition arising in the work. Indeed, Raphael 
Rubenstein proposes that Salomon was likely unaware of the danger before her when 
she presented herself to authorities in Nice; she was turned away because she looked 
too French to be imprisoned with foreign Jews (Rubenstein 114). Moreover, an 
acquaintance of Salomon's reported to the artist's biographer that Salomon definitely 
did not understand the eminent danger. In fact, Lowenthal Felstiner's research led her 
to conclude that "None of the refugees on the Coted' Azur understood the roundups ... 
taking Jews from France to Poland to death" (Lowenthal Felstiner, To Paint 156). 
While Salomon's artwork shows that she suffered from the restrictions and hatred 
imposed by anti-Semitism in Berlin, there is nothing in the work to suggest that she was 
at all aware of her fate, nor that she particularly exemplified the suffering of six million 
Jews, especially since she was able to leave Berlin and live comfortably for four years 
in the South of France. The closing scene of Life? or Theatre? depicts the artist seated 
by the seashore, soul-searching, hopeful and inspired-hardly an indication that she 
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was conscious of coming tragedy. Furthermore, the occasion mentioned above, in 
which she turned herself in for deportation, signals her relative lack of awareness of the 
gravity of her circumstances, as does the fact that she and her husband returned to their 
address in France in 1943 (from which they were later deported) despite having other 
options and despite having been warned that such action would likely lead to their 
arrest (Salomon 25). These historical details appear within the same volume as 
Rosenthal's comments, and render his reading questionable. It seems to be a 
construction, to lend Salmon's work value as a document of clairvoyance. 
The exhibition's format reinforced Rosenthal's reading and directed the gallery 
audience to contextualize the work exclusively within the Holocaust. Upon entering the 
exhibition at the AGO, the viewer was presented with numerous photographs of 
Salomon as a young child, something you were not likely to see at any of the other 
exhibitions occurring simultaneously. Granted, her work is autobiographical, but the 
childhood pictures were superfluous and merely generated sympathy on the part of the 
spectator, drawing inappropriate associations between Salomon and Anne Frank, who 
wrote her diary as an adolescent, and was murdered at age 15, more than a decade 
younger than Salomon. 
There is also the fact that Salomon's first depiction of anti-Semitism is given its 
own wall and frame, marking the entrance to the second room, whereas all of the 
preceding gouaches were framed in groups. This image depicts a Nazi rally on January 
30, 1933, when Hitler was sworn in as chancellor (Salomon 192). Several following 
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images represent Nazi propaganda, the professional persecution of Salomon's parents 
and Kurt Singer's establishment of the Jewish Culture League in 1933 (Salomon 193-
205). A later image represents the anti-Semitism of Pope Puis XI (Salomon 216), and 
two more signal some degree of party influence on the fine arts academy to which 
Salomon gains admission (Salomon 224 &240). Kristallnacht is represented by two 
images that depict propaganda and looting (Salomon 64 7-648). These are followed by 
images that relate to the arrest of Salomon's father (Salmon 649-655). Several images 
later, Salomon notes that Jews are barred from public establishments (Salomon 672), 
and then she conveys that there are reports of German Jews being mistreated in the 
camps (Salomon 683). Five following images document her father's internment, 
release, and recovery at home (Salomon 684-689). The main section's final chapter 
depicts a dinner party at which the primary topic is Jewish emigration (Salomon 690-
693). It concludes with images of Salomon leaving Berlin. The subject of the war in 
general occasionally re-emerges in the epilogue as a backdrop to the action, and a few 
images in the main section include the swastika, but it is primarily these images noted 
above that pertain directly to Jewish persecution. 49 Most of these images appeared in 
the exhibition, which comprised a total of 405 images from Life? or Theatre? 
In the midst of exploring these and other images, the spectator is led through a 
screening room in which film from the Third Reich-Nazi soldiers marching, saluting, 
49 According to the Jewish Historical Museum, the "complete collection" appears on 
their website, where they have categorized 4 7 images under the themes "antisemitism" 
and "national socialism", including 10 "disapproved" verso images, which the archive 
regards as drafts of other images. (December 13, 2011 
http://www.jhm.nl/collection/themes/charlotte-salomon/leben-oder-theater) 
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and burning books-is continuously reeled. While this film diverges from the artist's 
instructions regarding her work's presentation (implicit in the fact that Salomon did not 
script the intrusion of Third Reich film into Life? or Theatre?), it restates the 
significance of the work in terms of the racial and political nightmare surrounding the 
Holocaust. 50 
Now consider the audio guide, which is included in the ticket price of the 
exhibition, encouraging the spectator's reliance on it as a means of interpreting Life? or 
Theatre? It opens with Matthew Teitelbaum (Director of the Art Gallery of Ontario) 
informing the patron's appreciation of the work. He tells us that the work was "made in 
exile, hidden from public view for decades" (AGO Press Script 2), thereby 
emphasizing its history as a matter of Jewish persecution and subversion. The guide 
also concludes with Teitelbaum's voice telling the listener that "the work of Charlotte 
Salomon must stand as a very special monument to Jewish suffering during one of the 
most horrific and bestial periods of recent European history----and furthermore stands 
as a wondrously heroic exploration of some of the most fundamental questions of 
human existence----which touches us all" (AGO Press Script 20). The language in this 
statement not only contends that the work primarily represents the persecution of the 
Jews; it also arbitrarily bridges "Jewish suffering" and a vague, universal suffering 
"which touches us all", thereby both asserting that the work is a monument primarily to 
anti-Semitism, deeply entwined with the persecution of the Jews in World War II, and 
50 While the exhibition was curated by Rosenthal at the Royal Academy and toured many 
locations, it seems that the AGO alone decided to add this screening room. (Greenburg 
162) 
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then negating even that claim-diluting the acuity of Jewish persecution-by blending 
it into a common and diffuse emotion devoid of subjectivity. 
I concur with the many critics cited above that the nearly singular emphasis on 
Salomon's experience of the Third Reich, considering its relatively minor appearance in 
her narrative, risks obscuring the artistic merits of the work. I want to add that the 
AGO exhibition influenced aesthetic reception by writing the work into a specific 
historical context that typified the exhibition itself as a protagonist in a struggle against 
fascism-a survivor and a reminder-shaping the history of the exhibition as well as 
the history of its artist into the story of Nazi aggression. By narrating the artwork as 
testimonial to this tragedy primarily, (even though it was completed two years before 
Salomon was deported), the exhibition obscured many other aspects of the work. 
I am not claiming that Salomon's Jewish identity is irrelevant, but rather that 
ongoing attention to this subject almost singularly is problematic. Specifically, while 
this exhibition's focus left little room in its rhetoric or presentation to declaim Life? or 
Theatre?' s artistic merits, it also negated the work's intersectional feminist politics. It 
did this by failing to attend adequately to the artist's skill, by ignoring the political 
significance of its avant-garde form, and by excluding numerous gouaches that make 
overt feminist claims in opposition to the insufficiencies characterizing the lives of the 
women dramatized. Since much of Salomon's representation of and comment on 
women's experience-a major thematic concern of Life? or Theatre ?-was erased 
from the exhibition, its concentration on the Holocaust seems like: an attempt to fill the 
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lacuna of artistic motive, content, and value left by the absented feminist discourse, just 
as its characterization of the work as "universal" seeks to elide difference and evade 
marginalization. 
Of course, these two exhibition strategies contradicted each other, and the 
exhibition would have benefitted from an intersectional analysis of subjectivity. This 
problem crystallizes when we consider Lowenthal Felstiner's comment on the gendered 
dimension of the Holocaust: 
In that crucial moment on the ramp, one sex was chosen disproportionately for 
death. What helped make the Final Solution ... a 'new thing' ... [was] the stealthy 
intentional murder of a Jewish female sex .... Women were the ones more often 
left behind during emigrations from the Reich .... they were the ones left out of 
leadership in Jewish groups that stayed; they were the ones forced to have sex in 
internment camps like Ours ... harassed on the road .. .in want of contraception 
through the war. .. deported for their pregnancies ... not part of any Jewish Order 
Service exempted from the trains. (Lowenthal Felstiner, To Paint 205) 
These discrepancies cannot be accounted for in terms of labour, because jobs at the 
camps "took no special skill, and none were thought too hard for female hands" 
(Lowenthal Felstiner, To Paint 207). The primary explanation for this disproportionate 
persecution was to "'obliterate the biological basis of Jewry,' said Himmler to Hoss" 
(Lowenthal Felstiner, To Paint 207). It would be especially worth noting this context in 
the exhibition if the curators are concerned with Salomon's experience of the Holocaust 
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as a woman, since the artist was pregnant when she was killed. Unfortunately, the 
crucial intersection of ethnicity and gender was not adequately addressed. 
Buerkle argues that the work's critical framing leaves no room for such 
intersectional analysis. She writes that "the post-Holocaust spectator can, and I argue 
does, interpolate the Holocaust into Salomon's images even when, in fact, it is not 
there" because the spectator 
constructs a narrative about Salomon's work that attempts to anchor the 
spectator herself in a moral order. The persuasiveness of this moral order, in 
turn, depends on the history of totalitarianism in its totalizing effects. Spectral 
subjectivity constructed on this basis makes it necessary that what Salomon 
places at the center of her narrative-namely women's despair and suicide, apart 
from the specific Nazi brutality-not be true. (Buerkle 74-75, italics original) 
Essentially, cultural memory surrounding the Holocaust is so strong that it compels the 
reading of any work by or about Jews through its lens, even when it blinds us to other 
readings. 
Buerkle does not otherwise criticize the exhibition or extensively consider its 
feminist dimension, outside of her attention to the problem of suicide. I hope to have 
revealed here the many ways in which the exhibition attempted to frame the work as 
Holocaust art and as universal trauma, as well as the feminist dimension thereby 
excluded. However, I am not the first to consider the exhibition's construction of the 
work in detail. Greenberg experienced the Life? or Theatre? exhibition at the Royal 
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Academy and considers how vicarious trauma was problematically managed by its 
physical format, which the AGO maintained. For Greenberg, the exhibition 
demonstrated 
how an institution can tame work difficult to categorize or display by 
assimilating it to a very traditional concept of an artwork, one based on easel 
painting hung on a wall .... Rather than elevating the cycle to wall art, the 
elaborate installation, I would argue, detrimentally transformed the artist's 
conception. The pretty or unusual surface patterns of the hang had the effect of 
aestheticizing Salomon's trauma narrative and its unusual format. Underlying 
this decorative display was a projection of an institution's reluctance to 
accommodate or accept traumatic, gendered, or creative difference. Viewers 
witnessed a curatorial 'acting out' which fundamentally altered the identity of 
the work on display. ( 160 Greenberg) 
Greenberg's concern is that the work was fragmented by the exclusion of most 
transparencies and by its hanging in both vertical and horizontal lines. Images became 
isolated and the work's formal complexity was compromised, making it seem more 
mainstream (Greenberg 157, 159). Another way of understanding this problem would 
be to posit that the exhibition disabled the "transaction of sensation" about which 
Bennett writes. It enabled the comfortable appropriation of the artist's experience as it 
was framed by the exhibition, and denied the empathic vision potential to the original 
work. 
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Greenberg concludes that the exhibition performed its own trauma: 
Re-framing, interrupting the narrative, changing direction or adding a postscript 
to Life? or Theatre? are various ways of constructing a safe public space for 
viewers to witness the personal and historical tragedies portrayed by the artist. 
All such interventions, however well-intended, run the risk of distorting the 
artwork. The exhibition space then becomes one of contending histories and 
repeated traumas (Greenberg 164). 
I would like to consider here one such "trauma" which pertains to Salomon's 
employment of a Sleeping Beauty motif, a crucial component of the work that was lost 
in the exhibition. Critics have not considered this aspect of Life? or Theatre? so far, 
and it reveals in detail some of the feminist content of the work while demonstrating its 
heterogeneous form. The narrative of Sleeping Beauty reverberates on many levels of 
Life? or Theatre? The fairytale itself depicts the collapse and resurrection of a creative 
female voice. It represents a social silencing of women and a reliance on male 
regeneration of the female that Salomon's life and work resisted, which is probably 
why the fairytale dances through her artwork. It also articulates the impact of cultural 
memory on the artist, as she draws on folk culture. 
There are numerous gouaches that allude to the Sleeping Beauty fairytale. The 
exhibition includes two frames in which Barbara, one of Charlotte's classmates, is 
admired by the class for her beauty (Salomon 238-9). A few gouaches later, Salomon 
relates Barbara's thoughts, but these frames have been omitted from the exhibition (the 
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consequences of which are considered below). She reflects, "I am Barbara, beloved by 
all, but I can only love the one - my own. The mists do billow and swell, tinged by the 
sun of mom - and no one can ever tell, why I feel so forlorn. The mists do billow and 
swell, tinged by the sun of the mom- and there's only one who can tell, why I feel so 
forlorn" (Salomon 242-243). Barbara's sense of isolation is further expressed in the 
following gouache: "Out there in the forest there goes - there lives many a prince or 
princess - in the forest, there let us hearken. Sleep gently, Sleeping Beauty, how sweet 
you look!" (Salomon 244 ). In the next frames, Charlotte and Barbara become friends. 
Charlotte learns of Barbara's experience of sexual confinement and self-emancipation, 
and the two girls develop a silent solidarity based on their shared experience of 
womanhood: 
Barbara 'We only kissed once, and they put me in a convent. 
Charlotte 'You only kissed once, and they put you in a convent. .. ' 
(Salomon 246) 
Barbara 'I escaped from there, and now I'm here, and of course we're still 
seeing each other.' 
Charlotte 'And of course you're still seeing each other.' 
(Salomon 24 7) 
And they walked home together, absorbed in silent communication. 
(Salomon 248) 
Although Barbara is the beauty of the art class, by escaping the convent, enrolling in 
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school, and continuing to pursue her desires, she subverts the imposition of her 
archetype and achieves autonomy. In these omitted gouaches, the dimensions of the 
beautiful classmate emerge: She is not merely our beautiful Barbara - nor the sweet 
looking, comatose exile - but a troubled artist who confronts sexual oppression. She is 
not another suicidal Juliet. By only including the gouaches in which Barbara's beauty 
is widely admired, the exhibition actually condoned the idealization of women's 
aesthetic value that Salomon disparages, thereby canceling Salomon's critique of 
women's social construction (though it is central to the uncensored work) and shaping 
the exhibition's contribution to cultural memory. 
The Sleeping Beauty allusion reappears when Salomon depicts the character of 
her lover, resigning his fiance to the role of Sleeping Beauty. Several gouaches portray 
his mistreatment of the fiance. He postpones their wedding for years, he loses her ring, 
he arrives to see her on her birthday three hours late and then leaves early to meet 
secretly with another woman. He is unfaithful and he even takes his lover Charlotte on 
a romantic excursion in a boat that is named after his fiance-whose name we never 
learn, just as the fairytale fails to name the princess. He keeps a picture of the fiance 
with him, which he is asked about on her birthday. He tells his interlocutor that it was 
"taken when she'd just turned ten. That's how I still see her ... She must be about 
thirty. She's a little Sleeping Beauty that should not be awakened" {Salomon 340). 
Then he acknowledges "but the way things are nowadays princes are allowed to starve 
and Sleeping Beauties have to work as typists" (Salomon 341 ). The former image was 
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included in the exhibition, but not the latter. In this commentary, the audience catches a 
glimpse of the realities of women's lives through the eyes of a man who would like to 
keep them elevated, but perpetually frozen, petrified in his image of perfection. He 
calls his fiance "the very paragon of all women in the flesh" (Salomon 341) and 
obsesses over her photograph, wherein she stands like a helpless child in the woods; 
about this he utters, "out there in the forest, where I hear the wind sweep, there lies my 
princess, fast asleep. Sleeping Beauty, oh Sleeping Beauty!" (Salomon 3 51, omitted 
from the exhibition). The object of desire is one that can neither speak nor be named, 
and her vacancy allows her to stand in for all that is feminine. Though much of this 
character's mistreatment of his fiance appears in the exhibition, Salomon's 
contextualization of her within the Sleeping Beauty motif-referencing a myth of wide 
social dissemination and consequence-does not. Consequently, Salomon's message 
about, not only individual incidences of sexism, but systemic, psychosocial inequality is 
substantially diluted. 
The Sleeping Beauty allusions that are left out also make meaningful the 
gouache in which Charlotte's art professor ruminates, "our German fairy tales are a 
priceless treasure. Blessed be he who preserves them!" (Salomon 237). This scene 
indicates that Salomon recognizes the obstacle to emancipation presented by men such 
as her professor who insist on keeping alive the oppressive construction of gender and 
social order propagated in fairytales. Salomon's use of the Sleeping Beauty fairytale 
comments on a problem in her society's perception of gender that is represented by her 
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professor's insistence on keeping such myths alive. He insists one frame earlier, while 
looking over a male and female student, "be ever true and constant too, until beneath 
the sod, and waver not a finger's breadth from ways marked out by God" (Salomon 
236, omitted from the exhibition). This scene highlights the professor's means of 
reinforcing the ideological status quo through the classroom. 
Salomon's approach to social criticism through fairytale is telling since "unlike 
any country in the western world, with the possible exception of Great Britain, 
Germany has incorporated folk and fairy tales in its literary socialization process so that 
they play a most formative role in cultivating aesthetic taste and value systems" (Zipes 
134). Salomon recognized the impact of myth, poetry, and the written word on social 
consciousness and in particular on the description of women's lives. This is likely one 
reason why she painted a narrative accompanied by text and she incorporated 
newspaper clippings and various literary allusions into her text. She reappropriated this 
cultural material to highlight its impact on social life and to facilitate her own creative 
reckoning with life. Likewise, her alter ego in the work encourages her grandmother to 
live despite the tragedy in her life (mostly caused by the suicides of those related to her) 
by writing and developing her own artistic voice. To her grandmother she says, 
Some of your most recent poems are positively inspired, and I am convinced 
that a great literary talent has been lost in you. So I'll make you the following 
proposition: instead of taking your own life in such a horrible way ... why don't 
you make use of the same powers to describe your life? I am sure there must be 
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some interesting material that weighs on you, and by writing it down you will 
liberate yourself and perhaps perform a service to the world. (Salomon 762-
763, omitted from the exhibition) 
Here Salomon perceives the sleeping beauty within her grandmother, the repressed or 
anesthetized creative potential, whose absence feeds the death instinct, and she 
encourages her artistry as an affirmation of life. Like Salomon, the grandmother is both 
a figure of art and an artist. In her own artistic production, Salomon employs the 
Sleeping Beauty motif to nuance her representation of female experience and to 
perform an awakening critique. Ironically, the exhibition portrays Life? or Theatre? 
itself as a kind of sleeping beauty, once lost but reawakened by curators. 
Unfortunately, the work's feminist discourse has again been exiled into the forest of 
obscurity, like the princess. 
Universalizing Experience 
The work's feminist dimension is obscured not only by the omission of 
pertinent gouaches, and the exhibition's concentration on anti-Semitism, but by rhetoric 
that disperses the exhibition's significance into a representation of universal struggle. 
This rhetoric was present in Teitlbaum's voice over (cited earlier), and also appears in 
the AGO Member's Journal, which states that, "the exhibition is about the universal 
experiences of life and the coming to terms with love and death" (AGO Member's 
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Journal 4 ). By denying the representation of a specifically gendered, classed, and 
ethnic experience, this depiction of Life? or Theatre? negates its intersectional critique. 
Critics like Maclagan further this broad reading of the work. He asks, "could 
we see Salomon's work as a kind of memorial, not to herself and her family, but to life, 
and at the same time to the images generated by life?" (Maclagan 7 6). In Maclagan' s 
reading, the work is not only a memorial to past, as if no longer present, conditions of 
"life" (a memorial to life?), but it should also find its significance not in the domestic, 
private sphere of Salomon and her life but in the potentially, more seemingly 
significant, non-specific, public sphere of "life". In his statement, Maclagan employs a 
conventional method of excluding female interests from social/political prominence by 
drawing a false distinction between the private and the public. The dichotomy is also 
propagated by the AGO website, which argues that "to imagine Life? or Theatre? 
purely as a work derived from a therapeutic process of reintegration is to seriously 
undermine its intellectual and historical place in the history of art" (AGO Website: 
Exhibitions: Art and Trauma: Para 9). Why would the work's confrontation with the 
psychological effects of social relations, "undermine its intellectual and historical place 
in the history of art" unless its feminist approach to the subject is presumed irrelevant? 
The gendered nature of the work is repeatedly overwritten by male analysts in 
this fashion. Lowenthal F elstiner documents some of this history. For instance, 
"theologian Paul Tillich gave readers a reason to value Charlotte Salomon: 'There is 
something universally human, something that bridges the distance between man and 
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man .. .in the almost primitive simplicity of these pictures.' The 'uriiversally human' 
diary governs views of Life? or Theater? for the next twenty years" (Lowenthal 
Felstiner, To Paint 224). Lowenthal Felstiner rightly notes that thework has here been 
conceived of as both universal and as merely a personal diary, a reading that fails to 
recognize the work's political dimension or the political dimension of private life, 
which is not equivalent to its "universality" since it is characterized by power 
differentials. 
However, Lowenthal Felstiner also attempts to bridge gender difference when 
she inadvertently credits men with the artist's creation and the work's preservation. In 
reference to Daberlohn's model, Alfred Wolfsohn, Lowenthal Felstiner writes "her 
mentor, her double, her lover, her seer, born into loss and dread, knew the need for a 
journey down to one's unlit core. Without him Lotte Salomon would surely have been a 
painter, but not of Life? or Theatre?" (Lowenthal Felstiner, To Paint 61). In this 
statement, which closes a chapter in Salomon's biography, Lowenthal Felstiner 
mistakenly undermines Salomon's ownership of her work. It is true that the narrative 
reflects Salomon's engagement with her lover's theories and evidences their role in her 
creative development. But she independently resolves to overcome her circumstances 
by delving into the psyches of her characters and the expanse of her experience. She 
also draws on many other cultural influences (psychoanalysis, fairytales, opera, etc.) of 
which she would have had direct experience. All of this cannot so easily be attributed 
to her lover. But by employing Salomon's childhood nickname in this statement, 
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Lowenthal Felstiner infantilizes the artist and thereby reinforces her conclusion that 
Salomon is dependent on him in this way. 
Lowenthal Felstiner later gives inappropriate credit to Salomon's husband 
Alexander Nagler when she closes another chapter and section of the biography with 
this statement: "On the packages that wrapped up Life? or Theatre? there were labels 
in Alexander's hand reading PROPERTY OF MRS. MOORE-a useful ruse for 
keeping the artwork safe. The 'not very intelligent, not very apt' 'sorry specimen' 
[comments about Nagler from his sister-in-law and a neighbour] was the one who saved 
it for us all" (Lowenthal Felstiner, To Paint 174). Despite Lowenthal Felstiner's 
attempt to romanticize our heroine's prince, I believe it was primarily Salomon's 
decision to surrender Life? or Theatre? into the safekeeping of friends that preserved 
the work throughout the war. The artist was thus responsible for the work's creation 
and its preservation. Here, Lowenthal Felstiner's gestures to the contrary pulls back 
from the explicit and controversial feminist critique that appears elsewhere in her book. 
Van Alphen performs a similar misreading of the work when he writes that 
"male creativity and female suicide become the two principal motifs in Life or 
Theater?" (Van Alphen, Caught 67). Again, it is true that the artist mediates within the 
work on her lover's theories concerning the myth of Orpheus-as she depicts his 
obsessive infatuation with her stepmother, his infidelity, his neglect of his fiance, and 
his dismissive manipulation of her alter ego, the protagonist Charlotte Kann. But 
ultimately it is the pain caused by him, and other difficulties within her life, that she 
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confronts in her work, and her interest in his theories reside here in their promotion of 
the possibility of Orphic rebirth, creativity instigated by trauma. He is part of what she 
must destroy for the sake of creative transcendence. She explicitly plays out this 
confrontation, destruction, and reintegration through the final scenes of Life? or 
Theatre? (Salomon 815-821). Van Alphen's reductive summary of motifs seems to 
overlook the work's attention to female creativity and male narcissism. 
It is the recreation and self-preservation of the artist as well as her confrontation 
with the social basis of female despair that predominantly characterizes the content and 
structure of this massive work and permits Salomon, in generating Life? or Theatre?, 
to overturn the Sleeping Beauty narrative by refusing to "sleep" or rely on the prince's 
rescue. This is what a socialist feminist reading of the work as cultural memory reveals 
because it recognizes Life? or Theatre?'s grounding in historically specific social 
relations. Just as the once sexually violent and cannibalistic fairytale of Sleeping 
Beauty has been filtered through memory and rewritten over time, so has Salomon's 
presentation of her personal experience. She fictionalized her own biography and then 
lost it to another level of translation when critics and curators reconstructed it, allowing 
them to author a historical document that is both process and production, as it both 
represents and recreates Salomon's history, and writes itself into public memory. This 
recapturing and reinscription is "the endless effect of loss and debt, but it neither 
preserves nor restores an initial content, as this is forever lost (forgotten) and 
represented only by substitutes which are inverted and transformed according to the law 
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set up by a founding exclusion" (de Certeau 323). Critics and curators have invoked 
the erasure of one history in exchange for the telling of another, first by characterizing 
the work primarily as Holocaust art and then, as if in compensation for the 
shortcomings of this strategy, by laying the unifying metanarrative of universal 
suffering over Salomon's story. Here arises the danger of eliminating alterity inherent 
in the writing of history, which is an editorial process that aims at making the fact seem 
like a transcendental thing, the stuff of "universal experience" and "life". 
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Chapter 5: Policy as a Cultural Memory Frame 
In this chapter I will reflect on the AGO's management of Life? or Theatre?'s 
politics while considering the institution's social influence and its structural constraints. 
As I have shown in the preceding chapter, the exhibition's normative values seem to 
privilege the representation of ethnic difference over feminist struggle, and historical 
conflict over present power imbalances, rather than a more complex engagement with 
these intersecting issues and despite their prominence in the work. My understanding 
of this problem is informed by a socialist feminist political economy analysis of 
Canadian cultural policy, and its consequences for what is seen, how it is shown, and 
the ideological impacts of cultural production on society at-large. I contend that the 
policy framework impacts the exhibition practices of cultural institutions and the 
cultural memory politics they produce. 
By considering the economic and ideological environment surrounding the 
AGO at the time of this exhibition, and analyzing its implications for the presentation of 
Salomon's work, I will argue that cultural institutions such as the AGO are not immune 
to the effects of patriarchal capitalism in which they are embedded. This is not to say 
that they are wholly determined by it, but my case study illustrates the potential for 
patriarchal capitalism to intersect with nationalist discourse and thereby produce within 
cultural institutions a complacent politics concerning multiculturalism. While cultural 
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institutions should be representatives of difference, the inherent risk and compromises 
of such a politics can be used to prop-up social inequality, lacking due consideration of 
intersectional power and oppression. Given the degree to which a singular focus on 
Salomon's ethnicity overrides other aspects of her work, the exhibit reflects this 
context, as I will demonstrate. 
I take this to be the case even though curators at the Royal Academy of London 
organized the exhibition because the AGO had the freedom to alter its presentation of 
the work so that it could address a broader array of concerns. It had critical distance 
from the original curatorial process that determined the selection of gouaches and the 
exhibition format, yet it chose to emphasize the Holocaust association by adding Third 
Reich film, and by producing its own supplementary educational programming, 
marketing and publications in the same vein. An analysis of the AGO's context may 
shed some light on these decisions. By demonstrating that the exhibition reflects its 
ideological and material conditions in Toronto, I will illustrate how a socialist feminist 
theory of cultural memory (as a mode of political economy analysis) informs our 
understanding of the exhibition by providing us with an analysis of patriarchal 
capitalisms' impact on the arts. 
It is necessary to begin with an understanding of the art institution's role in 
cultural memory because that speaks to the consequences of its work as well as its 
origins. The approach that art museums bring to exhibitions is informed by cultural 
memory; curators carry culturally embedded training in aesthetics, institutional 
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responsibilities and social expectations. Consequently, exhibitions are not purely the 
result of rational objectivity but reflect cultural contexts. Art museums can also be 
understood as cultural memory producers, or lieux des memoires (Nora) because they 
generate meaning by creating a juncture for the physical and symbolic, for the material 
and discursive. The artefacts within them contain and transmit cultural memory, but the 
institutions themselves create another layer of cultural memory as spaces that frame and 
showcase the work of others. So it is reasonable to claim that their cultural capital 
enables them to be memory-making sites because they influence the reception of work 
en masse. 
As cultural memory makers, arts institutions play a determinant role in the 
formation of identity and group affiliation. As Susan Crane explains, "Memory OF 
cultures, nature, and nations is set to trigger memory IN and for multiple, diverse 
collectives. These memories then become components of identities-even for 
individuals who would in no other way feel connected to [museum] objects" (Crane 3, 
emphasis original). In other words, the institution is set to play a formative role in 
establishing people's values by creating meaningful experiences. This does not happen 
in a simple, linear fashion that leaves individuals isolated. As memory transmitters, 
museums represent dialectical spaces-"sites of interaction between personal and 
collective identities, between memory and history, between information and knowledge 
production" (Crane 12). Consequently, they negotiate the terrain between individual 
cognition and group solidarity, linking people together into collective consciousness. 
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This is why cultural institutions have the potential to build empathy between 
those who would not otherwise relate to each other, but to enable empathy it is 
imperative that these institutions offer diverse and complex narratives of meaning to 
avoid propagating reductive metanarratives. As Andreas Huyssen explains, ours is a 
time "when more people are eager to hear and see other stories, to hear and see the 
stories of others, when identities are shaped in multiply layered and never-ceasing 
negotiations between self and other, rather than being fixed and taken for granted in the 
framework of family and faith, race and nation" (Huyssen 34 ). In other words, the 
museum must be able to practice an intersectional politics in its construction of cultural 
memory to reflect the complex nature of subjectivity, which is the nexus of the social 
and the individual. In Salomon's case, it must be able to hold in tandem analyses of 
Life? or Theatre? t~at acknowledge the intersection of categories such as ethnicity, 
gender, and class. This should be obvious to curatorial practice today given the legacy 
of critical theory, but my case study suggests that it bears repeating. To privilege any 
one category of analysis risks appropriating the artist's memory, while disregarding 
differences between subject positions. This is the power of metanarratives to overwrite 
and reduce a work of art. As Ann Bradbury reminds us (in the context of HIV 
testimonial), the listener maintains power over the teller: "It is the listener who has 
ordered the telling, the listener who is in a position to assess and evaluate the teller's 
character by and through their cultural memory" (pdf 70). Our reading of Life? or 
Theatre? should also be attentive to this hierarchy. Although a wholly undistorted 
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reading of a work may not be possible, some distortions are greater than others, and we 
must be careful not to preclude readings of the work if we wish it to empower 
difference and build empathy. 
A complex representation of difference in Life? or Theatre? is compromised by 
the exhibition's narrow and entrenched focus on Salomon's association with the 
Holocaust. While the absence of a more layered representation of Life? or Theatre? 
may help to mainstream it, the principle of marginalization is reinforced by the 
exclusion of alternate readings. By reducing Salomon's work to "Holocaust art", the 
exhibition contradicts its capacity to provide a forum for the historically persecuted 
because it subscribes to a correlation between social hierarchy and artistic taxonomy. 
This problem is in fact the raison d'etre of contemporary art, much of which has 
dedicated itself to undoing such correlations through hybrid, interdisciplinary and 
multidisciplinary interventions that challenge the institutionalization of difference. As 
Celeste Schenck explains, 
Beneath the Western will to taxonomize lies not only a defensive history of 
exclusions that constitute a political ideology but also a fetishizing of aesthetic 
purity ... Pure genres, like biological genders, had best remain discrete and 
intact. Mixed, unclassifiable, blurred, or hybrid genres, like impure, anomalous, 
or monstrous genders, have traditionally offered up problems to their 
diagnosticians. Implicit in these sexual metaphors as thoroughly as in genre 
theory itself is also a binary opposition between norm and departure, between 
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convention and confusion, Platonic idea and deceiving appearance, pure form 
and polluted copy, which bears a subtext of not only gender but also racial 
oppression. (Schenck 284) 
While the exhibition seemingly celebrated the formal hybridity of Salomon's work, the 
work as a representation of difference, at another level it has done what Schenck 
describes. The attempt to ameliorate anti-Semitism facilitated the persistence of 
institutional sexism because the exhibition under-represented the work's feminist 
dimension. While the exhibition capitalized on Salomon's class and gender to idealize 
victims of the Holocaust, it otherwise overlooked how these matters complicated the 
work; it thereby obscured much of what is interesting about the work, and much of 
what the work is about. It also oversimplified the work's ethnic dimension and, with its 
strategic essentialism, the exhibit risked asserting that Salmon's ethnicity was grounds 
for censoring her art. I use the word "censoring" to indicate the political implications 
of this move. By largely negating the work's feminist dimension, the exhibition 
inadvertently reproduced the very thing it contested-a silencing of the subaltern. It 
thereby demonstrated the intersection of varying forms of oppression. 
Again, this political mistake is significant because of the institution's role in 
writing history and producing cultural memory. The art gallery operates under the 
assumption that (through this exhibition) it contributes to history by memorializing and 
making culturally prominent the immorality of the Nazi persecution of the Jews, 
thereby drawing from and adding to the cultural memory of its own society. By 
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consecrating a set of concerns such as this, museums "can be powerful identity-defining 
machines. To control a museum means precisely to control the representation of a 
community and some of its highest, most authoritative truths. It also means power to 
define and rank people, to declare some as having a greater share than others in the 
community's common heritage-in its very identity" (Duncan qtd. in Lisus and Ericson 
205). The exhibition puts Jewish history on the public agenda, enfranchises Jewish 
identity, and writes the rejection of anti-Semitism into collective consciousness. In this 
way the exhibition informs public discourse, and signals by omission what is 
insignificant. 
This is not merely a fleeting intervention. Shelley Hornstein argues that an 
exhibition is cemented into history through the institution's publications (whereas art 
outside of the museum is not) and the museum fortifies a canon that "reflects national, 
sage, and objectified valuations" (Hornstein 229). The AGO takes on national 
signification, especially through its construction of the past (World War II in this 
instance) and the heritage of its citizens, through the representation of work in a 
historical context. This understanding of the art museums' s influence on historical 
consciousness is also reflected in Michel de Certeau's text on historiography and nation 
building. He identifies "a UNESCO report [which] notes in passing, that 'knowledge of 
the past is structural' to the extent that it plays a unifying role in each nation's ways of 
thinking" (de Certeau 137). Teitelbaum seems to be aware of this nation building role 
too when he tells the audio guide audience that "Charlotte Salomon's autobiographical 
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fiction Life? or Theatre? is a magnum opus which bears witness to her life and times-
a historical moment whose effects must never be forgotten for, as the saying goes, those 
who forget history may be doomed to repeat it" (AGO Press Script 2). This may be 
why Life? or Theatre? is presented primarily as a document of the Holocaust and at the 
same time as a representation of "universal" truth; the exhibition is a historical 
document with implications for Canadian national identity. 
It must therefore be consistent with existing state politics, in which ethnic 
diversity supercedes problems of gender and class. Note that the Ministry of Heritage 
remains focused on "cultural, ethnic and linguistic" diversity (Canadian Heritage, 
"Canada's"). Its Museum Assistance Program objectives also emphasize ethnic 
diversity (Canadian Heritage, "Museum"). Similarly, the Canada Council Equity 
Office Mandate identifies a focus on "racial" diversity, Aboriginal culture, and minority 
language communities. Also see its policy entitled "Cultural Diversity: The 
Cornerstone of Canadian Society" which states "as outlined in its Corporate Plan, the 
Council's goals are to expand existing audiences, create new audiences and foster 
public enjoyment of the arts. To help meet these goals, the Council has identified the 
culturally diverse community as a strategic funding priority, along with the youth 
community and the Aboriginal community". The Ontario Art Council's 2008-2013 
strategic plan stresses similar concerns. Gender equality does not figure within these 
guiding documents, despite decades of feminist struggle. 
Ethnic diversity is an issue of central importance to Canada's social and 
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economic condition, but it is also an issue that can be defused, or used to reinforce the 
status quo. The AGO exhibition demonstrates how the discourse of multiculturalism 
can be used to promote a complacent nationalism and quell social unrest by creating the 
illusion of social justice. It presented a facade of radicalism, as I show in my analysis 
below, while maintaining a controlled and uncritical environment for public 
engagement. Observe how the exhibition's rhetoric, while claiming universality, 
paradoxically manipulated the private character of the work to enhance its appeal by 
stressing that the work is Salomon's "whole life", depicts her personal trauma, was 
hidden, would have been destroyed by fascism, and having survived, having subverted 
such obstacles, has just been unearthed for you the public. This suggests that there is 
something subversive about the work, but its subversive potential is also highly 
personal and historically contingent, rather than actually relating to present day social 
conditions. The audio guide further fosters the spectators' impression that they are 
entering a secret, private world by atomizing them into individual listeners. The text's 
enactment by actress Tilda Swinton likewise contributes to this sense of intimacy; it 
seems to bring Salomon to life, as though you can hear her reading her narrative and 
performing her characters for you. 51 So while the exhibition, through the printed word, 
the audio guide commentary, the family photographs, the screening room, and the 
51 While the enactment is a fair response to Salomon's attempt to create a theatrical 
performance, the actress's British accent, in tandem with repeated reference to 
Rosenthal's full professional title ("Secretary of the Royal Academy in London") 
insinuates that the legitimation of the artwork as high art is found in its British 
institutional sanction rather than in the content and quality of the work itself. 
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placement and selection of gouaches, constructed a politically charged setting that 
emphasized the broad social significance of anti-Semitism, any kind of political 
response, and any feeling of being controlled by the institution, was counterbalanced, 
contained or dispelled by the spectator's illusion of access, interpersonal contact, and 
individualism. 
An environment of open dialogue, free of coercion, is exactly what Teitelbaum 
encourages in his audio guide introductory statements: 
Bringing this important work here, to share with Toronto audiences, is very 
important to us. It provides an opportunity to discuss the ways in which art is 
central to personal experience, politics and history because, above all else, the 
Art Gallery of Ontario is a place of discovery and debate, a place of intense 
experiences. We want the Art Gallery of Ontario to be a place where you see 
the world anew. (AGO Press Script 2) 
Here, Salomon's art is declaimed as an exemplar of innovative, social engagement. It 
becomes a forum for AGO self-promotion because the gallery labels it an emblem of its 
own intellectual agape. Teitelbaum further emphasizes this attitude in the Member's 
Journal announcing the exhibition. He writes, 
It is not that we want to tum all values upside down and stretch the meaning of 
the visual arts beyond reasonableness, but we do want to challenge a few long 
held ideas, and make the experience of museum-going refreshing and new ... In 
each case our purpose is to invigorate the experience of looking by encouraging 
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direct enquiry. (Teitelbaum, Member's Journal 18) 
Yet a glance through the catalogue (which reproduces more of the original work than 
exhibited) reveals that the exhibition's current state does not admit significant aspects 
of the direct enquiry present in Life? or Theatre?, since the exhibition obscures the 
presence of an overtly feminist critique in the work. Teitelbaum's rhetoric distracts us 
from that omission. It leads us to believe that we are really engaging with the work's 
controversial material, while we overlook its intersectional politics. 
The AGO may have done this because it was concerned with creating a safe and 
accessible environment. Buekle speaks to the necessity for institutions to shield visitors 
from vicarious trauma in the experience of Salomon's work (noting that this can have a 
distortion effect on the work itself). The AGO is also attune to the visitor's experience 
since, when in 1996 it hosted the Art of a Nation exhibit of the Group of Seven 
alongside an interactive workshop on Canadian art and identity, researchers found that 
gallery goers "visited for comfort, not contest" (Lisus and Ericson 214 ). The design of 
the Life? or Theatre? exhibition assured those same conditions. The audience was 
instructed to use the work as a therapeutic approach to genocide; we could partake in its 
surviving beauty and apparent innocence, while learning something (if relatively little) 
about the Holocaust. The gallery could claim to stimulate public debate (on a morally 
unquestionable issue) to be controversial (regarding a subject that had already achieved 
widespread consensus), to be relevant to the contemporary (while historicizing and 
resigning to the past fascism, anti-Semitism, sexism), and to be open to a plethora of 
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public interpretations (while constructing a specific reception). Any gallery hosting this 
exhibition could claim to serve the public purpose of providing memorials against 
fascism, nourishing a compassionate nation, while atomizing audience members and 
diverting their attention to diffuse anger, thereby serving a nation-building role (i.e. 
Canada as tolerant, democratic, and intellectually curious) without causing any trouble. 
The exhibition was also likely to draw a large crowd given the widely, socially 
recognized relevance of the Holocaust, and the large Jewish community in Toronto. In 
other words, the exhibition had the edginess of the political without the controversy (or 
substance) that a feminist reading might proffer. 
This perspective contradicts the presumed objectivity of cultural institutions. 
There is no doubt that these organizations are composed of ethical and critically minded 
individuals. Nonetheless, institutional and curatorial bias as a result of personality, 
politics and policy is well-documented. As Richard Sandell writes 
the inevitably political role of museums in privileging certain forms of 
knowledge has, of course, been widely discussed (Karp and Lavine 1995, 
Macdonald 1998, Hooper-Greenhilll 2000, Luke 2002). As Timothy Luke 
states, 'while their public pose most frequently is one of cool detached 
objectivity, museums are unavoidable enterprises organized around engaged 
partisan principles' (2002: 228). All museums embody sets of values which 
communicate a particular vision of society but this tendentiousness is very often 
denied by exhibition makers, both explicitly and implicitly, and rarely openly 
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acknowledged to visitors. (Sandell 1 77) 
This problem of partisan politics in the museum results not merely from human fallacy. 
It relates to government mandates and the economic climate in which museums operate. 
Museums are dependent on these more than the social movements they may engage 
with from time to time. As T.V. Reed explains, feminist cultural impacts in particular 
go unrecognized in the museum because "most institutions, whether political or 
cultural, are invested in their own stability, while movements [such as feminism] thrive 
on engendering instability" (Reed 313). This is demonstrated by the manner in which 
the AGO mounted the exhibition and is evidence of the impact of the institutional 
framework on the erasure of certain ideas. 
Peter Burger's analysis of art as institution suggests that this is a necessary 
consequence of capitalism. He argues that the separation of art and life, which, is the 
result of the capitalist division of labour, creates "specialists" and in turn a "shrinking 
of experience" in art that "can no longer be translated into the praxis of life" because it 
is only "partial" (33). Art loses its social function because this separation of art and life 
under capitalism "neutralizes the political content of individual work" and the work 
comes to be "perceived as a 'mere' art product" (90). Avant-garde efforts to overcome 
this separation have failed and sometimes resulted in the creation of "false 
sublation .... whose primary aim is to impose a particular kind of consumer behaviour 
[or social function] on the reader" (54). This turns "an instrument of emancipation" 
into "one of subjection" (54) because it imposes on the work a kin~ of false 
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reconciliation, an attempt to dissolve art's relative autonomy that effaces its productive 
dialectical tensions. The problem of "false sublation" can be applied to the Salomon 
exhibition since the intersectional analysis of Salomon's work was replaced with a 
more narrow agenda concerning multiculturalism that was, as I will argue below, in-
part prescribed by capitalism and the state, as a kind of false reconciliation of 
difference. 
With reference to the state, it is important to acknowledge that the AGO has been 
given a cultural diversity mandate. It has not been given an interse,ctional, feminist 
politics mandate. The AGO is compelled to produce particular kinds of cultural 
memory because it is affected by the federal government's 1990 Museums Act which 
mandates it to "'preserv[ e] and promot[ e] the heritage of Canada and all its peoples 
throughout Canada and abroad, and [to] contribut[e] to the collective memory and sense 
of identity of all Canadians'" (Whitelaw 126). The "collective memory" being 
constructed in this exhibit privileges Jewish history over women's history. I am 
suggesting that because of public policy, Salomon's ethnicity was more relevant to a 
multicultural, Canadian identity than her gender ever could be. Moreover, the exhibit's 
uncontroversial politics, its admonishment of anti-Semitism, suits the popular political 
identity of Canada as a compassionate but not radical nation, concerned about genocide 
outside of its borders and sensitive to the lessons of history, albeit less able to address 
internal or domestic power struggles. This goes some distance to explain why the AGO 
represented the work in such a one-dimensional fashion. 
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I would not argue that the AGO entirely excludes the more contested and 
unpopular terrain of feminism from its cultural memory making since some of its 
exhibitions have placed some focus on this issue. Moreover, since its reopening in 
2008, the AGO has maintained a standing exhibition of feminist art. I also do not wish 
to claim that debates and fissures regarding curatorial policy have never existed within 
the AGO. Institutions are not monocultural, and they are indeed shaped by struggles 
over cultural memory. Given this condition, it is worth noting that the AGO operates 
within a charged, political environment in which to challenge discourse surrounding the 
Holocaust readily exposes one to accusations of anti-Semitism. For instance, note how 
Jenny Peta's University of Toronto Masters thesis, which is critical of Holocaust 
education, was condemned in the National Post and Ontario legislature in 2010. Still it 
is worth reflecting on why the AGO did not pursue a more nuanced and layered 
representation of Salomon's work a decade ago, why it added the screening room, and 
why it pursued a marketing and educational angle focused so unilaterally on the work in 
relation to the Holocaust. Again, I am interested in the AGO's decisions in this regard 
more than in the Royal Academy's precisely because the AGO did not initiate the 
exhibit. It is the choice the AGO made at a critical distance to reproduce the exhibit 
and, moreover, to add its own framing devices, which is of interest to me here, 
especially as it relates to my own cultural policy context. That being said, the policy 
context in all of the countries in which the exhibition appeared are not radically 
different from one another. I am proposing that the AGO may have been inclined to 
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emphasize the artist's ethnicity and to deemphasize her feminism at least in-part 
because of the political climate in which it was operating and specifically the pressure it 
was under as a result of government mandates toward multiculturailism. This 
interpretation is suggested by the fact that the gallery's ongoing struggle to secure 
adequate funding was explicitly related to the ethnic demographics of its audience. 
According to Pamela Young, 
During the summer [of 1992], the Ontario government refused the AGO's 
request for additional funding of $6 million. The institution then extended a 
three-month closure required for the renovations to seven months and laid off 
244 of its 445 employees (it has since rehired 50) .... [and] flaslam [the NDP 
Culture and Communications Minister] commissioned a task force ... to examine 
the structure and policies of the AGO. Its report, released last November 
[1993], states that the gallery's financial management was "basically sound," 
but that it must reduce its dependence on government funding. Haslam also 
asked the task force to consider whether the AGO was meeting the needs of 
Canada's most ethnically diverse province. The report concluded: "The most 
important and difficult problem facing the AGO is ... how to broaden its 
audience." (Young 56) 
The institution was under pressure to increase contributions from private and corporate 
donors, through some kind of ethnically centred programming. Likewise, "museums of 
all kinds, and in many parts of the world, are increasingly expected to develop their 
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displays in ways that reflect the diverse, culturally pluralist societies within which they 
are operating" (Sandell x). 52 Championing Holocaust art helped the AGO appear to be 
more ethnically sensitive in the representation of a diverse Canada. 
Moreover, as government funding has declined, the AGO has had to strengthen 
its partnership with the corporate world, whose interests also lie in multiculturalism as a 
means of market expansion. Satya A. Mohanty argues that the corporate establishment 
makes use of a discourse of diversity, turning antiracist sentiment into an opportunity 
for profit by emphasizing a concern for conservative and symbolic cultural pluralism 
over radical and experiential racial equality. The rhetoric of multiculturalism ends in 
"depoliticizing race and substituting (a narrowly defined) 'culture' for antiracist 
consciousness" (Mohanty 1 7), thereby further disempowering those parties the 
corporations claim to support. This analysis, which resonates with Biirger' s concern 
about false sublation, highlights the fact that the exhibition's focus on Salomon's 
ethnicity emphasized a concern for symbolic cultural pluralism over a more radical 
racial equality that would have represented Salomon's work in a more comprehensive 
manner. 
In summary, I contend that with regard to the exhibition the widely sanctioned 
moral imperative found in the Holocaust has the effect of propagating a national 
discourse that conveys a multicultural, politically open, Canadian identity, while in 
actuality constructing a controlled public sphere in which political opposition is not at 
52 This trend is also documented, as Sandell notes, in Tony Bennett. 
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stake, and a tenable market is assured, thereby gratifying the institutional funding 
mandates imposed by governmentality and the corporate sphere. While the AGO 
provides a case study for considering the impact of policy on museum practice in a 
capitalist context, similar socio-economic conditions pertain to cultural institutions 
throughout the world, given the global expansion of capitalism. 
This problem of depoliticization was recently observed again at the AGO's 
Massive Uprising fundraising party in 2009, which employed civil dissent as a party 
theme. The event led Aaron Cain to conclude that "the popular culture machine is 
eating up progressive elements to transform them into bland, dislocated simulacra" 
(Cain 19). It is not insignificant that this event was specifically concerned with the 
institution's fiscal reality, appealing to art's political engagement for the sake of 
revenue, and thereby reassigning the political dimension of art to propping up the 
socioeconomic conditions of capitalism. 
If the economic context seems an unlikely explanation for the way in which the 
feminist aspects of Salomon's work have been downplayed, we should reconsider the 
state of feminism within the artworld at large, where we can perceive the intersection of 
symbolic and economic power with its effects for women. While I have just made the 
case that there was a systemic bias in favour of an ethnic presentation of Salomon's 
work, at the expense of its other dimensions, I will now argue that there was also an 
implicit, systemic bias against a feminist interpretation. 
We know that economic organization is a significant determinant of any 
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gender's access to power, and that one manifestation of power is found in the symbolic 
capital of cultural institutions. This is why social inequalities become reproduced in the 
museum and are reproduced by it. Nochlin highlights the continuum between sexism in 
society at-large and in the cultural field when she writes that 
Assumptions about women's weakness and passivity; her sexual availability for 
men's needs; her defining domestic and nurturing function; her identity with the 
realm of nature; her existence as object rather than creator of art; the patent 
ridiculousness of her attempts to insert herself actively into the realm of history 
by means of work or engagement in political struggle-all of these notions, 
themselves premised on an even more general, more all-pervasive certainty 
about gender difference itself-all of these notions were shared, if not 
uncontestedly, to a greater or lesser degree by most people of our period [i.e. the 
201h century], and as such constitute an ongoing subtext underlying almost all 
individual images involving women. (Nochlin 2) 
Here Nochlin posits that pervasive and deeply entrenched attitudes about gender 
materially constrain women in the public sphere and are manifest in cultural production. 
This creates an ideological circuit that is difficult to breach. Museum practice is 
understandably implicated in this circuit because museums are part of the public sphere 
and the practice of cultural production . 
. Cultural policy circumscribing the museum has also been implicated; it is 
resigned to a low echelon of value because of its association with women. Alison Beale 
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and Annette Van den Bosch have found that "the arts as 'feminine', irrational, spiritual, 
and, in the romantic tradition, as the antithesis of economic values (all of which makes 
their public-sector support portrayable as economic and moral dependency), is an image 
that has persisted throughout the recent period in which the arts in Canada and Australia 
have been required to model themselves as cultural industries" (Beale & Van den Bosch 
247). For one example, Beale and Van den Bosch point to the Chair of the Canada 
Council's remarks at the 1995 Governor General's literary awards, in which she 
advertised "the Council's availability as matchmaker" between private sector art 
patrons and artists (Beale & Bosch 246). Such a feminine casting of artistic production 
as dependent on the masculine patron of public/private funding, has prepared the 
ground for the problematic representation of women in exhibition by perpetuating 
myths of women as weak and needy objects of desire rather than autonomous, creative 
and important. 
This problem is compounded by government cutbacks in favour of market 
economics that align women and the arts as low priorities. Beale and Van den Bosch 
observe that 
In Ontario especially, such amputations of public policies and institutions have 
been made tyrannically by cabinet fiat at lightning speed with no consultation or 
public debate .... Some 13 feminist groups, signatories of the Ontario Women's 
Declaration on December 6, 1995, demanded that the new government 'cease its 
policies of discriminatory cutbacks' so that the "hard-won legal, economic, 
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social and political gains women have achieved" could be maintained. They also 
protested against the "deep cuts for funding for the arts and culture," stressing a 
connection between women and the arts in this social realignment. (Beale & 
Van den Bosch 44) 
Activists recognize an antagonism in public policy toward any social concern (e.g. 
cultural production, gender equality, environmental sustainability) that cannot be met 
with a market solution. A shift in policy toward market economics divorced from 
social relations53 has precipitated this problem. The marketability of women's art has 
been at issue because policy has looked toward the propagation of the cultural 
industries as an economic and imperialist engine. Hence, "Other forms of cultural 
production, such as craft, the fine and performing arts and community arts, are 
construed as part of the feminine welfare state sector, as opposed to the export earning, 
technologised world of the masculine 'bottom line'" (Beale & Van den Bosch 2). 
Domestically, galleries have also been impacted by this tum toward international 
capitalism since "increased corporate sponsorship of major museums and the social 
functions associated with this funding has established a private audience for corporate 
sponsored functions in public institutions, and has resulted in an over-emphasis on the 
blockbuster exhibition. This emphasis too, is unlikely to reflect women's culture" 
(Beale & Van den Bosch 15). 
53 For evidence of this policy movement see McMurtry 2004. Polyani can be credited 
with describing the socially disembedded character of economics precipitated by 
capitalism. 
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I 
Given the pervasive quality of patriarchy and capitalism, (and the patriarchal 
character of capitalism)54, it is unsurprising that not only images, but also their 
custodians are significantly determined by gender dynamics. Carol Becker has noticed 
the parallel between the psychodynamics of institutions and those of traditional 
nuclear and extended families. The typical institutional configuration is all too 
familiar. At the top a patriarch serves as figurehead and final arbitrator, 
possessing the bulk of the decision-making power-the father. Often second in 
command is a woman who works closely with him as advisor, confidant, 
mediator, interceptor-the mother. And several other males and females assist 
him in his leadership and relate to the hierarchy of the institution as they did to 
their parents, and to their peers as if they were siblings. These, of course, are 
the children. (Becker 249) 
Becker's study demonstrates that the gender politics of our economy not only surround, 
but also insert themselves into, our cultural organizations. Arts administrators both 
respond to these conditions in their external environment, and enact them internally. 
This may be why, despite decades of feminist criticism, cultural policy has 
proved itself nearly impenetrable to the feminist movement. Beale & Bosch 
demonstrated this in their exhaustive study of Canadian and Australian cultural policy 
of the early 90s. They found that, 
54 The externalities of capitalism disproportionally affect women as producers of 
workers, as household consumers, and as a predominantly landless and low waged 
second class. 
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both mainstream liberal and neo-marxist cultural policy analysis in Australia 
and Canada showed remarkably little feminist influence. It was dominated by 
agendas of national cultural preservation, or by questioning these agendas, and 
by managing changes in technologies and in cultural markets. To a lesser extent 
it was concerned with multiculturalism, racism, aboriginal peoples, and 
community arts. (Beale & Van den Bosch 2) 
So heritage, market priorities and the management of ethnic difference are identified as 
the three areas of attention, and presumably each one is approached primarily from the 
perspective of the other two. This condition encourages a market approach to Canadian 
diversity because if market priorities are always part of the approach then market 
solutions are likely to be sought in all cases. Such an approach would not encourage 
investment in the representation of other forms of difference. 
By 2005 the ongoing effects of such a policy environment were evident at the 
epicenter of modern art: 
In a 2005 follow-up review of the new Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in New 
York, published one year after its massive expansion and reopening, the art 
critic Jerry Saltz of the Village Voice suggested that the public boycott the 
institution until its "arrogantly parochial misrepresentation" of women artists 
was corrected and those responsible were "held accountable." "Of the 
approximately 410 works in the fourth and fifth-floor galleries," he reported, 
only a paltry 16 are by women. (Nochlin & Reilly 19) 
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Even as late as 2005, even within this bastion of the avant-garde, there has been a 
failure to embrace an intersectional feminist politics. 
While critics have long recognized such problems resulting from the 
marketization of art and the tum toward globalization, most tend to ignore the specifics 
of capitalism as an economic system. When capitalism is mentioned by cultural critics, 
it typically remains undefined and the implication is that capitalism represents all forms 
of market economics, which renders it unavoidable, with only one alternative located in 
the totalitarian state. 55 Capitalism is the private and exclusionary ownership of the 
means of production for profit. We should ask what kind of cultural memory such a 
system can enable. Horkheimer and Adorno have famously argued that the effect of 
capitalist industrial processes on cultural production is a commodification that 
encourages sameness, and coerces audience members to participate in their own 
objectification under the guise of entertainment pleasure, overriding any quality of 
individuality. More recently in Klein's study of disaster zones, we discover that the 
Chicago School's extreme strain of capitalism demands the erasure of culturally 
specific memory altogether. Such a system, it seems, is not conducive to feminist 
cultural memory. 
The dialectic of individual and collective life, of which feminist cultural memory 
is a product, enables life itself. The culture of privatization endemic to capitalism 
55 Cooperative cultural producers demonstrate otherwise and this is an area deserving of 
further study. 
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contradicts this dialectic. Cultural memory is a challenge to the singular focus of 
universalizing capitalism because it forges links between individuals and the collective; 
it also challenges the erasure of experience and difference against commodification's 
universal sameness. 
Salomon's work exemplifies this potential by articulating intersectional 
frameworks of oppression and employing a dialectical approach to cultural memory, 
one that productively relates categories of difference such as fact and fiction, gender 
and ethnicity, self and other. So it is crucial to understand the work's exhibition context 
and how it mitigates the power of Life? or Theatre?. Ironically, the content of 
Salomon's work directly comments on how economic relations impact women's 
experience of power, just as economic relations impact the reception of her work.56 For 
instance, the women in the text find themselves emancipated by professions outside the 
home and destroyed by dynamics internal to the patriarchal family. One principal cause 
of the suicidal impulse in Life? or Theatre? is posited to be the women's frustrated 
intellectual and creative labour. Women of independent economic means are seen to 
inspire the artist. Moreover, the affair central to Life? or Theatre? is marked by class 
difference. Salomon's leading man is explicitly conditioned by his economic position; 
he is a "prince ... allowed to starve" (Salomon 341 ). More could be written about the 
56 I recognize that the close reading of the text which now follows could equally belong 
in chapter 4, but I have included it here because, while chapter 4 seelks to highlight the 
work's feminist dimension, I am speaking more explicitly in this chapter to demonstrate 
the critique of economic conditions that a socialist feminist theory brings to a reading of 
the exhibition, both its context and its content. This inclusion also br'ings full circle the 
analysis of chapter 4 and 5, by integrating analysis of the work, exhibition, and 
exhibition context. 
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class content of this work, as it intersects significantly with Life? or Theatre?'s other 
dimensions. It is essentially a critique of bourgeois relationships. But much of this 
cultural memory content concerning economic conditions has so far been curtailed by 
the economic contingencies surrounding it. Here we see how the work's cultural 
memory (described more comprehensively in chapter 4) correlates with its conditions of 
production. 
More recent, feminist performance is constituted by critiques of economic 
conditions similar to Salomon's. They attempt to resist economies of reproduction and 
capitalist appropriation. But this is one of the difficulties in presenting Salomon's work 
as feminist-its limited, market value. This is another reason the work is subject to an 
analysis of class, at the intersection of gender and ethnicity. Ultimately it is not a 
question of whether the work's engagement with ethnicity, class or $ender is more 
significant. It is about how these categories intersect internally and externally, how a 
limited focus on any one category poses a detriment to the others, and how an 
awareness of this intersection is curtailed by capitalism's influence on the context of 
cultural production. This is what a socialist feminist cultural memory framework 
addresses. Let us not hedge our tragedies against one another but recognize them where 
they flourish. 
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Conclusion 
This project has engaged with a number of professional streams (aesthetic 
theory and criticism, cultural memory, intersectional feminist politics, museum studies 
and cultural policy) to illuminate their interconnection. It has drawn together rationales 
within aesthetic theory that understand aesthetic politics in terms of dialectics. It has 
brought the lens of cultural memory to those rationales to develop our understanding of 
art's political potential and its limitations-that it can be circumscribed by material and 
ideological conditions through the cultural memory it creates and reinforces-while 
simultaneously developing a dialectical definition of cultural memory. This project has 
also applied a feminist analysis of aesthetics to ground these rationales in a progressive 
politics, and it has mobilized feminist critique of the museum to reconsider a particular 
exhibition of a woman's work and its engagement with cultural memory. The project 
has reinforced a political economy critique of capitalism's impact on cultural policy by 
considering policy's implications for the exhibition. Finally, this work has employed a 
socialist feminist theory of art as cultural memory to suggest a more ethical basis for 
cultural policy, one that better reflects an understanding of art's social value as cultural 
memory to account for the diverse political implication of the arts and to challenge the 
hegemony of capitalism which constrains them. 
I began by making the case in chapter 1 that the arts are intrinsic to social 
change because they are media of cultural memory. Culture is a reflection or 
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instantiation of cultural memory, which filters and maintains cultural content across 
time and space. As a tool of cultural memory, the arts embody this cultural content. 
Consequently the arts can enable the imagination of difference, the representation of 
action, and the fulfillment of phylogeny, all necessary precursors to social change. The 
arts also disseminate ideas, frame them and enable collectivizing around them. In so far 
as they relate to subjectivity, by integrating the heterogeneity of the subject so that the 
subject can act, the arts mobilize cultural memory to influence people at the conscious 
and unconscious level, where memory is stored and recalled. They therefore have a 
central role in the construction of individuals and how they relate. 
In chapter 2 I argued that the definition of cultural memory could be usefully 
developed to shed light on this dynamic. If cultural memory is essentially the 
propagation of collective memory through cultural signs and manifesting in cultural 
signs, it is dialectical, not static, the terrain of ideological struggle, which links us to 
values, groups, and identities. But cultural memory requires representation to realize 
itself, to reflect and integrate experience, which facilitates learning. Such 
representation also enables us to recollect and be guided by transcendent values. 
Furthermore, it constructs experiential knowledge, which is necessary to the 
development of empathy and action. In total, representation as cultural memory relates 
us to the metaphysical and the political; this range helps us to understand varied 
interpretations of aesthetic value. Art and cultural memory struggle and transform 
through one another as they negotiate between the material and spiritual, past and 
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present, the sensuous and rational, text and context, author and reader, affirmation and 
negation. This is a useful means of defining the function of art, which places it at the 
centre of life struggles. 
Such an aesthetic theory of art as cultural memory cannot avoid political 
content. In chapter 3 I made the argument that feminism and socialism together create 
an ideal mode of intersectional politics relevant to aesthetics, grounded in an analysis of 
structure and agency. This mode reveals the correlation of women and art under 
capitalism. I have argued that feminist art and theory inform one another, especially 
through the principle that the personal is political, which takes on various 
manifestations worthy of attention, and merges the arts with everyday life. I have 
further demonstrated an alignment between feminism and cultural memory making that 
reveals the capacity of cultural memory to relate the personal and political. Art 
materializes social change to some degree by intervening in the discourse of gender, 
translating past, personal experience into present politics. This intervention of cultural 
memory bridges discourse and material reality through its aesthetic and sensory 
dimensions. Memory is drawn from the material world and is experienced physically. 
It also draws on emotional worlds that are extra-discursive and materialize in the body. 
Art likewise relies on the transaction of sensation, which provokes a relational and 
conceptual engagement with the matter presented that renders it social and political. 
This explains the transformative impact of discourse on reality and vice versa, without 
conflating the two, which leaves cultural memory distinct from discourse and praxis. 
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Understanding of these distinctions is itself a struggle of cultural memory and is 
necessary to feminist politics, which depend on the remembrance of the lived 
experienced of oppression. The distinction between memory and discourse is necessary 
if feminism is to critique capitalism as both discourse and material reality, a critique 
that is obscured by the dominance of discourse theory, which helps capitalism to erase 
memory. 
Art reinstates the progressive political potential of cultural memory, not as 
nostalgia or affect, upon which capital increasingly seeks to operate, but as a return of 
the repressed. Capital may mobilize affect and suppress memory or rewrite memory 
through affect; it can even mobilize cultural memory to its own ends, but the arts 
continue to facilitate the resurgence of counter memory. 
In chapter 4 I have demonstrated the cultural memory value of Life? or Theatre? 
as a multidisciplinary work of art that embodies my five part definition of cultural 
memory and demonstrates its politics. The work transforms Salomon's experience into 
a memory that enables catharsis and education in tandem with estrangement. It 
productively reintegrates various sources of psychological angst and disruption, and 
engages art in everyday life to make and remake memory-to move from Thanatos to 
Eros. Consequently, it is a work of feminist cultural memory that demonstrates how 
cultural memory can stimulate empathy in the service of politics. I have elucidated the 
feminist dimension of the work in particular, evident in many of its themes, motifs, and 
characters as well as in its aesthetic strategies, which together inspire a critical 
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awareness within the audience concerning the cultural construction of intersectional 
identities and experiences. Such identities and experiences are mobilized to foster a 
relational and empathic reading of the work, and thereby extend its intersectional 
politics. 
I have demonstrated that one exhibition of Salomon's work has restricted its 
cultural memory potential by focusing almost exclusively on the ethnic dimension of 
Life? or Theatre?, and I have explored how this framing of the work has been 
challenged or affirmed by critics. I have specifically highlighted a feminist reading that 
is often overlooked, to complicate our interpretation of Life? or Theatre?. I have also 
made the argument that the work's complexity has been compromised by a 
historiographic metanarrative that problematically universalizes its import. This move 
counters the work's feminist commentary and intersectional politics by negating 
difference, and it demonstrates the potential for cultural memory to be manipulated. 
I attempted in chapter 5 to review the role of cultural institutions in cultivating 
cultural memory and I established the necessity that they be guided by an intersectional 
politics in doing so. I have argued that a failure in this regard perpetuates the logic of 
oppression and that the stakes are high given the investment of cultural institutions in 
national discourse. This investment has created pressure points for cultural institutions, 
pushing toward a complacent politics and the management of dissent. I have drawn on 
others to make the case that institutions are subject to such political pressures, which 
influence exhibition practices, underlined by capitalism and patriarchy. As a 
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consequence, the status of women and the status of art are closely related just as 
capitalism and patriarchy are mutually embedded. Cultural memory is a tool to 
overcome this dynamic when it is grounded in a socialist feminist politics that 
challenges our alienation from life values and reasserts the dialectical principle. 
I have undertaken this project because I believe that Canadians must develop 
and adopt a better way of understanding the social value of the arts, beyond our 
common and superficial assumptions about its positive and negative effects. We have 
assumed that the arts can be educational and spiritually uplifting, offensive, and even 
misleading. We have not developed a coherent and common understanding of their 
politics, of their central role in the construction of subjectivity, empathy, and social 
change. In the absence of such an understanding, which should be central to our civic 
life, we are left with the vague impression that the arts have the capacity to change our 
minds but little understanding of how, or in what direction, and even less hope that such 
change might translate into a more just and meaningful existence. Is it any wonder then 
that art becomes merely the terrain of entertainment at the service of industry, widely 
undervalued and misunderstood, and the mythic figure of the starving artist persists as a 
static reality? At best, the arts are regarded with equal measures of hope and cynicism, 
given the indeterminacy of any meaning they might offer. This is the limitation of 
discourse analysis, a limitation I have attempted to breach by creating a bridge into 
materialism using a concept of cultural memory that is situated within an intersectional 
feminist politics. The theory of cultural memory developed here enables us to better 
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understand how the experiences and ideas offered by the arts might actually contribute 
to the construction of reality. Furthermore, a cultural memory awproach makes clear 
why it is necessary to attend as much to the material conditions of artistic production as 
to its ideological heritage. This has been addressed by the sociology of art, which 
considers the conditions of cultural production, but a cultural memory lens makes 
visible the manner in which cultural production transforms itselfthrough memory and 
discourse. 
The method of applying a socialist feminist theory of art as cultural memory to 
the experience of a work of art is to ask what is being remembered in the work, what is 
being forgotten, and what are the politics of that remembering or forgetting. Moreover, 
it asks these questions with an attention to the socially and economically constructed 
nature of a society (the work's context) and its intersectional power dynamics. 
Salomon's work has provided a relatively transparent case study for this method 
because it has an autobiographical and realist underpinning. The artist intended it to be 
a memory-based project. Through the theories, reflections and experiments of its 
characters the narrative itself articulates ideas about the imbrication of memory and art. 
Furthermore, the work has been valued and promoted largely because of its memorial 
dimension, as a document of Jewish, European history. I am not suggesting that the 
reading I have proposed is the only one possible; nor is it exclusive of other readings, 
but I have demonstrated what kind of reading might result from the application of a 
social feminist theory of art as cultural memory. It is my supposition that work 
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associated with other artistic disciplines could equally benefit from this method of 
analysis, but a longer work is required to demonstrate that through case studies. 
Perhaps other cultural critics and arts audiences will develop such an approach. 
I hope to have made clear the origins of my approach to aesthetics in my review 
of aesthetic theory, the sociology of the arts, cultural memory, and the politics of 
socialist feminism. I have aimed to correlate these fields so that I could explicitly 
articulate a mode of understanding the arts with which others might easily identify, and 
thereby move toward improving the status of the arts in Canada through recognition of 
its role in social change. What I have overlooked is the possibility that this role is 
already well understood by some, and actually explains the sequestering of the arts 
because of the threat they pose to power. Indeed, it is the hegemony of capitalism that 
limits the effect of critical art and critical discourse about art. We must keep 
questioning assumptions about our cultural inheritance; we must keep answering the 
question, as I have here, why are the arts important and why are they problematic, or 
else critical discourse will be bypassed and hegemony enabled. This requires a socialist 
feminist aesthetic theory, which will not end capitalism but is a necessary precondition 
for its overcoming in the cultural sphere. A socialist feminist politics of art as cultural 
memory pushes representation into engagement with intersectionality and the economic 
conditions of cultural production and policy, with consequences for national political 
consciousness. Applying that lens to cultural policy at least facilitates some kind of 
democratic recourse around capitalism. Even more broadly, the concept of cultural 
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memory can help us to understand how the cultural sphere is used to mitigate and 
interpret challenging economic, social, environmental, and political conditions. It is the 
aesthetic and material grounding for survival and identity in the built, social and natural 
environments, of which it is both product and producer, and it is always informing the 
choices that communities make. 
180 
Works Cited 
Adams, Jacqueline. "Art in Social Movements: Shantytown Women's Protest in 
Pinochet's Chile." Sociological Forum. 17. 1 (2002): 21-56. 
Adorno, Theodor W. "Art, Society, Aesthetics." Aesthetic Theory. Eds. Gretel 
Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997. 1-15. 
----,Negative Dialectics. Trans. E.B. Ashton. New York: Continuum, 
1994. 
Alaimo, Stacy, and Susan Hekman, eds. Material Feminisms. Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 2008. 
Anderson, Margaret L. and Patricia Hill Collins. Race, Class and Gender: An 
Anthology. gth ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 2012. 
Andrew, Caroline, & Monica Gattinger. "Accounting for Culture: Thinking Through 
Cultural Citizenship." Accounting/or Culture. Eds. C. Andrews, M. Gattinger, 
S. Jeannotte, & W. Straw. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2005: 1-6. 
Apollinaire, Guillaume. "On the Subject in Modem Painting". Art in Theory: 1900-
1990. Eds. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood. Oxford UK and Cambridge US: 
Blackwell, 1992. 180. 
Aristotle. "The Poetics". Apx. 335-322 B.C. Tran. S.H. Buchner. Criticism: Major 
Statements. Ed. Charles Kaplan and William Anderson. 3rd ed. New York: 
181 
St. Martin's Press, 1991. 21-52. 
Armatage, Kay et al. Gendering the Nation: Canadian Women's Cinema. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1999. 
Art Gallery of Ontario. Members' Journal. 8.3 Spring (2000). 
----. Press Script: Life? or Theatre?: The Work of Charlotte Salomon. 
----. Website: http://info.ago.net 
Assman, Jan. "Collective Memory and Cultural Identity". Trans. John Czaplicka. 
New German Critique. 65. 125-133. 
Atkinson, R.C.; Shiffrin, R.M. "Human Memory: A Proposed System and its Control 
Processes". The Psychology of Learning and Motivation. Vol. 2. K. W. Spence 
and J.T. eds. Spence, J.T. New York: Academic Press, 1~68: 89-195. 
Baert, Renee. "Materializing Memory: The Clothing Works of Faye HeavyShield." 
n.paradoxa: International Feminist Art Journal. 3 (1999): 49-65. 
Barry, Judith. "Women, Representation, and Performance Art: Northern California." In 
Carl E. Loeffler and Darlene Tong, eds, Performance Anthology: Source Book 
of Californian Performance Art. San Francisco: Last Gasp Press and 
Contemporary Arts Press, 1989. 
Barry, Judith and Sandy Flitterman-Lewis. "Textual Strategies: The Politics of Art-
Making." The Feminism and Visual Culture Reader. Ed. Amelia Jones. 
London & New York: Routledge, 2003. 
Beale, Alison, and Annette Van den Bosch, eds. Ghosts in the Machine: Women and 
182 
Cultural Policy in Canada and Austrailia. Toronto: Garamond Press, 1998. 
Becker, Carol. Zones of Contention: Essays on Art, Institutions, Gender, and Anxiety. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. 
Benjamin, Walter. "Theses on the Philosophy of History." Illuminations. London: 
Fontana Press, 1970. 
Bennett, Jill. Empathic Vision: Affect, Trauma, and Contemporary Art. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2005. 
Bennett, Tony. "Civic Laboratories: Museums, Cultural Objecthood, and the 
Governance of the Social", CRES Working Paper series, no. 2, University of 
Manchester and the Open University, 2005. 
Berlin, Isaiah. Political Ideas in the Romantic Age. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2006. 
Betterton, Rosemary. "Spaces of Memory: Photographic Practices of Home and Exile 
in the work of Breda Behan." n.padadoxa 13 (2004): 22-28. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. The Field of Cultural Production. Ed. Randal Johnson. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993. 
Bradbury, Ann. Textured Imprints: Images, Social Change, and Cultural Memory. MA 
Thesis. University of Toronto, 1997. 
Brecht, Bertolt. "Short Description of a New Technique of Acting which Produces an 
Alienation Effect." Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic. Ed. 
and Trans. John Willett. New York: Hill and Wang, 1994. 136-40. 
183 
Burger, Peter. Theory of the Avant-Garde. Tran. Michael Shaw. Theory and History of 
Literature series, Vol. 4. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. 1984. 
Burke, Edmund. On Taste. 1756. Vol. XXIV, Part 1. The Harvard Classics. New 
York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909-14. 
On the Sublime and Beautiful. 1756. Vol. XXIV, Part 2. The Harvard Classics. 
New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909-14. 
Brodzki, Bella and Celeste Schenck. "Introduction." Life/Lines: Theorizing Women's 
Autobiography. Eds. Bella Brodzki and Celeste Schenck. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988. 1-18. 
Buerkle, Darcy. "Historical Effacements: Facing Charlotte Salomon." Reading 
Charlotte Salomon. Eds. Michael Steinberg and Monica Bohm-Duchen. Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 2006. 73-87. 
Cain, Aaron. "What a Riot". Fuse, 32.3, 2009. 17. 
Canada Council. "Cultural Diversity: The Cornerstone of Canadian Society" 
"http://www.canadacouncil.ca/aboutus/Promotion/dkl 27306715935781250.htm 
Accessed June 5, 2012. 
----, "Equity Office Mandate" 
http://www.canadacouncil.ca/equity/lcl29113296673105666.htm 
Accessed June 5, 2012. 
Canadian Heritage. "Canada's Commitment to Cultural Diversity." 
http://www.pch.gc.ca/eng/1332871836953/1332872826975 
184 
Accessed June 5, 2012. 
"Museum Assistance Program" 
http://www.pch.gc.ca/eng/1268597502197 Accessed June 5, 2012 
Chadwick, Whitney. Women, Art, and Society. 2007. London: Thames and Hudson, 
2007. 
Claire, Marriette and Richard Johnson. "Method in our Madness: Identity and Power in 
a Memory Work Method." Memory and Methodology. Ed. Susannah Radstone. 
Oxford & New York: Berg, 2000. 
Connerton, Paul. How Societies Remember. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989. 
Crane, Susan A. ed. Museums and Memory. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press: 
Stanford, 2000. 
Craven, David. "Marxism and Critical Art History." A Companion to Art Theory. Eds. 
Paul Smith & Carolyn Wilde. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002. 
Cultural Memory Group. Remembering Women Murdered by Men: Memorials Across 
Canada. Toronto: Sumach Press, 2006. 
Danto, Arthur. After the End of Art. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. 
de Certeau, Michel. The Writing of History. Trans. Tom Conley. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1988. 
de Lauretis, Teresa. Technologies of Gender: Essays on Theory, Film, and Fiction. 
185 
Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987. 
du Gay, Paul et al. Doing Cultural Studies: The Story of the Sony Walkman. London: 
Sage Publications Ltd., 1997. 
Derrida, Jacques. "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences." 
Criticism: Major Statements. 3rd Ed. Eds. Charles Kaplan, William Anderson. 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991. 515-534. 
Ebert, Teresa L. Ludie Feminist and After: Postmodernism, Desire, and Labour in Late 
Capitalism. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1999. 
Edelman, Murray. From Art to Politics. Chicago & London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1995. 
Erll, Astrid & Ansgar Ni.inning. Cultural Memory Studies: An International and 
Interdisciplinary Handbook. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GMbH & Co., 2008. 
Florida, Richard. The Rise of the Creative Class. New York: Basic Books, 2002. 
Foster, Hal. The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture. New York: New Press, 
2002. 
Foucault, Michel. Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and 
Interviews. Ed. Donald Bouchard. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, 1977. 
Garretson, Tom. "The Sprinkle Story." 
http://anniesprinkle.org/about-annie/the-sprinkle-story/ Posted January 2003. 
Accessed June 9, 2012. 
186 
Gibbons, Joan. Contemporary Art and Memory: Images of Recollection and 
Remembrance. London & New York: LB. Tauris, 2007. 
Gopnik, Blake. "It's not about the horror." Globe and Mail. 24 Jun. 2000: RIO. 
Hall, Donald. Subjectivity. New York: Routledge Critical Idiom Series, 2004. 
Hall, Stuart. "The Work of Representation." Representation: Cultural Representations 
and Signifying Practices. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2003: 41-63. 
Hamlyn, Anne. "Textures of Memory." n.paradoxa: International Feminist Art 
Journal. 6 (2000): 40-43. 
Hegel, G.W.F. Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics. 1886. Trans. H. Paolucci. Ed. 
Michael Inwood. London: Penguin Books, 1993. 
Hein, Hilde. "The Role of Feminist Aesthetics in Feminist Theory." Feminism and 
Tradition in Aesthetics. Eds. Peggy Zeglin Brand and Carolyn Korsmeyer. 
University Park, PN: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995. 
Hirsch, Marianne. Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997. 
Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor M. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Ed. Gunzelin 
Schmid Noerr. Trans. Edmund Jesphcott. Standford, CA: Standford University 
Press, 2002. 
Hornstein, Shelley. "The Shape of Time and the Value of Art." Capital Culture: A 
187 
Reader on Modernist Legacies, State Institutions, and the Value(s) of Art. Ed. 
Jody Berland and Shelley Hornstein. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 2000. 218-232. 
Hume, David. "Of the Standard of Taste". 1757. Aesthetics: The Classic Readings. 
Ed. David E. Cooper. Blackwell Publishers, 1997. 76-93. 
Huyssen, Andreas. Twilight Memories. New York & London: Routledge, 1995. 
Jameson, Fredric. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981. 
----."Reflections in Conclusion." Aesthetics and Politics. Trans. Ronald Taylor. New 
York/London: Verso, 1977. 196-213. 
Jensen, Joan M. One Foot on the Rockies: Women and Creativity in the Modern 
American West. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995. 
Jones, Amelia, ed. The Feminism and Visual Culture Reader. London & New 
York: Routledge, 2003. 
Juno, A. & V. Vale, eds. Angry Women, Re/Search 13. New York: Juno Books, 1991. 
Kellner, Douglas. Media Culture: Cultural Studies, Identity, and Politics between the 
Modern and the Postmodern. London & NY: Routledge, 1995. 
Kistenberg, Cindy J. AIDS, Social Change, and Theater: Performance as Protest. 
New York & London: Gerland Publishing Inc., 1995. 
Klein, Naomi. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. Toronto: Vintage 
188 
Canada, 2008. 
Kratz, C.A. The Ones that are Wanted: Communication and the Politics of 
Representation in a Photographic Exhibition. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: 
University of California Press, 2002. 
Kristof, Nicholas D. and Sheryl WuDunn. "The Women's Crusade." New York Times 
Magazine, 7 pages 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/23/magazine/23 Women-t.html?pagewanted=3 
Kuhn, Annette, ed. Women's Pictures: Feminist and Cinema. London & New 
York: Verso, 1994. 
Leger, Dan. "Arts and Culture: Making the Case for Federal Cash." The Chronicle 
Herald (Halifax, NS) 4 July, 2011: A 7. 
Le Goff, Jacques. History and Memory. Trans. Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Claman. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 192. 
Lisus, Nicola A. and Richard V. Ericson. "Authorizing Art: The Effect of Multimedia 
Formats on the Museum Experience." The Canadian Review of Sociology and 
Anthropology. 36.2 May (1999): 199-216. 
Longinus. "On the Sublime". Apx. 3rd Century. Tran. A.O. Prickard. Criticism: 
Major Statements. Ed. Charles Kaplan and William Anderson. 3rd ed. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1991. 54-93. 
Lowenthal Felstiner, Mary. "Taking Her Life/History: The Autobiography and the 
Postulation of the Self." Life/Lines: Theorizing Women's Autobiography. Ed. 
189 
Bella Brodzki and Celeste Schenck. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. 
320-37. 
To Paint Her Life: Charlotte Salomon in the Nazi Era. New York: HarperCollins, 
1994. 
Lowith, Karl. Permanance and Change. Haum: Cape Town South Africa, 1969. 
Lyotard, Jean-Frarn;ois. "Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?" 
Postmodernism: A Reader. Ed. Thomas Docherty. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993. 38-46. 
Mack, John. Museums of the Mind: Art & Memory in World Cultures. The British 
Museum Press, 2003. 
Madagan, David. " 'So is all you're here in this world for to paint?'" Modern 
Painters. 11.4 Winter (1998): 76-9. 
Mann, Dennis Alan, ed. The Arts in a Democratic Society. Bowling Green University, 
Ohio: Popular Press, 1977. 
Marcuse, Herbert. The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics. 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1978. 
Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1960. 
Mark, Lisa Gabrielle. Wack! Art and the Feminist Revolution. Cambridge & London: 
MIT Press, 2007. 
Marx, Karl. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Trans. Martin Milligan. 
190 
New York: Prometheus Books, 1988. 
----."Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy." 1859. Supp. The German 
Ideology. Ed. C.J. Arthur. New York: International Publishers, 2001. 124-152. 
----."Marx to Ferdinand LaSalle in Berlin." 1859. Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, 
Collected Works. Vol. 40. 1856-1859. New York: International Publishers, 
1976. 418. 
Theories of Surplus-Value. Part 1. 1861. Trans. Emile Bums. London: 
Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., 1975. 
Marx, Karl & Engels, Fredrick. The German Ideology. 1845. Ed. C.J. Arthur. New 
York: International Publishers, 2001. 
Mason, Mary G. "The Other Voice: Autobiographies of Women Writers." Life/Lines: 
Theorizing Women's Autobiography. Ed. Bella Brodzki and Celeste Schenck. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. 19-44. 
Matriart: A Canadian Feminist Art Journal. 5.3 (1996) spec. issue entitled "Creating 
Memory" 
McCall, L. "The Complexity oflntersectionality". Signs. 30.3 (2005): 1771-1800. 
McMurtry, J.J. ed. Living Economics. Toronto: Edmond Montgomery Publications, 
2010. 
----."Social Economy as Political Practice", International Journal of Social Economics. 
31. 9 (2004): 868 - 878. 
McMurtry, J.J., Reed, Darryl. "Procurement: A People Centred Economy" Knowledge 
191 
Mobilization Paper Series. Canadian Social Economy Research Partnership, 
University of Victoria, July 2010. 
Meskimmon, Marsha. Women Making Art: History, Subjectivity, Aesthetics. London & 
NY: Routledge, 2003. 
Mohanty, Satya P. Literary Theory and the Claims of History: Postmodernism, 
Objectivity, Multicultural Politics. Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1 997. 
Mortimer-Sandilands, Catriona. "Landscape, Memory, and Forgetting" Material 
Feminisms. Eds. Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman. Bloomington & 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008. 265-290. 
Mulvey, Laura. Visual and Other Pleasures. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
Nagar, Richa and Amanda Lock Swarr. Critical Transnational Feminist Praxis. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Birth of Tragedy. 1872. Trans. Walter Kauffmann. New 
York: Modem Library, 1968. 
The Will to Power. 1901. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale. New 
York: Vintage, 1968. 
Twilight of the Idols. 1888. The Portable Nietzsche. Tran. Walter Kaufmann. 
New York: Viking, 1980. 
Nochlin, Linda. Women, Art, and Power. New York: Harper & Row, 1988. 
----. "Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?" ARTnews January (1971): 22-
192 
39, 67-71. 
Nochlin, Linda and Maura Reilly, eds. Global Feminisms: New Directions in 
Contemporary Art. London & New York: Merrell, 2007. 
Nora, Pierre. Les Lieux de Memoire. Paris: Gallimard, 1984. 
Ollick, Jeffrey K. and Joyce Robbins. "Social Memory Studies: From 'Collective 
Memory' to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices." Annual Review of 
Sociology. 24.1(1998):105-136. 
Ontario Art Council. "2008-2013 Strategic Plan." 
http://www.arts.on.ca/page525.aspx Accessed June 5, 2012. 
Opie, Peter and Iona Opie. "Sleeping Beauty." The Classic Fairy Tales. London: 
Oxford University Press, 1974. 81-92. 
Ortner, Sherry. Anthropology and Social Theory: Culture, Power and the Acting 
Subject Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2006. 
Plato, The Republic "Book X" Apx. 370 B.C. Tran. Benjamin Jowett. Criticism: 
Major Statements. Ed. Charles Kaplan and William Anderson. 3rd ed. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1991. 1-16 
Pollock, Griselda, and Victoria Turvey Sauron, eds. The Sacred and the Feminine: 
Imagination and Sexual Difference. London: LB. Tauris, 2007. 
Polyani, Karl. The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press, 1944. 
Radstone, Susannah. "Working with Memory: an Introduction." Memory and 
Methodology. Oxford & New York: Berg, 2000. 
193 
Reed, T.V. The Art of Protest: Culture and Activism from the Civil Rights Movement to 
the Streets of Seattle. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005. 
Rosenthal, Norman. "Charlotte Salomon's Life? or Theatre?: A 201h-century Song of 
Innocence and Experience." Life? or Theatre? Ed. Leila Vennewitz. Zwolle: 
Waanders Publishers; Amsterdam: Jewish Historical Museum; Amsterdam: 
Charlotte Salomon Foundation, 1998. 9-14. 
Rowland, Wade. Greed Inc. New York: Arcade Publishing, 2006. 
Rubenstein, Raphael. "Charlotte Salomon: A Visual Testament." Art in America. 
January (1999): 76-83, 114. 
Salomon, Charlotte. Life? or Theatre? Ed. Leila Vennewitz. Zwolle: Waanders 
Publishers; Amsterdam: Jewish Historical Museum; Amsterdam: Charlotte 
Salomon Foundation, 1998. 
Sandell, Richard. Museums, Prejudice, and the Reframing of Difference. Routledge: 
London and New York, 2007. 
Schenck, Celeste. "All of a Piece: Women's Poetry and Autobiography." Life/Lines: 
Theorizing Women's Autobiography. Ed. Bella Brodzki and Celeste Schenck. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. 281-305. 
Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education of Man. 1795. Tran. Reginald Snell. 
Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 2004. 
Schmetterling, Astrid. "Tracing the Life (or Theatre?) of Charlotte Salomon." Issues in 
Architecture, Art and Design 5.1 (1997-98): 115-28. 
194 
Shelley, Percy Bysshe. "A Defence of Poetry". 1840. Ed. John Shawcross. Criticism: 
Major Statements. Ed. Charles Kaplan and William Anderson. 3rd ed. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1991. 309-335. 
Shiner, Larry. The Invention of Art: A Cultural History. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2001. 
Simon, Roger et al. Between Hope and Despair: Pedagogy and the Remembrance of 
Historical Trauma. Lanham, Boulder, New York & Oxford: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000. 
Smith, Paul. Discerning the Subject. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1988. 
Smith, Phil. Cultural Theory: An Introduction. Malden: Basil Blackwell, 2001. 
Solinger, Rickie et al., eds. Telling Stories to Change the World. Routledge New York 
& London, 2008. 
Sommer, Doris. "'Not Just a Personal Story': Women's Testimonies and the Plural 
Self." Life/Lines: Theorizing Women's Autobiography. Ed. Bella Brodzki and 
Celeste Schenck. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. 107-30. 
Statistics Canada; Canada Council for the Arts Research and Evaluation Section. 
Statistics FAQ. http://www.canadacouncil.ca/publications _ e/fact_ sheets.htm 
Posted August 2010. Accessed July 13, 2011. 
Steinberg, Michale P. and Monica Bohm-Duchen, eds. Reading Charlotte Salomon. 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006. 
195 
Sturken, Marita. Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, The Aids Epidemic, and the 
Politics of Remembering. Berkeley: University California Press, 1997. 
Telegraph. "Everyone's an Artist, Anything can be Art." 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/4726169/Everyones-an-artist-anything-can-
be-art.html Posted October 20, 2001. Accessed February 20, 2012 
Toronto Star. "Ordinary Folks Don't Care About the Arts: Harper." September 24, 
2008. http://www.thestar.com/federalelection/article/504811--ordinary-folks-
don-t-care-about-arts-harper 
Van Alphen, Ernst. Caught by History: Holocaust Effects in Contemporary Art, 
Literature, and Theory. Stanford, CA: Standford University Press, 1997. 
----."Giving Voice: Charlotte Salomon and Charlotte Delbo." Reading Charlotte 
Salomon. Eds. Michael Steinberg and Monica Bohm-Duchen. Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2006. 114-125. 
Wark, Jayne. Radical Gestures: Feminism and Performance Art in North America. 
Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006. 
Wheeler, Michael. 
http://praxistheatre.com/2010/08/why-stephen-harper-will-continue- to-attack-
the-arts/ Posted August 25, 2010. Accessed February 20, 2012. 
Whitelaw, Anne. "Whiffs of Balsam, Pine and Spruce: Art Museums and the 
Production of a 'Canadian' Aesthetic." Capital Culture: A Reader on Modernist 
Legacies, State Institutions, and the Value(s) of Art. Ed. Jody Berland and 
196 
IT ----
Shelley Hornstein. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 
2000. 122-137. 
Woolf, Janet. "The Artists and the Flaneur: Rodin, Rilke, and Gwen John in Paris." 
Resident Alien: Feminist Cultural Criticism. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1995. 
Young, Pamela. "A Museum Reborn: The Art Gallery of Ontario Rises from the 
Ashes." Maclean 's 106 Feb. 1 (1993): 56. 
Zarecka, lwona-Irwin, Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective Memory. 
New Brunswick USA and London UK: Transaction Publishers, 1994. 
Zipes, Jack. Fairy Tales and the Art of Subversion: The Classical Genre for Children 
and the Process of Civilization. New York: Wildman Press, 1983. 
197 
A man like that demands that honourable 
women devote their entire time to him -
and, she went on to think: Gone is the 
dream of the singer if I join my life to his; 
so, although deeply touched, she 
remained firmly resolved not to marry 
him. To the tune: 'Paulinkaa, I love you, 
oh will you be my wife?' 
JHM no. 4182 
Mrs. Knarre does not cry, but her eyes 
seem to penetrate the profoundest depths 
of the world. From the topmost tips of her 
hair down to the farthest joints of her 
small feet, her grief spreads throughout 
her body. It transcends her own suffering. 
It is the suffering of the world, the 
suffering of the fate that Mrs. Knarre, nee 
Bend, has been elected to bear. MRS. 
KNARRE 'Now my little Franziska too.' 
JHM no. 4245 
Paulinka was very touched by this mournful 
recital, and even more so when her husband 
mentioned that his parents-in-law secretly 
accused him of being to blame for his first 
wife's suicide. Suddenly it seemed quite clear 
to her that, if there was any question at all of 
blame, it was solely the mother-in-law and 
mother who was to blame - the person who 
had stifled every natural impulse in her 
children by bringing them up to be stiff and 
formal, who had imposed the example of her 
own perfection on them in such a way that, in 
the certainty of their own imperfection and, 
on the other hand, impelled by strong natural 
instincts, they found themselves in such 
violent inner conflicts that their only escape 
was through death. Paulinka cannot rid 
herself of the thought that one day young 
Charlotte, likewise confronted by these 
doubts, might also throw herself out the 
window. 
JHM no. 4233 
And now the circle of her thoughts closes. 
At her parents' grave she begins to sing:' 
Why should I avoid the pathways where 
the other signposts stand? Looking for 
those hidden archways through that 
snowbound rocky land? Ne'er a soul have 
I deceived that I should shun my fellow 
man. What mad command have I received 
that would me to the desert ban? There's a 
signpost in that hollow that I clearly now 
discern. There's a pathway I must follow, 
there's a pathway I must follow from 
which no mortal shall return. And 
mentally she adds: 'And now I must 
return to my duty, to this man with this 
child.' 
JHM no. 4288 
Tune: 'And my husband loves me not. 
And my child, she needs me not. Why, oh 
why, am I alive? "So her thoughts ran in 
her mind.' 
JHM no. 4287 
'And I will be Professor. Don't disturb, 
please don't disturb me. And I will be 
Professor. 'MRS. KNARRE 'Ah yes, even 
when quite small she was very cheeky, 
often annoying her mother.' 
~' ~ 
--Ore 
_____'.\ 
\( .., J 
''1~~ 
~( 
PROFESSOR 'Be ever true and constant 
too, until beneath the sod, and waver not a 
finger's breadth from ways marked out by 
God.' 
JHM no. 4293 
'Then my sister and my brother's only 
daughter took their lives.' 
Out there in the forest there goes-there 
lives many a prince or princess-in the 
forest, there let us hearken. Sleep gently, 
Sleeping Beauty, how sweet you look!' 
JHM no. 4357 
STUDENTS AND PROFESSOR 
TOGETHER 'How beautiful our Barbara 
is!' 
'However, surely it would give your 
fiancee more pleasure if you were to 
devote more attention to her as she is now 
instead of staring at an ancient 
photograph of her.' 
JHM no. 4389 
Here you see him standing, like many a 
woman, at the window-so full of dreams-
so full of longing. 
'And again, when I saw these two 
pictures, I was reminded of the essay by 
that other young girl. She makes it very 
clear: when she is happy and begins to 
paint, bright colours and red and yellow 
dots flow from her brush, and when her 
mood is dark her colours turn dusky 
gray. And it should of course be noted 
that this applies regardless of the subject 
the artist has in mind. When, as in these 
two pictures, the spiritual mood at the 
moment of creation happens to coincide 
with the despair-filled theme, 'Death and 
the Maiden', the result, together with the 
optimistic 'Meadow with the Yellow 
Flowers', is- on a very minor scale of 
course-true art ... My discovery of the 
similarity between what young girls 
produce and what certain geniuses 
produce is completely justified. Like 
young girls .. .' 
JHM no. 4502 
After all his strenuous arguments, he 
would have expected a different reaction 
from Paulinka. DABERLOHN 'Let me 
shape you,)et me form you. That's all I 
ask, all I ask.' 
JHMno. 4642 
'Real painter's hands.' CHARLOTTE 'To 
me they're just ugly.' 
JHM no. 4641 
'Isn't it a absurd to address each other so 
formally? You're such a baby-here, let me 
hold your hand.' 
CHARLOTTE 'Please let go of me, you 
disgust me.' DABERLOHN 'Yes, my 
dear, that's something you'll have to get 
used to.' 
JHM no. 4654 
CHARLOTTE 'Oh, please, stay - I don't 
want you to go!' DABERLOHN 'No, let 
go of me. I must leave now.' 
:·.:!• JHM no. 4663 
JHM no. 4664 
·~ J Ei/tJ 
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) 
DABERLOHN 'I knew you were gifted.' 
DABERLOHN 'See? You already look 
like Botticelli's Venus! What progress!' 
VO:.· 
I 
GRANDFATHER 'I don't understand 
you. What's wrong with sharing a bed 
with me-when there's nothing else 
available? I'm in favour of what' 
natural.' CHARLOTTE 'Don't torment 
me. You know that I know exactly what I 
have to do.' 
JHM no. 4840 
'Young girls of a certain age need men.' 
CHARLOTTE 'I've never yet been 
interested in men, and I ask you once and 
for all to spare me that topic.' 
JHM no. 4920v 
CHARLOTTE 'You know, Grandpa, I 
have a feeling the whole world has to be 
put together again.' 
GRANDFATHER 'Oh, go ahead and kill 
yourself and put an end to all this 
babble!' 
JHM no. 4918v 
CHARLOTTE 'What's the racket?' 
GERMAN REFUGEE 'Quiet, ssh, 
You're Sainte Marie!' 
CHARLOTTE 'Get out of here!' 
JHM no. 4923r 
... might possibly preserve her from 
suicide inasmuch as she remembered 
one of Amadeus's favorite utterances: 
Love, know thyself first in order to 
love thy neighbour. And then: one has 
to go into oneself-into one's 
childhood-to be able to go out of 
oneself. And he felt that the movie 
was the machine of modem man as a 
means of going out of oneself. And 
finally she recalled the famous couple 
embracing under a bathrobe, 
functioning as one person 
All images are reprinted with permission from the Collection Jewish Historical 
Museum, Amsterdam. ( c) Charlotte Salomon Foundation. 
